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Title: An Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas
   of Beauty and Virtue, In Two Treatises
Author: Hutcheson, Francis (1694-1746)
Date of first publication: 1725
Edition used as base for this ebook:
   London: D. Midwinter, A. Bettesworth, and C. Hitch,
   J. and J. Pemberton, R. Ware, C. Rivington, F. Clay,
   A. Ward, J. and P. Knapto, T. Longman, R. Hett,
   and J. Wood, 1738 (fourth edition)
Date first posted: 23 March 2010
Date last updated: 23 March 2010
Project Gutenberg Canada ebook #507

This ebook was produced by: David T. Jones
& the Online Distributed Proofreading Team
at http://www.pgdpcanada.net

This file was produced from images generously made
available by the Internet Archive/Canadian Libraries




AN INQUIRY INTO THE
ORIGINAL of our IDEAS
OF BEAUTY _and_ VIRTUE,
In TWO TREATISES.

I. Concerning BEAUTY, ORDER, HARMONY, DESIGN.

II. Concerning MORAL GOOD and EVIL.

    *    *    *    *    *

The Fourth Edition, Corrected.

    *    *    *    *    *

      Itaque eorum ipsorum qu aspectu sentiuntur, nullum
      aliud animal pulchritudinem, venustatem, convenientiam
      partium sentit. Quam similitudinem natura ratioque ab
      oculis ad animum transferens, multo etiam magis
      pulchritudinem, constantium, ordinem in consiliis,
      factisque conservandum putat. Quibus ex rebus
      conflatur & efficitur id quod qurimus honestum: Quod
      etiamsi nobilitatum non sit, tamen honestum sit:
      quodque etiamsi  nullo laudetur, natur est
      laudabile. Formam quidem ipsam & tanquam faciem
      honesti vides, qu si oculis cerneretur, mirabiles
      amores excitaret sapienti. _Cic. de Off. lib. 1. c. 4._


    *    *    *    *    *

_LONDON_:


      Printed for D. Midwinter, A. Bettesworth, and C.
      Hitch, J. and J. Pemberton, R. Ware, C. Rivington, F.
      Clay, A. Ward, J. and P. Knapto, T. Longman, R. Hett,
      and J. Wood. X.DCC XXXVIII.


[Illustration: LOYAL DEVOIR]


TO His EXCELLENCY
_JOHN_,
Lord _CARTERET_,
Lord Lieutenant of _IRELAND_.


_May it please your Excellency_,

When I publish'd these Papers, I had so little Confidence of their
Success, that I was unwilling to own them; and what I was unwilling
myself to own, I durst not presume to inscribe to any great Name.

Your Excellency's favourable Reception of them, soon put me out of all
Fears about their Success with the wiser and better Part of the World;
and since this has given me Assurance to own them, I humbly presume to
inscribe them in this second Edition to your Excellency, that I may
have at once an Opportunity of expressing the sincerest Gratitude for
the Notice you were pleas'd to take of me, and have the Pleasure also
of letting the World know, that this small Work has your Excellency's
Approbation.

The Praise bestow'd by Persons of real Merit and Discernment, is
allow'd by all to give a noble and rational Pleasure. Your Excellency
first made me feel this in the most lively manner; and it will be a
Pleasure as lasting as it is great: 'twill ever be matter of the
highest Joy and Satisfaction to me, that I am Author of a Book my Lord
Carteret approves.

I know, my Lord, that much of your Commendation is to be attributed to
your own Humanity: You can intirely approve the Works of those alone,
who can think and speak on these Subjects as justly as Yourself; and
that is what few, if any, even of those who spend their Lives in such
Contemplations, are able to do. In the Conversation, with which your
Excellency has been pleas'd to honour me, I could not, I own, without
the utmost surprize, observe so intimate an Acquaintance with the most
valuable Writings of contemplative Men, Antient and Modern, so just a
Taste of what is excellent in the ingenious Arts, in so young a Man,
amidst the Hurry of an active Life. Forgive me, my Lord, that mention
this Part of your Character: 'tis so uncommon, that it deserves the
highest Admiration; and 'tis the only one which an obscure
Philosopher, who has receiv'd the greatest Obligations from your
Excellency, can with any Propriety take notice of.

Those other great Endowments which have enabled You, even in Youth, to
discharge the most difficult Employments, with the highest Honour to
Yourself, and Advantage to your Country, I dare not presume to
describe. He who attempts to do Justice to so great and good a
Character, ought himself to be one of uncommon Merit and Distinction:
And yet the ablest Panegyrist would find it difficult to add any
thing to your Excellency's Fame. The Voices of Nations proclaim your
Worth. I am,

         _May it please your Excellency_,
           _Your most obliged_,
             _Most obedient, and_
               _Most devoted humble Servant_,

Dublin,
_June 19_.
1725.

                   Francis Hutcheson.




    *    *    *    *    *

THE PREFACE.


_There no Part of_ Philosophy _of more Importance, than a_ just
Knowledge _of_ Human Nature, _and its various Powers and Dispositions.
Our late Inquirys have been very much employ'd about our_
Understanding, _and the several Methods of obtaining_ Truth. _We
generally acknowledge, that the Importance of any Truth is nothing
else than its Moment, or Efficacy to make Men happy, or to give them
the greatest and most lasting Pleasure; and_ Wisdom _denotes only a
Capacity of pursuing this End by the best Means. It must surely then
be of the greatest Importance, to have distinct Conceptions of this
End itself, as well as of the Means necessary to obtain it; that we
may find out which are the greatest and most lasting Pleasures, and
not employ our Reason, after all our laborious Improvements of it, in
trifling Pursuits. It is to be fear'd indeed, that most of our Studys,
without this Inquiry, will be of very little Use to us; for they seem
to have scarce any other Tendency than to lead us into speculative_
Knowledge _itself. Nor are we distinctly told how it is that_
Knowledge _or_ Truth _is pleasant to us._

_This Consideration put the_ Author _ of the following Papers upon
inquiring into the various Pleasures which_ Human Nature _is capable
of receiving. We shall generally find in our modern philosophick
Writings, nothing farther on this Head, than some bare Division of
them into_ Sensible, _ and_ Rational, _and some trite Common-place
Arguments to prove the_ latter _ more valuable than the_ former._ Our_
sensible Pleasures _are slightly pass'd over, and explained only by
some Instances in_ Tastes, Smells, Sounds, _or such-like, which Men of
any tolerable Reflection generally look upon as very trifling
Satisfactions. Our_ rational Pleasures _have had much the same kind of
Treatment. We are seldom taught any other Notion of rational Pleasure
than that which we have upon reflecting on our Possession of Claim to
those Objects, which may be Occasions of Pleasure. Such Objects we
call_ advantageous;_but_ Advantage,_ or_ Interest, _cannot be
distinctly conceiv'd, till we know what those Pleasures are which
advantageous Objects are apt to excite; and what Senses or Powers of
Perception we have with respect to such Objects. We may perhaps find
such an Inquiry of more Importance in_ Morals,_to prove what we call
the_ Reality of Virtue,_or that it is the_ surest Happiness _of the_
Agent,_ than one would at first imagine._

_In reflecting upon our_ external Senses, _we plainly see, that our
Perceptions of Pleasure or Pain do not depend directly on our_ Will.
_Objects do not please us, according as we incline they should. The
Presence of some Objects necessarily pleases us, and the Presence of
others as necessarily displeases us. Nor can we, by our_ Will, _any
otherwise procure Pleasure, or avoid Pain, than by procuring the
former kind of Objects, and avoiding the latter. By the very_ Frame
_of our_ Nature _the one is made the Occasion of Delight, and the
other of Dissatisfaction._

_The same Observation will hold in all our other Pleasures and Pains.
For there are many other sorts of Objects, which please, or displease
us as necessarily, as material Objects do when they operate upon our
Organs of Sense. There is scarcely any Object which our Minds are
employ'd about, which is not thus constituted the necessary Occasion
of some Pleasure or Pain. Thus we find ourselves pleas'd with a_
regular Form, _a Piece of_ Architecture _or_ Painting, _a Composition
of_ Notes, _a_ Theorem, _an_ Action, _ an_ Affection, _a_ Character.
_And we are conscious that this Pleasure necessarily arises from the
Contemplation of the Idea, which is then present to our Minds, with
all its Circumstances, altho' some of these Ideas have nothing of what
we commonly call sensible Perception in them; and in those which have,
the Pleasure arises from some_ Uniformity, Order, Arrangement,
Imitation; _and not from the simple Ideas of_ Colour, _or_ Sound, _or
Mode of_ Extension _ separately consider'd._

_These_ Determinations _to be pleas'd with any Forms, or Ideas which
occur to our Observation, the_ Author _chooses to call_ Senses;
_distinguishing them from the Powers which commonly go by that Name,
by calling our Power of perceiving the_ Beauty _of_ Regularity, Order,
Harmony, _ an_ Internal Sense; _and,/i> that Determination _to
approve_ Affections, Actions, _or_ Characters _of_ rational Agents,
_which we call_ virtuous, _ he marks by the Name of a_ Moral Sense.

_His principal Design is to shew, "That_ Human Nature _was not left
quite indifferent in the Affair of_ Virtue, _to form to itself
Observations concerning the_ Advantage, _or_ Disadvantage _of
Actions, and accordingly to regulate its Conduct." The Weakness of our
Reason, and the Avocations arising from the Infirmities and Necessitys
of our Nature, are so great, that very few Men could ever have form'd
those long Deductions of Reason, which shew some Actions to be in the
whole_ advantageous _to the_ Agent, _and their Contrarys_ pernicious._
The_ Author _of_ Nature _has much better furnish'd us for a virtuous
Conduct, than our_ Moralists _seem to imagine, by almost as quick and
powerful Instructions, as we have for the Preservation of our Bodys.
He has given us_ strong Affections _to be the Springs of each virtuous
Action; and made Virtue a lovely Form, that we might easily
distinguish it from its Contrary, and be made happy by the Pursuit of
it._

_This_ Moral Sense _of_ Beauty _in_ Actions _and_ Affections, _may
appear strange at first View. Some of our_ Moralists _themselves are
offended at it in my_ Lord Shaftesbury; _so much are they accustomed
to deduce every Approbation, or Aversion, from rational Views of
private_ Interest, (_except it be merely in the Simple Ideas of the
external Senses) and have such a Horror at_ innate Ideas, _which they
imagine this borders upon. But this_ moral Sense _has no relation to
innate Ideas, as will appear in the second Treatise. Our Gentlemen of_
good Taste, _can tell us of a great many_ Senses, Tastes, _and_
Relishes _for_ Beauty, Harmony, _ Imitation in_ Painting _and_ Poetry;
_and may not we find too in Mankind a_ Relish _ for a_ Beauty _in_
Characters, _in_ Manners? I doubt we have made_ Philosophy, _ as well
as_ Religion, _by our foolish management of it, so austere and
ungainly a Form, that a Gentleman cannot easily bring himself to like
it; and those who are strangers to it, can scarcely bear to hear our
Description of it. So much it is changed from what was once the
delight of the finest Gentlemen among the_ Antients, _and their
Recreation after the Hurry of publick Affairs!_

_In the first Treatise, the_ Author _ perhaps in some Instances has
gone too far, in supposing a greater Agreement of Mankind in their_
Sense _of_ Beauty, _ than Experience will confirm; but all he is
sollititous about is to shew, "That there is some_ Sense _of_ Beauty
natural _ to Men; that we find as great an Agreement of Men in their
Relishes of_ Forms, _as in their external Senses, which all agree to
be_ natural; _ and that Pleasure or Pain, Delight or Aversion, are_
naturally _ join'd to their Perceptions." If the Reader be convinc'd
of such_ Determinations _of the Mind to be pleas'd with_ Forms,
Proportions, Resemblances, Theorems; _it will be no difficult matter
to apprehend another _ superior Sense, natural _also to Men,
determining them to be pleas'd with _ Actions, Characters, Affections.
_This is the_ moral Sense, _which makes the Subject of the second
Treatise._

_The proper Occasions of Perception by the external Senses, occur to
us as soon as we come into the World; whence perhaps we easily look
upon these Senses to be_ natural: _but the Objects of the superior
Senses of_ Beauty _ and_ Virtue _generally do not. It is probably some
little time before Children reflect, or at least let us know that
they reflect upon_ Proportion _and _ Similitude; _upon_ Affections,
Characters, Tempers; _or come to know the external Actions which are
Evidences of them. Hence we imagine that their _ Sense _of_ Beauty,
_and their_ moral Sentiments _ of Actions, must be entirely owing to_
Instruction _and_ Education; _ whereas it is as easy to conceive, how
a_ Character, _a_ Temper, _as soon as they are observ'd, may be
constituted by_ Nature _the necessary Occasion of Pleasure, or an
Object of Approbation, as a_ Taste _or a_ Sound; _tho' these Objects
present themselves to our Observation sooner than the other._

_The first Impression of these Papers was so well receiv'd, that the_
Author _hopes it will be no Offence to any who are concern'd in the_
Memory _of the late_ Lord Viscount Molesworth, _if he lets his Readers
know that he was the Noble Person mention'd in the Preface to the
first Edition, and that their being publish'd was owing to his
Approbation of them. It was from him he had that shrewd Objection,
which the Reader may find in the_ first Treatise[1]; _besides many
other Remarks in the frequent Conversations with which he honour'd
the_ Author; _by which _ that Treatise _was very much improv'd beyond
what it was in the Draught presented to him. The_ Author _retains the
most grateful Sense of his singular Civilities, and of the Pleasure
and Improvement he receiv'd in his Conversation; and is still fond of
expressing his grateful Remembrance of him: but,_


     Id cinerem, & Manes credas curare sepultos?


_To be concern'd in this Book can be no Honour to a Person so justly
celebrated for the most generous Sentiments of_ Virtue _and_ Religion,
_deliver'd with the most manly Eloquence: yet it would not be just
toward the World, should the_ Author _conceal his Obligations to the
Reverend Mr._ Edward Syng; _not only for revising these Papers, when
they stood in great need of an accurate Review, but for suggesting
several just Amendments in the general Scheme of_ Morality. _The_
Author _was much confirm'd in his Opinion of the Justness of these
Thoughts, upon finding that this Gentleman had fallen into the same
way of Thinking before him; and will ever look upon his Friendship as
one of the greatest Advantages and Pleasures of his Life._

[Footnote 1: _Sect. 5. Art. 2. the last Paragraph._]

_To recommend the_ Lord Shaftesbury's _Writings to the World, is a
very needless Attempt. They will be esteem'd while any_ Reflection
_remains among Men. It is indeed to be wish'd, that he had abstain'd
from mixing with such Noble Performances, some Prejudices he had
receiv'd against _ Christianity; _a_ Religion _which gives us the
truest Idea of_ Virtue, _and recommends the_ Love _of_ God, _and of _
Mankind, _as the Sum of all_true Religion. _How would it have moved
the Indignation of that_ ingenious Nobleman, _ to have found a
dissolute Set of Men, who relish nothing in Life but the lowest and
most sordid Pleasures, searching into his_ Writings _for those
Insinuations against_ Christianity, _that they might be the less
restrained from their Debaucherys; when at the same time their low
Minds are incapable of relishing those noble Sentiments of_ Virtue _
and_ Honour, _which he has placed in so lovely a Light!_

_Whatever Faults the Ingenious may find with this Performance, the_
Author _hopes no body will find any thing in it contrary to_ Religion,
_or_ good Manners: _and he shall be well pleased, if he gives the
learned World an Occasion of examining more thoroughly these Subjects,
which are, he presumes, of very considerable Importance. The chief
Ground of his Assurance that his Opinions in the main are just, is
this, That as he took the first hints of them from some of the_
greatest Writers _of Antiquity, so the more he has convers'd with
them, he finds his Illustrations the more conformable to their
Sentiments._

_In the later Editions, what Alterations are made, are partly owing to
the Objections of some Gentlemen, who wrote very keenly against
several Principles in this Book. The_ Author _was convinc'd of some
inaccurate Expressions, which are now alter'd; and some Arguments, he
hopes, are now made clearer: but he has not yet seen Cause to renounce
any of the Principles maintain'd in it. Nor is there any thing of
Consequence added, except in_ Sect. II. _of_ Treatise 2d; _ and the
same Reasoning is found in _ Sect. I. _of_ the Essay on the Passions.

_In this 4th Edition there are Additions interspersed, to prevent
Objections which have been published against this Scheme by several
Authors; and some Mathematical Expressions are left out, which, upon
second Thoughts, appear'd useless, and were disagreeable to some
Readers._



    *    *    *    *    *

THE CONTENTS.


TREATISE I.

Sect. I. _Concerning some_ Powers _of_ Perception _
distinct from what is generally understood by_ Sensation.      Page 1

Sect. II. _Of_ original _or_ absolute Beauty.                      16

Sect. III. _Of the_ Beauty _of_ Theorems.                          30

Sect. IV. _Of_ relative _or_ comparative Beauty.                   39

Sect. V. _Concerning our Reasonings about_ Design _and_ Wisdom
_in the_ Cause, _from the_Beauty _or_ Regularity _of_ Effects.     46

Sect. VI. _Concerning the_ Universality _of our
_ Sense _of_ Beauty.                                               70

Sect. VII. _Concerning the Power of_ Custom, Education
_and_ Example, _as to our_ internal Senses.                        84

Sect. VIII. _Of the_ Importance _of the_ internal
Senses _in Life, and the_ final Causes _of them._                  93


TREATISE II.

Introduction.                                                     105

Sect. I. _Of the_ Moral Sense, _by which we perceive
_ Virtue _and_ Vice, _and approve, or disapprove
them in others._                                                  111

Sect. II. _Concerning the_ immediate Motive _to
_ virtuous Actions.                                               132

Sect III. _The_ Sense of Virtue, _and the_ various
Opinions _about it, reducible to_ one general Foundation.
_The Manner of computeing the_ Morality of Actions.               166

Sect. IV. _All Mankind agree in this_ general Foundation
_of their Approbation of_ moral Actions. _The Grounds
of_ different Opinions _about_ Morals.                            200

Sect. V. _A farther Confirmation that we have_ practical
Dispositions _to_ Virtue _implanted in our_ Nature:
_with a farther Explication of our_ Instinct _to_
Benevolence _in its various Degrees; with the_ additional
Motives _of_ Interest, _viz._ Honour, Shame, Pity.                218

Sect. VI. _Concerning the_ Importance _of this_ moral
Sense _to the present Happiness of Mankind, and its_
Influence _on human Affairs._                                     244

Sect. VII. _A Deduction of some_ complex moral Ideas, _viz.
of_ Obligation, _and_ Right, Perfect, Imperfect, _and_
External; Alienable _and_ Unalienable _from this_ moral Sense.    267




AN INQUIRY
into the Original of our Ideas of
Beauty _and_ Virtue.

    *    *    *    *    *




Treatise I.

_Of_ Beauty, Order, Harmony, Design.

    *    *    *    *    *




SECT. I.


     _Concerning some_ Powers _of_ Perception, _distinct
     from what is generally understood by_ Sensation.


To make the following Observations understood, it may be necessary to
premise some _Definitions_, and _Observations_, either universally
acknowledg'd, or sufficiently prov'd by many Writers both antient and
modern, concerning our Perceptions called _Sensations_, and the
Actions of the Mind consequent upon them.

[Sidenote: _Sensation._]

_Art._ I. Those _Ideas_ which are rais'd in the Mind upon the Presence
of external Objects, and their acting upon our Bodys, are call'd
_Sensations_. We find that the Mind in such Cases is passive, and has
not Power directly to prevent the Perception or Idea, or to vary it at
its Reception, as long as we continue our Bodys in a State fit to be
acted upon by the external Object.

[Sidenote: _Different Senses._]

II. When two Perceptions are intirely different from each other, or
agree in nothing but the general Idea of _Sensation_, we call the
Powers of receiving those different Perceptions, _different Senses_.
Thus _Seeing_ and _Hearing_ denote the different Powers of receiving
the Ideas of Colours and Sounds. And altho' Colours have great
Differences among themselves, as also have Sounds; yet there is a
greater Agreement among the most opposite Colours, than between any
Colour and a Sound: Hence we call all Colours Perceptions of the same
Sense. All the several Senses seem to have their distinct Organs,
except _Feeling_, which is in some degree diffus'd over the whole
Body.

[Sidenote: _The Mind how active._]

III. The Mind has a Power of _compounding_ Ideas, which were receiv'd
separately; of _comparing_ Objects by means of the Ideas, and of
observing their _Relations_ and _Proportions_; of _enlarging_ and
_diminishing_ its Ideas at Pleasure, or in any certain _Ratio_, or
Degree; and of considering _separately_ each of the simple Ideas,
which might perhaps have been impress'd jointly in the Sensation.
This last Operation we commonly call _Abstraction_.

[Sidenote: _Substances._]

IV. The Ideas of _Substances_ are compounded of the various simple
Ideas jointly impress'd, when they presented themselves to our Senses.
We define Substances only by enumerating these sensible Ideas. And
such Definitions may raise an Idea clear enough of the Substance in
the Mind of one who never immediately perceiv'd the Substance;
provided he has separately receiv'd by his Senses all the simple Ideas
which are in the Composition of the complex one of the Substance
defin'd: But if there be any simple Ideas which he has not receiv'd,
or if he wants any of the _Senses_ necessary for the Perception of
them, no Definition can raise any simple Idea which has not been
before perceiv'd by the _Senses_.

[Sidenote: _Education. Instruction._]

V. Hence it follows, "That when _Instruction_, _Education_, or
_Prejudice_ of any kind, raise any Desire or Aversion toward an
Object, this Desire or Aversion must be founded upon an Opinion of
some Perfection, or of some Deficiency in those _Qualitys_, for
Perception of which we have the proper Senses." Thus, if _Beauty_ be
desir'd by one who has not the Sense of _Sight_, the Desire must be
rais'd by some apprehended Regularity of _Figure, Sweetness_ of
_Voice, Smoothness_, or _Softness_, or some other Quality perceivable
by the other Senses, without relation to the Ideas of _Colour_.

[Sidenote: _Pleasure, Pain._]

VI. Many of our sensitive Perceptions are pleasant and many painful,
immediately, and that without any Knowledge of the Cause of this
Pleasure or Pain, or how the Objects excite it, or are the Occasions
of it; or without seeing to what farther Advantage or Detriment the
Use of such Objects might tend: Nor would the most accurate Knowledge
of these things vary either the Pleasure or Pain of the Perception,
however it might give a rational Pleasure distinct from the sensible;
or might raise a distinct Joy, from a Prospect of farther Advantage in
the Object, or Aversion, from an Apprehension of Evil.

[Sidenote: _Different Ideas._]

VII. The _simple Ideas_ rais'd in different Persons by the same
Object, are probably some way different, when they disagree in their
Approbation or Dislike; and in the same Person, when his _Fancy_ at
one time differs from what it was at another. This will appear from
reflecting on those Objects, to which we have now an Aversion, tho'
they were formerly agreeable: And we shall generally find that there
is some accidental _Conjunction_ of a disagreeable Idea, which always
recurs with the Object; as in those Wines to which Men acquire an
Aversion, after they have taken them in an Emetick Preparation, we are
conscious that the _Idea_ is alter'd from what it was when that Wine
was agreeable, by the Conjunction of the Ideas of Loathing and
Sickness of Stomach. The like Change of _Idea_ may be insensibly made
by the Change of our Bodys as we advance in Years, or when we are
accustomed to any Object, which may occasion an Indifference toward
Meats we were fond of in our Childhood; and may make some Objects
cease to raise the disagreeable Ideas, which they excited upon our
first use of them. Many of our simple Perceptions are disagreeable
only thro' the too great _Intenseness_ of the Quality: thus moderate
Light is agreeable, very strong Light may be painful; moderate Bitter
may be pleasant, a higher Degree may be offensive. A Change in our
Organs will necessarily occasion a Change in the _Intenseness_ of the
Perception at least; nay, sometimes will occasion a quite contrary
Perception: Thus a warm Hand shall feel that Water cold, which a cold
Hand shall feel warm.

We shall not find it perhaps so easy to account for the Diversity of
Fancy about more _complex Ideas_ of Objects, in which we regard many
Ideas of different Senses at once; as some Perceptions of those call'd
_primary Qualitys_, and some _secondary_, as explain'd by Mr. Locke:
for instance, in the different Fancys about _Architecture_,
Gardening, Dress_. Of the two former we shall offer something in Sect.
VI. As to _Dress_, we may generally account for the Diversity of
Fancys from a like Conjunction of Ideas: Thus, if either from any
thing in Nature, or from the Opinion of our Country or Acquaintance,
the fansying of _glaring Colours_ be look'd upon as an Evidence of
Levity, or of any other evil Quality of Mind; or if any _Colour or
Fashion_ be commonly us'd by Rusticks, or by Men of any disagreeable
Profession, Employment, or Temper; these additional Ideas may recur
constantly with that of the _Colour_ or _Fashion_, and cause a
constant Dislike to them in those who join the additional Ideas,
altho' the Colour or Form be no way disagreeable of themselves, and
actually do please others who join no such Ideas to them. But there
does not seem to be any Ground to believe such a Diversity in human
Minds, as that the same simple Idea or Perception should give Pleasure
to one and Pain to another, or to the same Person at different times;
not to say that it seems a Contradiction, that the same simple Idea
should do so.

[Sidenote: _Complex Ideas._]

VIII. The only Pleasure of Sense, which many Philosophers seem to
consider, is that which accompanys the simple Ideas of Sensation: But
there are far greater Pleasures in those complex Ideas of Objects,
which obtain the Names of _Beautiful_, _Regular_, _Harmonious_. Thus
every one acknowledges he is more delighted with a fine Face, a just
Picture, than with the View of any one Colour, were it as strong and
lively as possible; and more pleas'd with a Prospect of the Sun
arising among settled Clouds, and colouring their Edges, with a starry
Hemisphere, a fine Landskip, a regular Building, than with a clear
blue Sky, a smooth Sea, or a large open Plain, not diversified by
Woods, Hills, Waters, Buildings: And yet even these latter Appearances
are not quite _simple_. So in Musick, the Pleasure of _fine
Composition_ is incomparably greater than that of any one Note, how
sweet, full, or swelling soever.

[Sidenote: _Beauty._]

IX.Let it be observ'd, that in the following Papers, the Word _Beauty_
is taken for _the Idea rais'd in us_, and a _Sense_ of Beauty for _our
Power of receiving this Idea_.

[Sidenote: _Harmony_.]

_Harmony_ also denotes _our pleasant Ideas arising from Composition of
Sounds_, and a _good Ear_ (as it is generally taken) a _Power of
perceiving this Pleasure_. In the following Sections, an Attempt is
made to discover "what is the _immediate Occasion_ of these pleasant
Ideas, or what real Quality in the Objects ordinarily excites them."

[Sidenote: _Internal Sense._]

X. It is of no Consequence whether we call these Ideas of _Beauty_ and
_Harmony_, Perceptions of the _External Senses_ of Seeing and Hearing,
or not. I should rather choose to call our Power of perceiving these
Ideas, an Internal Sense, were it only for the Convenience of
distinguishing them from other Sensations of Seeing and Hearing, which
Men may have without Perception of _Beauty_ and _Harmony_. It is plain
from Experience, that many Men have, in the common Meaning, the Senses
of Seeing and Hearing perfect enough; they perceive all the _simple
Ideas_ separately, and have their Pleasures; they distinguish them
from each other, such as one Colour from another, either quite
different, or the stronger or fainter of the same Colour, when they
are plac'd beside each other, altho' they may often confound their
_Names_ when they occur apart from each other, as some do the Names of
_Green_ and _Blue_: they can tell in separate Notes the _higher_,
_lower_, _sharper_ or _flatter_, when separately sounded; in Figures
they discern the _Length_, _Breadth_, _Wideness_ of each Line,
Surface, Angle; and may be as capable of hearing and seeing at great
Distances as any Men whatsoever: And yet perhaps they shall find no
Pleasure in Musical Compositions, in Painting, Architecture, natural
Landskip; or but a very weak one in comparison of what others enjoy
from the same Objects. This greater Capacity of receiving such
pleasant Ideas we commonly call a _fine Genius_ or _Taste_: In Musick
we seem universally to acknowledge something like a distinct Sense
from the External one of Hearing, and call it a _good Ear_; and the
like Distinction we should probably acknowledge in other Objects, had
we also got distinct Names to denote these _Powers_ of Perception by.

[Sidenote: _Different from External._]

XI. We generally imagine the brute Animals endowed with the same sort
of Powers of Perception as our _External Senses_, and having sometimes
greater Acuteness in them: but we conceive few or none of them with
any of these sublimer Powers of Perception here call'd _Internal
Senses_; or at least if some of them have them, it is in a Degree much
inferior to ours.

There will appear another Reason perhaps hereafter, for calling this
Power of perceiving the Ideas of _Beauty_, an _Internal Sense_, from
this, that in some other Affairs, where our _External Senses_ are not
much concern'd, we discern a sort of Beauty, very like, in many
Respects, to that observ'd in sensible Objects, and accompany'd with
like Pleasure: Such is that _Beauty_ perceiv'd in _Theorems_, or
universal Truths, in _general Causes_, and in some _extensive
Principles_ of Action.

XII. Let one consider, first, That 'tis probable a Being may have the
full Power of External Sensation, which we enjoy, so as to perceive
each Colour, Line, Surface, as we do; yet, without the Power of
_comparing_, or of discerning the _Similitudes_ or Proportions: Again,
It might discern these also, and yet have no _Pleasure_ or Delight
accompanying these Perceptions. The bare Idea of the Form is something
separable from Pleasure, as may appear from the different _Tastes_ of
Men about the Beauty of Forms, where we don't imagine that they differ
in any Ideas, either of the Primary or Secundary Qualities.
_Similitude_, _Proportion_, _Analogy_, or _Equality_ of Proportion,
are Objects of the Understanding, and must be actually known before we
know the natural Causes of our Pleasure. But _Pleasure_ perhaps is not
necessarily connected with the Perception of them: and may be felt
where the Proportion is not known or attended to: and may not be felt
where the Proportion is observed. Since then there are such different
Powers of Perception, where what are commonly called the _External
Senses_ are the same; since the most accurate Knowledge of what the
External Senses discover, may often not give the Pleasure of Beauty or
Harmony, which yet one of a _good Taste_ will enjoy at once without
much _Knowledge_; we may justly use another Name for these higher and
more delightful Perceptions of Beauty and Harmony, and call the
_Power_ of receiving such Impressions, an _Internal Sense_: The
Difference of the Perceptions seems sufficient to vindicate the Use of
a different Name, especially when we are told in what Meaning the Word
is applied.

[Sidenote: _Its Pleasures necessary and immediate._]

This superior Power of Perception is justly called _a Sense_, because
of its Affinity to the other Senses in this, that the Pleasure is
different from any _Knowledge_ of Principles, Proportions, Causes, or
of the Usefulness of the Object; we are struck at the first with the
Beauty: nor does the most accurate _Knowledge_ increase this Pleasure
of Beauty, however it may superadd a distinct rational Pleasure from
Prospects of _Advantage_, or may bring along that peculiar kind of
Pleasure, which attends the Increase of Knowledge[2].

XIII. And farther, the Ideas of Beauty and Harmony, like other
sensible Ideas, are _necessarily_ pleasant to us, as well as
immediately so; neither can any Resolution of our own, nor any
_Prospect_ of Advantage or Disadvantage, vary the Beauty or Deformity
of an Object: For as in the external Sensations, no View of _Interest_
will make an Object grateful, nor View of _Detriment_, distinct from
immediate _Pain_ in the Perception, make it disagreeable to the Sense;
so propose the whole World as a _Reward_, or _threaten_ the greatest
Evil, to make us approve a deform'd Object, or disapprove a beautiful
one; Dissimulation may be procur'd by Rewards or Threatnings, or we
may in external Conduct abstain from any _Pursuit_ of the Beautiful,
and pursue the Deform'd; but our _Sentiments_ of the Forms, and our
_Perceptions_, would continue invariably the same.

[Footnote 2: See above, _Art._ 6.]

[Sidenote: _This Sense antecedent to, and distinct from Prospects of
Interest._]

XIV. Hence it plainly appears, "that some Objects are _immediately_
the Occasions of this Pleasure of Beauty, and that we have Senses
fitted for perceiving it; and that it is distinct from that _Joy_
which arises upon Prospect of Advantage." Nay, do not we often see
Convenience and Use neglected to obtain Beauty, without any other
Prospect of _Advantage_ in the beautiful Form, than the suggesting the
pleasant Ideas of Beauty? Now this shews us, that however we may
_pursue_ beautiful Objects from Self-love, with a View to obtain the
Pleasures of Beauty, as in Architecture, Gardening, and many other
Affairs, yet there must be a _Sense_ of Beauty, antecedent to
Prospects even of this Advantage, without which Sense these Objects
would not be thus _advantageous_, nor excite in us this Pleasure which
constitutes them advantageous. Our _Sense_ of Beauty from Objects, by
which they are constituted good to us, is very distinct from our
_Desire_ of them when they are thus constituted: Our _Desire_ of
Beauty may be counter-balanc'd by Rewards or Threatnings, but never
our _Sense_ of it; even as Fear of Death may make us desire a bitter
Potion, or neglect those Meats which the _Sense_ of Taste would
recommend as pleasant; but cannot make that Potion agreeable to the
_Sense_, or Meat disagreeable to it, which was not so antecedently to
this Prospect. The same holds true of the Sense of Beauty and Harmony;
that the _Pursuit_ of such Objects is frequently neglected, from
Prospects of Advantage, Aversion to Labour, or any other Motive of
Interest, does not prove that we have no _Sense_ of Beauty, but only
that our Desire of it may be counter-balanc'd by a stronger Desire.

XV. Had we no such _Sense_ of Beauty and Harmony, Houses, Gardens,
Dress, Equipage, might have been recommended to us as convenient,
fruitful, warm, easy; but never as _beautiful_: And yet nothing is
more certain, than that all these Objects are recommended under quite
different _Views_ on many Occasions: 'Tis true, what chiefly pleases
in the Countenance, are the Indications of _Moral Dispositions_; and
yet were we by the longest Acquaintance fully convinc'd of the best
Moral Dispositions in any Person, with that Countenance we now think
deform'd, this would never hinder our immediate Dislike of the Form,
or our liking other Forms more: And Custom, Education, or Example,
could never give us _Perceptions_ distinct from those of the Senses
which we had the Use of before, or recommend Objects under another
_Conception_ than grateful to[3] them. But of the Influence of Custom,
Education, Example, upon the Sense of Beauty, we shall treat below[4].

[Sidenote: _Beauty Original or Comparative._]

XVI. Beauty, in Corporeal Forms, is either _Original_ or
_Comparative_; or, if any like the Terms better, _Absolute_, or
_Relative_: Only let it be observ'd, that by _Absolute_ or _Original_
Beauty, is not understood any Quality suppos'd to be in the Object,
which should of itself be beautiful, without relation to any Mind
which perceives it: For Beauty, like other Names of sensible Ideas,
properly denotes the _Perception_ of some Mind; so _Cold_, _Hot_,
_Sweet_, _Bitter_, denote the Sensations in our Minds, to which
perhaps there is no Resemblance in the Objects, which excite these
Ideas in us, however we generally imagine otherwise. The Ideas of
Beauty and Harmony being excited upon our _Perception_ of some
_primary Quality_, and having relation to _Figure_ and _Time_, may
indeed have a nearer Resemblance to Objects, than these Sensations,
which seem not so much any _Pictures_ of Objects, as _Modifications_
of the perceiving Mind; and yet were there no Mind with a _Sense_ of
Beauty to contemplate Objects, I see not how they could be call'd
_Beautiful_. We therefore by [5]_Absolute_ Beauty understand only that
Beauty which we perceive in Objects without _Comparison_ to any thing
external, of which the Object is suppos'd an Imitation, or Picture;
such as that Beauty perceiv'd from the _Works of Nature_, _artificial
Forms_, _Figures_. _Comparative_ or _Relative_ Beauty is that which we
perceive in Objects, commonly considered as _Imitations_ or
_Resemblances_ of something else. These two Kinds of Beauty employ the
three following Sections.

[Footnote 3: _See Art. 5._]

[Footnote 4: _Sect. 7._]

[Footnote 5: _This Division of_ Beauty _is taken from the different_
Foundations _of Pleasure to our Sense of it, rather than from the
Objects themselves: for most of the following Instances of relative
Beauty have also absolute Beauty; and many of the Instances of
absolute Beauty, have also relative Beauty in some respect or other.
But we may distinctly consider these two_ Fountains _of Pleasure, _
Uniformity _in the Object itself, and_ Resemblance _to some
Original._]




SECT. II.


     _Of_ Original _or_ Absolute Beauty.


[Sidenote: _Sense of Men._]

I. Since it is certain that we have _Ideas_ of Beauty and Harmony, let
us examine what _Quality_ in Objects excites these Ideas, or is the
Occasion of them. And let it be here observ'd, that our Inquiry is
only about the _Qualitys_ which are beautiful to _Men_; or about the
Foundation of their Sense of Beauty: for, as was above hinted, Beauty
has always relation to the _Sense_ of some Mind; and when we
afterwards shew how generally the Objects which occur to us are
_beautiful_, we mean, that such Objects are agreeable to the Sense of
_Men_: for there are many Objects which seem no way beautiful to Men,
and yet other _Animals_ seem delighted with them; they may have
_Senses_ otherwise constituted than those of Men, and may have the
Ideas of Beauty excited by Objects of a quite different Form. We see
Animals fitted for every Place; and what to Men appears rude and
shapeless, or loathsome, may be to them a _Paradise_.

II. That we may more distinctly discover the general _Foundation_ or
Occasion of the Ideas of Beauty among Men, it will be necessary to
consider it first in its _simpler_ Kinds, such as occurs to us in
regular Figures; and we may perhaps find that the same Foundation
extends to all the more complex Species of it.

[Sidenote: _Uniformity with Variety._]

III. The Figures which excite in us the Ideas of Beauty, seem to be
those in which there is _Uniformity amidst Variety_. There are many
Conceptions of Objects which are agreeable upon other accounts, such
as _Grandeur_, _Novelty_, _Sanctity_ and some others, which shall be
mention'd hereafter[6]. But what we call Beautiful in Objects, to
speak in the Mathematical Style, seems to be in a compound _Ratio_ of
_Uniformity_ and _Variety_: so that where the _Uniformity_ of Bodys is
equal, the Beauty is as the _Variety_; and where the Variety is equal,
the Beauty is as the _Uniformity_. This will be plain from Examples.

[Sidenote: _Variety._]

First, the _Variety_ increases the Beauty in equal Uniformity. The
Beauty of an _equilateral Triangle_ is less than that of the _Square_;
which is less than that of a _Pentagon_; and this again is surpass'd
by the _Hexagon_. When indeed the Number of Sides is much increas'd,
the Proportion of them to the _Radius_, or _Diameter_ of the Figure,
or of the _Circle_, to which regular _Polygons_ have an obvious
Relation, is so much lost to our Observation, that the Beauty does not
always increase with the Number of Sides; and the want of Parallelism
in the Sides of _Heptagons_, and other Figures of odd Numbers, may
also diminish their Beauty. So in _Solids_, the _Eicosiedron_
surpasses the _Dodecaedron_, and thus the _Octaedron_, which is still
more beautiful than the _Cube_; and this again surpasses the regular
_Pyramid_: The obvious Ground of this, is greater _Variety_ with equal
_Uniformity_.

[Footnote 6: _See Sect. vi. Art. 11, 12, 13._]

[Sidenote: _Uniformity._]

The greater _Uniformity_ increases the _Beauty_ amidst equal
_Variety_, in these Instances: An Equilateral _Triangle_, or even an
_Isosceles_, surpasses the _Scalenum_: A _Square_ surpasses the
_Rhombus_ or _Lozenge_, and this again the _Rhomboides_, which is
still more beautiful than the _Trapezium_, or any Figure with
irregular curve Sides. So the _regular_ Solids surpass all other
Solids of equal number of plain Surfaces: And the same is observable
not only in the Five perfectly _regular_ Solids, but in all those
which have any considerable _Uniformity_, as _Cylinders_, _Prisms_,
_Pyramids_, _Obelisks_; which please every Eye more than any rude
Figures, where there is no _Unity_ or Resemblance among the Parts.

[Sidenote: _Compound Ratio._]

Instances of the compound _Ratio_ we have in comparing _Circles_ or
_Spheres_, with _Ellipses_ or _Spheroides_ not very eccentric; and in
comparing the _compound_ Solids, the _Exoctaedron_, and
_Eicosidodecaedron_, with the perfectly _regular_ ones of which they
are compounded: and we shall find, that the want of that most perfect
_Uniformity_ observable in the latter, is compensated by the greater
_Variety_ in the former, so that the _Beauty_ is nearly equal.

IV. These Observations would probably hold true for the most part, and
might be confirm'd by the Judgment of Children in the _simpler_
Figures, where the _Variety_ is not too great for their Comprehension.
And however uncertain some of the particular aforesaid Instances may
seem, yet this is perpetually to be observ'd, that Children are fond
of all _regular_ Figures in their little Diversions, altho' they be no
more convenient, or useful for them, than the Figures of our common
Pebbles: We see how early they discover a _Taste_ or Sense of
_Beauty_, in desiring to see Buildings, regular Gardens, or even
Representations of them in Pictures of any kind.

[Sidenote: _Beauty of_ Nature.]

V. The same Foundation we have for our Sense of _Beauty_, in the Works
of Nature. In every Part of the World which we call _Beautiful_, there
is a surprizing _Uniformity_ amidst an almost infinite _Variety_. Many
Parts of the Universe seem not at all design'd for the Use of Man;
nay, it is but a very small Spot with which we have any Acquaintance.
The _Figures_ and _Motions_ of the great Bodys are not obvious to our
Senses, but found out by Reasoning and Reflection, upon many long
Observations: and yet as far as we can by Sense discover, or by
_Reasoning_ enlarge our Knowledge, and extend our Imagination, we
generally find their Structure, Order, and Motion, agreeable to our
Sense of _Beauty_. Every particular Object in _Nature_ does not indeed
appear _beautiful_ to us; but there is a great Profusion of _Beauty_
over most of the Objects which occur either to our Senses, or
Reasonings upon Observation: For, not to mention the apparent
Situation of the heavenly Bodys in the Circumference of a great
Sphere, which is wholly occasion'd by the Imperfection of our Sight in
discerning Distances; the Forms of all the great Bodys in the Universe
are nearly _Spherical_; the _Orbits_ of their Revolutions generally
_Elliptick_, and without great Eccentricity, in those which
continually occur to our Observation: now these are Figures of great
_Uniformity_, and therefore pleasing to us.

Further, to pass by the less obvious _Uniformity_ in the Proportion of
their _Quantitys_ of Matter, _Distances_, _Times_, of revolving, to
each other; what can exhibit a greater Instance of _Uniformity, amidst
Variety_, than the constant Tenour of Revolutions in nearly equal
Times, in each _Planet_, around its Axis, and the central Fire or Sun,
thro' all the Ages of which we have any Records, and in nearly the
same Orbit? Thus after certain Periods, all the same Appearances are
again renew'd; the alternate Successions of _Light_ and _Shade_, or
_Day_ and _Night_, constantly pursuing each other around each
_Planet_, with an agreeable and regular Diversity in the Times they
possess the several Hemispheres, in the _Summer_, _Harvest_, _Winter_,
and _Spring_; and the various _Phases_, _Aspects_, and _Situations_,
of the _Planets_ to each other, their _Conjunctions_ and
_Oppositions_, in which they suddenly darken each other with their
Conick Shades in Eclipses, are repeated to us at their fixed Periods
with invariable Constancy: These are the _Beautys_ which charm the
_Astronomer_, and make his tedious Calculations pleasant.


     _Molliter austerum studio fallente laborem._[7]


[Footnote 7: Hor. Lib. 2. Sat. 2. v. 12.]

[Sidenote: _Earth._]

VI. Again, as to the dry Part of the Surface of our Globe, a great
Part of which is cover'd with a very pleasant inoffensive Colour, how
_beautifully_ is it diversify'd with various Degrees of _Light_ and
_Shade_, according to the different Situations of the the Parts of
its Surface, in _Mountains_, _Valleys_, _Hills_, and open _Plains_,
which are variously inclin'd toward the great Luminary!

[Sidenote: _Plants._]

VII. If we descend to the minuter Works of Nature, what great
_Uniformity_ among all the Species of _Plants_ and _Vegetables_ in the
manner of their Growth and Propagation! how near the Resemblance among
all the Plants of the same Species, whose Numbers surpass our
Imagination! And this _Uniformity_ is not only observable in the Form
in gross; (nay, in this it is not so very exact in all Instances) but
in the Structure of their minutest Parts, which no Eye unassisted with
Glasses can discern. In the almost infinite Multitude of _Leaves_,
_Fruit_, _Seed_, _Flowers_ of any one Species, we often see a very
great _Uniformity_ in the Structure and Situation of the smallest
Fibres. This is the _Beauty_ which charms an ingenious _Botanist_.
Nay, what great _Uniformity_ and Regularity of Figure is found in each
particular _Plant_, _Leaf_, or _Flower_! In all Trees and most of the
smaller Plants, the Stalks or Trunks are either _Cylinders_ nearly, or
regular _Prisms_; the Branches similar to their several Trunks,
arising at nearly regular Distances, when no Accidents retard their
natural Growth: In one _Species_ the Branches arise in Pairs on the
opposite Sides; the perpendicular Plain of Direction of the
immediately superior Pair, intersecting the Plain of Direction of the
inferior, nearly at right Angles: In another _Species_, the Branches
spring singly, and alternately, all around in nearly equal Distances:
And the Branches in other _Species_ sprout all in Knots around the
Trunk, one for each Year. And in each _Species_, all the Branches in
the first Shoots preserve the same Angles with their Trunk; and they
again sprout out into smaller Branches exactly after the Manner of
their Trunks. Nor ought we to pass over that great _Unity_ of Colours
which we often see in all the Flowers of the same Plant or Tree, and
often of a whole Species; and their exact Agreement in many shaded
Transitions into opposite Colours, in which all the Flowers of the
same Plant generally agree, nay, often all the Flowers of a Species.

[Sidenote: _Animals._]

VIII. Again, as to the _Beauty_ of _Animals_, either in their inward
Structure, which we come to the Knowledge of by Experiment and long
Observation, or their outward Form, we shall find surprizing
_Uniformity_ among all the Species which are known to us, in the
Structure of those Parts, upon which Life depends more immediately.
And how amazing is the _Unity_ of Mechanism, when we shall find an
almost infinite Diversity of Motions, all their Actions in _walking_,
_running_, _flying_, _swimming_; all their serious Efforts for
_Self-preservation_, all their freakish _Contortions_ when they are
gay and sportful, in all their various Limbs, perform'd by one simple
Contrivance of a contracting _Muscle_, apply'd with inconceivable
Diversitys to answer all these Ends! Various Engines might have
obtain'd the same Ends; but then there had been less _Uniformity_, and
the _Beauty_ of our Animal Systems, and of particular Animals, had
been much less, when this surprizing _Unity_ of Mechanism had been
remov'd from them.

IX. Among Animals of the same Species, the _Unity_ is very obvious,
and this Resemblance is the very Ground of our ranking them in such
_Classes_ or _Species_, notwithstanding the great Diversitys in Bulk,
Colour, Shape, which are observ'd even in those call'd of the same
Species. And then in each Individual, how universal is that _Beauty_
which arises from the exact Resemblance of all the external double
Members to each other, which seems the universal Intention of Nature,
when no Accident prevents it! We see the Want of this Resemblance
never fails to pass for an Imperfection, and Want of _Beauty_, tho' no
other Inconvenience ensues; as when the Eyes are not exactly like, or
one Arm or Leg is a little shorter or smaller than its fellow.

As to that most powerful Beauty in _Countenances_, _Airs_, _Gestures_,
_Motion_, we shall shew in the second Treatise[8], that it arises from
some imagin'd _Indication_ of morally good Dispositions of Mind. In
Motion there is also a natural Beauty, when at fixed Periods like
Gestures and Steps are regularly repeated, suiting the Time and Air of
Music, which is observed in regular Dancing.

[Footnote 8: _Sect. vi. _Art. 3._]

[Sidenote: _Proportion._]

X. There is a farther _Beauty_ in Animals, arising from a certain
_Proportion_ of the various Parts to each other, which still pleases
the Sense of Spectators, tho' they cannot calculate it with the
Accuracy of a _Statuary_. The _Statuary_ knows what Proportion of each
Part of the _Face_ to the whole _Face_ is most agreeable, and can tell
us the same of the Proportion of the _Face_ to the _Body_, or any
Parts of it; and between the _Diameters_ and _Lengths_ of each Limb:
When this Proportion of the Head to the Body is remarkably alter'd, we
shall have a _Giant_ or a _Dwarf_. And hence it is, that either the
one or the other may be represented to us even in _Miniature_, without
relation to any external Object, by observing how the Body surpasses
the Proportion it should have to the Head in _Giants_, and falls
below it in _Dwarfs_. There is a farther _Beauty_ arising from that
Figure, which is a natural Indication of _Strength_; but this may be
pass'd over, because probably it may be alledg'd, that our Approbation
of this Shape flows from an Opinion of _Advantage_, and not from the
Form it self.

The _Beauty_ arising from Mechanism, apparently adapted to the
Necessities and Advantages of any Animal; which pleases us, even tho'
there be no Advantage to our selves ensuing from it; will be
consider'd under the Head of _Relative Beauty_, or _Design_.[9]

[Footnote 9: _See Sect. iv. Art. 7._]

[Sidenote: _Fowls._]

XI. The peculiar _Beauty_ of _Fowls_ can scarce be omitted, which
arises from the great _Variety_ of Feathers, a curious Sort of
Machines adapted to many admirable Uses, which retain a considerable
Resemblance in their Structure among all the Species; and a perfect
_Uniformity_ in those of the same Species in the corresponding Parts,
and in the two Sides of each Individual; besides all the _Beauty_ of
lively Colours and gradual Shades, not only in the external Appearance
of the Fowl, resulting from an artful Combination of shaded Feathers,
but often visible even in one Feather separately.

[Sidenote: _Fluids._]

XII. If our Reasonings about the _Nature_ of _Fluids_ be just, the
vast Stores of _Water_ will give us an Instance of _Uniformity_ in
_Nature_ above Imagination, when we reflect upon the almost infinite
Multitude of small, polish'd, smooth Spheres, which must be suppos'd
form'd in all the Parts of this Globe. The same _Uniformity_ there is
probably among the Parts of other _Fluids_ as well as Water; and the
like must be observ'd in several other natural Bodys, as _Salts_,
_Sulphurs_, and such like; whose uniform Propertys do probably depend
upon an _Uniformity_ in the Figures of their Parts.

[Sidenote: _Harmony._]

XIII. Under _Original Beauty_ we may include _Harmony_, or _Beauty of
Sound_, if that Expression can be allow'd, because _Harmony_ is not
usually conceiv'd as an Imitation of any thing else. _Harmony_ often
raises Pleasure in those who know not what is the Occasion of it: And
yet the Foundation of this Pleasure is known to be a sort of
_Uniformity_. When the several Vibrations of one Note regularly
coincide with the Vibrations of another, they make an agreeable
Composition; and such Notes are call'd _Concords_. Thus the Vibrations
of any one Note coincide in _Time_ with two Vibrations of its
_Octave_; and two Vibrations of any Note coincide with three of its
_Fifth_; and so on in the rest of the _Concords_. Now no _Composition_
can be harmonious, in which the Notes are not, for the most part,
dispos'd according to these natural Proportions. Besides which, a due
Regard must be had to the _Key_, which governs the whole, and to the
_Time_ and _Humour_, in which the Composition is begun: a frequent and
inartificial _Change_ of any of which will produce the greatest, and
most unnatural _Discord_. This will appear, by observing the
_Dissonance_ which would arise from tacking Parts of different Tunes
together as one, altho' both were separately agreeable. A like
_Uniformity_ is also observable among the _Bases_, _Tenors_, _Trebles_
of the same Tune.

There is indeed observable, in the best Compositions, a mysterious
Effect of _Discords_: They often give as great Pleasure as continu'd
Harmony; whether by refreshing the Ear with _Variety_, or by awakening
the Attention, and enlivening the Relish for the succeeding Harmony of
Concords, as Shades enliven and beautify Pictures, or by some other
means not yet known: Certain it is, however, that they have their
Place, and some good Effect in our best Compositions. Some other
Powers of _Musick_ may be consider'd hereafter[10].

[Footnote 10: _See Sect. vi. Art. 12._]

XIV. But in all these instances of[11] _Beauty_ let it be observ'd,
That the Pleasure is communicated to those who never reflected on this
general Foundation; and that all here alledg'd is this, "That the
pleasant Sensation arises only from Objects, in which there is
_Uniformity amidst Variety_:" We may have the Sensation without
knowing what is the Occasion of it; as a Man's _Taste_ may suggest
Ideas of Sweets, Acids, Bitters, tho' he be ignorant of the _Forms_ of
the small Bodys, or their Motions, which excite these Perceptions in
him.

[Footnote 11: _There is nothing singular in applying the Word_ Beauty
_to Sounds. The Antients observe the peculiar Dignity of the Senses of
Seeing and Hearing, that in their Objects we discern the [Greek:
Kalon], which we don't ascribe to the Objects of the other Senses._]




SECT. III.

     _Of the_ Beauty _of_ Theorems.


[Sidenote: _Theorems_.]

I. The Beauty of _Theorems_, or universal Truths demonstrated,
deserves a distinct Consideration, being of a Nature pretty different
from the former kinds of _Beauty_; and yet there is none in which we
shall see such an amazing _Variety_ with _Uniformity_: and hence
arises a very great Pleasure distinct from Prospects of any farther
Advantage.

II. For in one _Theorem_ we may find included, with the most exact
Agreement, an infinite Multitude of particular Truths; nay, often a
Multitude of Infinites: so that altho' the Necessity of forming
abstract Ideas, and universal _Theorems_ arises perhaps from the
Limitation of our Minds, which cannot admit an infinite Multitude of
singular Ideas or Judgments at once, yet this Power gives us an
Evidence of the Largeness of the human Capacity above our Imagination.
Thus, for instance, the 47^{_th_} Proposition of the first _Book_ of
Euclid's _Elements_ contains an infinite Multitude of Truths,
concerning the infinite possible _Sizes_ of right-angled _Triangles_,
as you make the _Area_ greater or less; and in each of these _Sizes_
you may find an infinite Multitude of dissimilar _Triangles_, as you
vary the Proportion of the _Base_ to the _Perpendicular_; all which
Infinites agree in the general _Theorem_. In _Algebraick_, and
_Fluxional Calculations_, we shall find a like _Variety_ of particular
_Truths_ included in general _Theorems_; not only in general
_Equations_ applicable to all Kinds of _Quantity_, but in more
particular Investigations of _Areas_ and _Tangents_: In which one
Manner of Operation shall discover _Theorems_ applicable to many
_Orders_ or _Species_ of _Curves_, to the infinite _Sizes_ of each
Species, and to the infinite _Points_ of the innumerable _Individuals_
of each Size.

[Sidenote: _Foundation of their Beauty._]

III. That we may the better discern this Agreement, or _Unity_ of an
Infinity of Objects, in the general _Theorem_, to be the Foundation of
the _Beauty_ or _Pleasure_ attending their Discovery, let us compare
our Satisfaction in such Discoveries, with the uneasy State of Mind
when we can only measure Lines, or Surfaces, by a Scale, or are making
Experiments which we can reduce to no general _Canon_, but are only
heaping up a Multitude of particular incoherent Observations. Now each
of these Trials discovers a new Truth, but with no Pleasure or
_Beauty_, notwithstanding the _Variety_, till we can discover some
sort of _Unity_, or reduce them to some general Canon.

[Sidenote: _Little Beauty in Axioms._]

IV. Again, Let us take a Metaphysical Axiom, such as this, _Every
Whole is greater than its Part_; and we shall find no _Beauty_ in the
Contemplation. For tho' this Proposition contains many Infinitys of
particular Truths; yet the _Unity_ is inconsiderable, since they all
agree only in a vague, undetermin'd Conception of _Whole_ and _Part_,
and in an indefinite Excess of the former above the latter, which is
sometimes great and sometimes small. So, should we hear that the
_Cylinder_ is greater than the inscrib'd _Sphere_, and this again
greater than the _Cone_ of the same Altitude, and Diameter of the
Base, we shall find no Pleasure in this Knowledge of a general
Relation of greater and less, without any precise Difference or
Proportion. But when we see the universal exact Agreement of all
possible Sizes of such Systems of Solids, that they preserve to each
other the constant _Ratio_ of 3, 2, 1; how beautiful is the _Theorem_,
and how are we ravish'd with its first Discovery!

[Sidenote: _Easy Theorems._]

We may likewise observe, that _easy_ or _obvious_ Propositions, even
where the _Unity_ is sufficiently distinct and determinate, do not
please us so much as those, which being less obvious, give us some
_Surprize_ in the Discovery: Thus we find little Pleasure in
discovering, that _a Line bisecting the vertical Angle of an Isosceles
Triangle, bisects the Base_, or the _Reverse_; or, that _Equilateral
Triangles are Equiangular_. These Truths we almost know _Intuitively_,
without Demonstration: They are like common _Goods_, or those which
Men have long possessed, which do not give such sensible Joys as much
smaller new _Additions_ may give us. But let none hence imagine, that
the sole Pleasure of Theorems is from _Surprize_; for the same
_Novelty_ of a single Experiment does not please us much: nor ought we
to conclude from the greater Pleasure accompanying a _new_, or
_unexpected_ Advantage, that _Surprize_, or _Novelty_, is the only
Pleasure of Life, or the only Ground of Delight in _Truth_. Another
kind of Surprize in certain Theorems increases our Pleasure above that
we have in Theorems of greater Extent; when we discover a _general
Truth_, which upon some confused Notion we had reputed false: as that
_Asymptotes always approaching should never meet the Curve_. This is
like the Joy of unexpected Advantage where we dreaded Evil. But still
the _Unity_ of many Particulars in the general Theorem is necessary to
give Pleasure in any Theorem.

[Sidenote: _Corollarys._]

V. There is another _Beauty_ in Propositions, when one _Theorem_
contains a great Multitude of Corollarys easily deducible from it.
Thus there are some leading, or fundamental Propertys, upon which a
long Series of Theorems can be naturally built: Such a _Theorem_ is
the 35th of the 1st _Book_ of Euclid, from which the whole Art of
measuring right-lin'd Areas is deduced, by Resolution into
_Triangles_, which are the Halfs of so many _Parallelograms_; and
these are each respectively equal to so many _Rectangles_ of the
_Base_ into the perpendicular _Altitude_: The 47th of the 1st _Book_
is another of like _Beauty_, and so are many others, in higher Parts
of Geometry. In the Search of _Nature_ there is the like _Beauty_ in
the Knowledge of some great _Principles_, or universal _Forces_, from
which innumerable Effects do flow. Such is _Gravitation_, in Sir Isaac
Newton's Scheme. What is the Aim of our ingenious Geometers? A
continual Inlargement of Theorems, or making them extensive, shewing
how what was formerly known of one Figure extends to many others, to
Figures very unlike the former in Appearance.

It is easy to see how Men are charm'd with the _Beauty_ of such
Knowledge, besides its Usefulness; and how this sets them upon
deducing the Propertys of each Figure from one _Genesis_, and
demonstrating the mechanick Forces from one _Theorem_ of the
Composition of Motion; even after they have sufficient Knowledge and
Certainty in all these Truths from distinct independent
Demonstrations. And this Pleasure we enjoy even when we have no
Prospect of obtaining any other _Advantage_ from such Manner of
Deduction, than the immediate Pleasure of contemplating the _Beauty_:
nor could Love of _Fame_ excite us to such regular Methods of
Deduction, were we not conscious that Mankind are pleas'd with them
immediately, by this _internal Sense_ of their _Beauty_.

[Sidenote: _Fantastick Beauty._]

It is no less easy to see into what absurd Attempts Men have been led
by this Sense of _Beauty_, and an Affectation of obtaining it in the
other Sciences as well as the _Mathematicks_. 'Twas this probably
which set Descartes on that hopeful Project of deducing all human
Knowledge from one Proposition, _viz._ _Cogito, ergo sum_; while
others pleaded, that _Impossibile est idem simul esse & non esse_, had
much fairer Pretensions to the Style and Title of _Principium human
Cognitionis absolut primum_. Mr. Leibnitz had an equal Affection for
his favourite Principle of _sufficient Reason_ for every thing in
_Nature_, and boasts of the Wonders he had wrought in the intellectual
World by its Assistance. If we look into particular Sciences, we see
the Inconveniences of this Love of _Uniformity_. How aukwardly does
Puffendorf deduce the several Dutys of Men to _God_, _themselves_, and
their _Neighbours_, from his single fundamental Principle of
_Sociableness to the whole Race of Mankind_? This Observation is a
strong Proof, that Men perceive the _Beauty of Uniformity_ in the
Sciences, since they are led into unnatural Deductions by pursuing it
too far.

VI. This Delight which accompanys Sciences, or universal _Theorems_,
may really be call'd a kind of _Sensation_; since it necessarily
accompanys the Discovery of any Proposition, and is distinct from bare
Knowledge itself[12], being most violent at first, whereas the
Knowledge is uniformly the same. And however Knowledge inlarges the
_Mind_, and makes us more capable of comprehensive Views and Projects
in some kinds of Business, whence _Advantage_ may also arise to us;
yet we may leave it in the Breast of every Student to determine,
whether he has not often felt this Pleasure without any such Prospect
of Advantage from the Discovery of his _Theorem_. All which can thence
be inferr'd is only this, that as in our external Senses, so in our
_internal_ ones, the pleasant Sensations generally arise from those
Objects which calm Reason would have recommended, had we understood
their Use, and which might have engag'd our Pursuits from
_Self-interest_.

[Footnote 12: Aristotle (Ethic. Nicom. l. 10. c. 3.) _justly observes,
that we have certain natural Propensitys to certain Actions, or to the
Exercise of certain natural Powers, without a View to, or Intention
of, obtaining those Pleasures which naturally accompany them._

[Greek: peri polla spoudn poisaimetha
an, kai ei mdemian heipheroi don, hoion oran, mnmoneuein, eidenai,
tas aretas echein ei d' ex anagks epontai toutois donai, ouden
diapherei eloimetha gar an tauta, kai ei m genoit an autn don.]

[Translation: "Also there are many things which we should be eager to
possess even if they brought us no pleasure, for instance sight,
memory, knowledge, virtue. It may be the case that these things are
necessarily attended by pleasure, but that makes no difference; for we
should desire them even if no pleasure resulted from them."]]

[Sidenote: _Works of Art._]

VII. As to the Works of Art, were we to run thro' the various
artificial Contrivances or Structures, we should constantly find the
Foundation of the _Beauty_ which appears in them, to be some kind of
_Uniformity_, or _Unity_ of Proportion among the Parts, and of each
Part to the Whole. As there is a great Diversity of Proportions
possible, and different Kinds of _Uniformity_, so there is room enough
for that Diversity of Fancys observable in _Architecture_,
_Gardening_, and such-like Arts in different _Nations_; they all may
have _Uniformity_, tho' the Parts in one may differ from those in
another. The _Chinese_ or _Persian_ Buildings are not like the
_Grecian_ and _Roman_, and yet the former has its _Uniformity_ of the
various Parts to each other, and to the Whole, as well as the latter.
In that kind of Architecture which the Europeans call _Regular_, the
_Uniformity_ of Parts is very obvious, the several Parts are _regular
Figures_, and either _equal_ or _similar_ at least in the same Range;
the Pedestals are _Parallelopipedons_, or square _Prisms_; the
Pillars, _Cylinders_ nearly; the Arches _circular_, and all those in
the same Row _equal_; there is the same Proportion every-where
observ'd in the same Range between the _Diameters_ of Pillars and
their _Heights_, their _Capitals_, the _Diameters_ of _Arches_, the
_Heights_ of the _Pedestals_, the _Projections_ of the _Cornice_, and
all the Ornaments in each of our _five Orders_. And tho' other
Countrys do not follow the _Grecian_ or _Roman_ Proportions; yet there
is even among them a Proportion retain'd, a _Uniformity_, and
Resemblance of corresponding Figures; and every Deviation in one Part
from the Proportion which is observ'd in the rest of the Building, is
displeasing to every Eye, and destroys or diminishes at least the
_Beauty_ of the Whole.

VIII. The same might be observ'd thro' all other Works of _Art_, even
to the meanest _Utensil_; the _Beauty_ of every one of which we shall
always find to have the same Foundation of _Uniformity amidst
Variety_, without which they appear mean, irregular and deform'd.




SECT. IV.

     _Of_ Relative _or_ Comparative Beauty.


[Sidenote: _Comparative Beauty._]

I. If the preceding Thoughts concerning the Foundation of _absolute
Beauty_ be just, we may easily understand wherein _relative Beauty_
consists. All _Beauty_ is relative to the Sense of some Mind
perceiving it; but what we call _relative_ is that which is
apprehended in any _Object_, commonly consider'd as an _Imitation_ of
some Original: And this _Beauty_ is founded on a _Conformity_, or a
kind of _Unity_ between the Original and the Copy. The Original may be
either some Object in _Nature_, or some _establish'd Idea_; for if
there be any known _Idea_ as a Standard, and Rules to fix this Image
or _Idea_ by, we may make a _beautiful Imitation_. Thus a _Statuary_,
_Painter_, or _Poet_, may please us with an Hercules, if his Piece
retains that _Grandeur_, and those Marks of _Strength_ and _Courage_,
which we imagine in that Hero.

And farther, to obtain _comparative Beauty_ alone, it is not necessary
that there be any Beauty in the Original; the Imitation of _absolute
Beauty_ may indeed in the whole make a more lovely Piece, and yet an
exact Imitation shall still be _beautiful_, though the Original were
intirely void of it: Thus the _Deformitys_ of old Age in a Picture,
the _rudest Rocks_ or _Mountains_ in a _Landskip_, if well
represented, shall have abundant _Beauty_, tho' perhaps not so great
as if the Original were _absolutely beautiful_, and as well
represented: Nay, perhaps the _Novelty_ may make us prefer the
Representation of Irregularity.

[Sidenote: _Description in Poetry._]

II. The same Observation holds true in the Descriptions of the Poets
either of _natural_ Objects or Persons; and this _relative Beauty_ is
what they should principally endeavour to obtain, as the peculiar
_Beauty_ of their Works. By the _Morat Fabul_, or the [**Greek:
th] of Aristotle, we are not to understand _virtuous Manners_ in a
moral Sense, but _just Representation_ of Manners or Characters as
they are in _Nature_; and that the _Actions_ and _Sentiments_ be
suited to the Characters of the _Persons_ to whom they are ascrib'd in
_Epick_ and _Dramatick_ Poetry. Perhaps very good Reasons may be
suggested from the Nature of our _Passions_, to prove that a Poet
should not draw his _Characters_ perfectly _Virtuous_; these
Characters indeed, abstractly consider'd, might give more Pleasure,
and have more _Beauty_ than the _imperfect_ ones which occur in Life
with a Mixture of Good and Evil: But it may suffice at present to
suggest against this Choice, that we have more lively Ideas of
_imperfect Men_ with all their Passions, than of _morally perfect
Heroes_, such as really never occur to our Observation; and of which
consequently we cannot judge exactly as to their Agreement with the
Copy. And farther, thro' Consciousness of our own State, we are more
nearly touch'd and affected by the _imperfect Characters_; since in
them we see represented, in the Persons of others, the _Contrasts_ of
Inclinations, and the _Struggles_ between the Passions of _Self-Love_
and those of _Honour_ and _Virtue_, which we often feel in our own
Breasts. This is the Perfection of _Beauty_ for which Homer is justly
admir'd, as well as for the _Variety_ of his _Characters_.

[Sidenote: _Probability, Simile, Metaphor._]

III. Many other Beautys of Poetry may be reduc'd under this Class of
_relative Beauty_: The _Probability_ is absolutely necessary to make
us imagine _Resemblance_; it is by Resemblance that the _Similitudes_,
_Metaphors_ and _Allegorys_ are made _beautiful_, whether either the
Subject or the Thing compar'd to it have _Beauty_ or not; the _Beauty_
indeed is greater, when both have some _original Beauty_ or Dignity as
well as _Resemblance_: and this is the Foundation of the Rule of
studying _Decency_ in _Metaphors_ and _Similes_ as well as _Likeness_.
The _Measures_ and _Cadence_ are Instances of _Harmony_, and come
under the Head of _absolute Beauty_.

[Sidenote: _Proneness to compare._]

IV. We may here observe a strange Pronenesse in our Minds to make
_perpetual Comparisons_ of all things which occur to our Observation,
even of those which are very different from each other. There are
certain _Resemblances_ in the Motions of all Animals upon like
Passions, which easily found a _Comparison_; but this does not serve
to entertain our Fancy: _Inanimate Objects_ have often such Positions
as resemble those of the _human Body_ in various Circumstances; these
Airs or Gestures of the _Body_ are Indications of certain Dispositions
in the _Mind_, so that our very _Passions_ and _Affections_, as well
as other Circumstances, obtain a Resemblance to _natural inanimate
Objects_. Thus a _Tempest_ at Sea is often an Emblem of _Wrath_; a
_Plant_ or _Tree_ drooping under the Rain, of a Person in _Sorrow_; a
_Poppy_ bending its Stalk, or a _Flower_ withering when cut by the
Plow, resembles the Death of a _blooming Hero_; an _aged Oak_ in the
Mountains shall represent an _old Empire_, a _Flame_ seizing a Wood
shall represent a _War_. In short, every thing in _Nature_, by our
strange Inclination to _Resemblance_, shall be brought to represent
other things, even the most remote, especially the Passions and
Circumstances of human Nature in which we are more nearly concern'd;
and to confirm this, and furnish Instances of it, one need only look
into Homer or Virgil. A fruitful Fancy would find in a _Grove_ or a
_Wood_, an Emblem of every _Character in a Commonwealth_, and every
Turn of _Temper_, or _Station in Life_.

[Sidenote: _Intention._]

V. Concerning that kind of _comparative Beauty_ which has a necessary
relation to some establish'd Idea, we may observe, that some Works of
_Art_ acquire a _distinct Beauty_ by their Correspondence to some
universally suppos'd _Intention_ in the Artificer, or the Persons who
employ'd him: And to obtain this _Beauty_, sometimes they do not form
their Works so as to attain the highest Perfection of _original
Beauty_ separately consider'd; because a Composition of this _relative
Beauty_, along with some Degree of the _original_ Kind, may give more
Pleasure, than a more _perfect original Beauty_, separately. Thus we
see, that strict _Regularity_ in laying out of Gardens in _Parterres_,
_Vistas_, _parallel Walks_, is often neglected, to obtain an Imitation
of _Nature_ even in some of its _Wildnesses_. And we are more pleas'd
with this _Imitation_, especially when the Scene is large and
spacious, than with the more confin'd Exactness of _regular Works_. So
likewise in the _Monuments_ erected in Honour of deceased _Heroes_,
altho' a _Cylinder_, or _Prism_ or _regular Solid_, may have more
_original Beauty_ than a very acute _Pyramid_ or _Obelisk_, yet the
latter pleases more, by answering better the suppos'd Intentions of
_Stability_, and being _conspicuous_. For the same reason _Cubes_, or
square _Prisms_, are generally chosen for the _Pedestals_ of
_Statues_, and not any of the more _beautiful Solids_, which do not
seem so secure from rolling. This may be the Reason too, why _Columns_
or _Pillars_ look best when made a little taper from the middle or a
third from the bottom, that they may not seem top-heavy, and in danger
of falling.

VI. The like Reason may influence Artists, in many other Instances, to
depart from the Rules of _original Beauty_, as above laid down. And
yet this is no Argument against our Sense of _Beauty_ being founded,
as was above explain'd, on _Uniformity amidst Variety_, but only an
Evidence, that our Sense of _Beauty_ of the _Original_ Kind may be
vary'd and over-balanc'd by another kind of _Beauty_.

VII. This _Beauty_ arising from Correspondence to _Intention_, would
open to curious Observers a new Scene of _Beauty_ in the Works of
Nature, by considering how the _Mechanism_ of the various Parts known
to us, seems adapted to the Perfection of that Part, and yet in
Subordination to the Good of some _System_ or _Whole_. We generally
suppose the Good of the _greatest Whole_, or of _all Beings_, to have
been the _Intention_ of the Author of _Nature_; and cannot avoid being
pleas'd when we see any Part of this _Design_ executed in the
_Systems_ we are acquainted with. The Observations already made on
this Subject are in every one's Hand, in the Treatises of our late
Improvers of _mechanical Philosophy_. We shall only observe here, that
every one has a certain Pleasure in seeing any Design well executed by
curious _Mechanism_, even when his own Advantage is no way concern'd;
and also in discovering the Design to which any complex _Machine_ is
adapted, when he has perhaps had a general Knowledge of the _Machine_
before, without seeing its Correspondence or Aptness to execute any
Design.

The Arguments by which we prove _Reason_ and _Design_ in any _Cause_
from the _Beauty_ of the _Effects_, are so frequently us'd in some of
the highest Subjects, that it may be necessary to inquire a little
more particularly into them, to see how far they will hold, and with
what degree of Evidence.




SECT. V.

     _Concerning our Reasonings about_ Design _and_ Wisdom
     _in the_ Cause, _from the_ Beauty _or_ Regularity _of_
     Effects.


[Sidenote: _Sense, arbitrary in its Author._]

I. THERE seems to be no necessary Connection of our pleasing Ideas of
_Beauty_ with the _Uniformity_ or _Regularity_ of the Objects, from
the _Nature_ of Things, antecedent to some _Constitution_ of the
Author of our Nature, which has made such Forms pleasant to us. Other
_Minds_ may be so fram'd as to receive no Pleasure from _Uniformity_;
and we actually find, that the same regular Forms seem not equally to
please all the Animals known to us, as shall probably appear
hereafter. Therefore let us make what is the most unfavourable
Supposition to the present Argument, _viz._ That the Constitution of
our Sense so as to approve _Uniformity_, is merely arbitrary in the
Author of our Nature; and that there are an Infinity of _Tastes_ or
_Relishes_ of _Beauty_ possible; so that it would be impossible to
throw together fifty or a hundred Pebbles, which should not make an
agreeable Habitation for some Animal or other, and appear _beautiful_
to it. And then it is plain, that from the Perception of _Beauty_ in
any one Effect, we should have no Reason to conclude _Design_ in the
_Cause_: for a Sense might be so constituted as to be pleas'd with
such _Irregularity_ as may be the Effect of an _undirected Force_[13].
But then, as there are an Infinity of _Forms_ possible into which any
System may be reduc'd, an Infinity of _Places_ in which Animals may be
situated, and an Infinity of _Relishes_ or _Senses_ in these Animals
is suppos'd possible; that in the immense Spaces any one Animal should
by Chance be plac'd in a System agreeable to its Taste, must be
improbable as _infinite_ to _one_ at least: And much more unreasonable
is it to expect from Chance, that a Multitude of Animals agreeing in
their Sense of _Beauty_ should obtain _agreeable Places_.

[Footnote 13: _By_ undirected Force, _or_ undesigning Force, _is to be
understood, _ That Force with which an Agent may put Matter into
Motion, without having any Design or Intention to produce any
particular Form. _The_ Conatus ad motum, _without an actual Line of_
Direction, _seems such a gross Absurdity in the_ Cartesian Scheme,
_that it is below the Dignity of common Sense to vouchsafe to confute
it. But Men have so many confus'd Notions of some_ Nature, _or_ Chance
_impressing Motions without any Design or Intention of producing any
particular Effect, that it may be useful to shew, that even this very
absurd_ Postulatum, _tho' it were granted them, is insufficient to
answer the Appearances in the_ Regularity _of the World: and this is
what is attempted in the first fourteen Articles of this Section.
These Arguments would really be useless, if all Men were persuaded of
what, to a Man of just Thought, will appear pretty obvious, that there
can be no_ Thoughtless Agent, _and that_ Chance _ and_ Nature _are
mere empty Names, as they are us'd on this Occasion, relative only to
our Ignorance._]

[Sidenote: _Undirected Force_.]

II. There is also the same Probability, that in any one System of
Matter an _Undirected Force_ will produce a _regular Form_, as any one
given _irregular_ one, of the same degree of Complication: But still
the _irregular Forms_ into which any System may be rang'd, surpass in
Multitude the _Regular_, as _Infinite_ does _Unity_; for what holds in
_one_ small System, will hold in a _Thousand_, a _Million_, a
_Universe_, with more Advantage, _viz_. that the _irregular Forms_
possible infinitely surpass the _Regular_. For Instance, the _Area_ of
an Inch _Square_ is capable of an Infinity of _regular Forms_, the
_Equilateral Triangle_, the _Square_, the _Pentagon, Hexagon,
Heptagon_, &c. but for each one regular Form, there are an Infinity of
irregular, as an Infinity of _Scalena_ for the one equilateral
Triangle, an Infinity of _Trapezia_ for the one Square, of irregular
_Pentagons_ for the one Regular, and so on: and therefore supposeing
any one System agitated by _undesigning Force_, it is infinitely more
probable that it will resolve itself into an _irregular Form_, than a
_regular_. Thus, that a System of _six_ Parts upon Agitation shall not
obtain the Form of a regular _Hexagon_, is at least _infinite_ to
Unity; and the more complex we make the System, the greater is the
Hazard, from a very obvious Reason.

We see this confirm'd by our constant Experience, that _Regularity_
never arises from any _undesign'd Force_ of ours; and from this we
conclude, that where-ever there is any _Regularity_ in the Disposition
of a System capable of many other Dispositions, there must have been
_Design_ in the _Cause_; and the Force of this Evidence increases,
according to the Multiplicity of Parts imploy'd.

But this Conclusion is too rash, unless some farther Proof be
introduc'd; and what leads us into it is this. Men, who have a Sense
of _Beauty_ in _Regularity_, are led generally in all their
Arrangements of Bodys to study some kind of _Regularity_, and seldom
ever design _Irregularity_: hence we judge the same of other Beings
too, _viz_. that they study _Regularity_, and presume upon _Intention_
in the _Cause_ where-ever we see it, making _Irregularity_ always a
Presumption of want of _Design_: whereas if other Agents have
different Senses of _Beauty_, or if they have no Sense of it at all,
_Irregularity_ may as well be design'd as _Regularity_. And then let
it be observ'd, that in this Case there is just the same Reason to
conclude _Design_ in the Cause from any one irregular Effect, as from
a regular one: for since there are an Infinity of other _Forms_
possible as well as this irregular one produc'd; and since to such a
Being[14] void of a Sense of _Beauty_, all Forms are as to its own
Relish indifferent, and all agitated Matter meeting must make some
Form or other, and all Forms, upon Supposition that the Force is
apply'd by an Agent void of a Sense of _Beauty_, would equally prove
_Design_; it is plain that no one Form proves it more than another, or
can prove it at all; except from a general metaphysical Consideration,
that there is no proper Agent without _Design_ and _Intention_, and
that every _Effect_ flows from the _Intention_ of some _Cause_.

[Sidenote: _Similar Forms by Chance, impossible._]

III. This however follows from the above mention'd Considerations,
that supposing a Mass of Matter surpassing a _cubick_ Inch, as
_infinite_ of the _first_ Power does _Unity_, and that this whole Mass
were some way determin'd from its own Nature without any _Design_ in a
_Cause_ (which perhaps is scarce possible) to resolve itself into
Parts whose solid Contents were each a _cubick_ Inch, and into a
_prismatick_ Form whose _Base_ should always be  of a _square_ Inch;
suppose these Conditions determin'd, and all others left to
_undirected Force_; all which we could expect from _undirected Force_
in this Case would be one equilateral _Prism_, or two perhaps: because
there are an Infinity of Irregular _Prisms_ possible of the same
_Base_, and _solid Content_; and when we met with many such _Prisms_,
we must probably conclude them produc'd by _Design_, since they are
more than could have been expected by the Laws of _Hazard_.

[Footnote 14: _There is a great Difference between such a Being as is
here mention'd, and a_ Being _which has no_ Intention _for any Reason
whatsoever to produce one Form more than another. This latter sort of_
Being, _as to the present Argument, would be the same with_ Chance,
_but not the former. For tho' a Being has no Sense of_ Beauty, _he may
notwithstanding be capable of_ Design, _and of_ Intention _to produce_
regular Forms; _and the Observation of greater_ Regularity _in any
Number of Effects, than could be expected from undirected_ Force, _is
a Presumption of_ Design _and_ Intention _in the_ Cause, _even where
the_ Cause _is suppos'd to have no Sense of_ Beauty _in such Forms,
since perhaps he may have other Reasons moving him to chuse such
Forms. Thus, supposing the_ Deity _not immediately pleas'd with_
Regularity, Uniformity, _or_ Similarity _in Bodys, yet there may be
Reasons moving him to produce such Objects, such as the pleasing his
Creatures, having given them a Sense of_ Beauty _founded on these_
Qualitys. _See the two last Paragraphs of the last Section._]

IV. But if this _infinite_ Mass was not determin'd to a _prismatick_
Form, we could only expect from its _casual Concourse_ one _Prism_ of
any Kind, since there is an Infinity of other Solids into which the
Mass might be resolv'd; and if we found any great Number of _Prisms_,
we should have reason to presume _Design_: So that in a Mass of Matter
as infinite of the _first_ Power, we could not from any _Concourse_ or
_Agitation_ expect with any good ground a Body of any given Dimensions
or Size, and of any given Form; since of any Dimension there are
infinite Forms possible, and of any Form there are an Infinity of
Dimensions; and if we found several Bodys of the same Dimension and
Form, we should have so much Presumption for _Design_.

V. There is one trifling Objection which may perhaps arise from the
_crystallizing_ of certain Bodys, when the Fluid is evaporated in
which they were swimming: for in this we frequently see _regular
Forms_ arising, tho' there is nothing suppos'd in this Affair but an
_undirected Force of Attraction_. But to remove this Objection, we
need only consider, that we have good Reason to believe, that the
smallest Particles of _Crystalliz'd_ Bodys have fix'd _regular Forms_
given them in the Constitution of _Nature_; and then it is easy to
conceive how their _Attractions_ may produce _regular Forms_; but
unless we suppose some preceding _Regularity_ in the Figures of
_attracting_ Bodys, they can never form any regular Body at all. And
hence we see how improbable it is, that the whole Mass of _Matter_,
not only in this Globe, but in all the fixed Stars known to us by our
Eyes or Glasses, were they a thousand times larger than our
Astronomers suppose, could in any _Concourse_ have produc'd any Number
of _similar_ Bodys _Regular_ or _Irregular_.

[Sidenote: _Combinations by Chance, impossible._]

VI. And let it be here observ'd, that there are many Compositions of
Bodys which the smallest Degree of _Design_ could easily effect, which
yet we would in vain expect from all the Powers of _Chance_ or
_undesigned Force_, after an _Infinity_ of Rencounters; even supposing
a Dissolution of every Form except the _regular one_, that the Parts
might be prepar'd for a new Agitation. Thus supposing we could expect
_one_ equilateral _Prism_ of any _given_ Dimensions should be form'd
from _undirected Force_, in an Infinity of Matter some way determin'd
to resolve itself into Bodys of a _given_ solid Content, (which is all
we could expect, since it is _infinite_ to _one_ after the _solid
Content_ is obtain'd, that the Body shall not be _Prismatical_; and
allowing it _Prismatical_, it is _infinite_ to _one_ that it shall not
be _Equilateral_:) And again, supposing another Infinity of Matter
determin'd to resolve it self into _Tubes_, of _Orifices_ exactly
equal to the _Bases_ of the former _Prisms_, it is again at least as
the _second_ Power of _Infinite_ to _Unity_, that not one of these
_Tubes_ shall be both _Prismatick_ and _Equiangular_; and then if the
_Tube_ were thus form'd, so as to be exactly capable of receiving one
of the _Prisms_, and no more, it is _infinite_ to _one_ that they
shall never meet in _infinite Space_; and should they meet, it is
_infinite_ to _one_ that the _Axes_ of the _Prism_ and _Tube_ shall
never happen in the same strait _Line_; and supposing they did, it is
again as _infinite_ to _three_, that _Angle_ shall not meet _Angle_,
so as to enter. We see then how infinitely improbable it is, "That all
the Powers of _Chance_ in _infinite Matter_, agitated thro' _infinite
Ages_, could ever effect this small Composition of a _Prism_ entering
a _Prismatick Bore_; and, that all our Hazard for it would at most be
but as _Three_ is to the _third_ Power of _Infinite_." And yet the
smallest _Design_ could easily effect it.

VII. May we not then justly count it altogether absurd, and next to an
absolute strict _Impossibility_, "That all the Powers of _undirected
Force_ should ever effect such a complex Machine as the most imperfect
_Plant_, or the meanest _Animal_, even in _one_ Instance?" For the
_Improbability_ just increases, as the Complication of Mechanism in
these _natural_ Bodys surpasses that _simple_ Combination
above-mention'd.

VIII. Let it be here observ'd, "That the preceding Reasoning from the
_Frequency_ of _regular Bodys_ of one Form in the _Universe_, and from
the _Combinations_ of various Bodys, is intirely independent on any
Perception of _Beauty_; and would equally prove _Design_ in the
_Cause_, altho' there were no _Being_ which perceiv'd _Beauty_ in any
Form whatsoever:" for it is in short this, "_That the recurring of any
Effect oftener than the Laws of Hazard determine, gives Presumption of
Design; and, That Combinations which no undesign'd Force could give us
Reason to expect, must necessarily prove the same; and that with
superior Probability, as the Multitude of Cases in which the contrary
might happen, surpass all the Cases in which this could happen_:"
which appears to be in the simplest Cases at least as _Infinite_ does
to _Unity_. And the Frequency of _similar irregular Forms_, or _exact
Combinations_ of them, is an equal Argument of _Design_ in the
_Cause_, since the _Similarity_, or exact _Combinations_ of _irregular
Forms_, are as little to be expected from all the Powers of
_undirected Force_, as any sort whatsoever.

IX. To bring this nearer to something like a _Theorem_, altho' the
_Idea_ of _Infinite_ be troublesom enough to manage in Reasoning: The
Powers of _Chance_, with _infinite Matter_ in _infinite Ages_, may
answer _Hazards_ as the _fifth_ Power of _Infinite_, and no more: thus
the _Quantity_ of Matter may be conceiv'd as the third Power of
_Infinite_, and no more, the _various Degrees_ of Force may make
_another_ Power of _Infinite_, and the _Number_ of Rencounters may
make the _fifth_. But this last only holds on Supposition, that after
every Rencounter there is no _Cohesion_, but all is dissolv'd again
for a new Concourse, except in _similar Forms_ or _exact
Combinations_; which Supposition is intirely groundless, since we see
_dissimilar Bodys_ cohering as strongly as any, and _rude Masses_ more
than any Combinations. Now to produce any _given_ Body, in a _given_
Place or Situation, and of _given_ Dimensions, or Shape, the Hazards
of the contrary are, _one_ Power of _Infinite_ at least to obtain the
_Place_ or Situation; when the _Situation_ is obtain'd, the _Solid
Content_ requires _another_ Power of _Infinite_ to obtain it; the
_Situation_ and _Solidity_ obtain'd require, for accomplishing the
_simplest given_ Shape, at least the other _three_ Powers of
_Infinite_. For instance, let the Shape be a four-sided _Prism_ or
_Parallelopiped_; that the _Surfaces_ should be _Planes_ requires
_one_ Power; that they should be _Parallel_ in this Case, or
_inclin'd_ in any _given Angle_ in any other Case, requires _another_
Power of _Infinite_; and that they should be in any given _Ratio_ to
each other, requires at least the _third_ Power: for in each of these
Heads there is still an _Infinity_ at least of other Cases possible
beside the one _given_. So that all the Powers of _Chance_ could only
produce perhaps _one_ Body of every simpler Shape or Size _at most_,
and this is all we could expect: we might expect one _Pyramid_, or
_Cube_, or _Prism_ perhaps; but when we increase the Conditions
requir'd, the Prospect must grow more improbable, as in more _complex
Figures_, and in all _Combinations_ of Bodys, and in _similar
Species_, which we never could reasonably hope from _Chance_; and
therefore where we see them, we must certainly ascribe them to
_Design_.

[Sidenote: _Combinations of irregular Forms, equally impossible._]

X. The Combinations of _regular Forms_, or of _irregular ones_ exactly
adapted to each other, require such _vast_ Powers of _Infinite_ to
effect them, and the Hazards of the _contrary_ Forms are so
_infinitely_ numerous, that all _Probability_ or _Possibility_ of
their being accomplish'd by _Chance_ seems quite to vanish. Let us
apply the Cases in _Art._ vi. in this _Section_ about the _Prism_ and
_Tube_, to our simplest Machines, such as _a Pair of Wheels_ of our
ordinary Carriages; each _Circular_, _Spokes_ equal in _Length,
Thickness, Shape_; the _Wheels_ set _parallel_, the _Axle-tree_ fix'd
in the _Nave_ of both, and secured from coming out at either End: Now
the Cases in which the contrary might have happen'd from _undirected
Concourses_, were there no more requir'd than what is just now
mention'd, must amount in Multitude to a Power of _Infinites equal_ to
every Circumstance requir'd. What shall we say then of a _Plant_, a
_Tree_, an _Animal_, a _Man_, with _such Multitudes_ of adapted
Vessels, _such Articulations_, _Insertions_ of _Muscles_, _Diffusion_
of _Veins, Arterys, Nerves_? The _Improbability_ that such Machines
arising daily in such Numbers in all Parts of the Earth with such
Similarity of Structure, should be the Effect of Chance, is beyond all
Conception or Expression.

XI. Further, were all the former Reasoning from _Similarity_ of Forms
and Combinations groundless, and could _Chance_ give us ground to
expect such Forms, with exact Combination, yet we could only promise
ourselves _one_ of these Forms among an _Infinity_ of others. When we
see then such a _Multitude_ of Individuals of a Species, _similar_ to
each other in a great number of Parts; and when we see in each
_Individual_, the corresponding Members so exactly like each other,
what possible room is there left for questioning _Design_ in the
_Universe_? None but the barest _Possibility_ against an
inconceiveably great _Probability_, surpassing every thing which is
not _strict Demonstration_.

XII. This Argument, as has been already observ'd[15], is quite
abstracted from any Sense of _Beauty_ in any particular Form; for the
_exact Similarity_ of a hundred or a thousand _Trapezia_, proves
_Design_ as well as the _Similarity_ of _Squares_, since both are
equally above all the Powers of _undirected Force_ or _Chance_; and
what is above the Powers of _Chance_, must give us proportionable
Presumption for _Design_.

[Footnote 15: See above, Art. viii.]

Thus, allowing that a _Leg_, or _Arm_, or _Eye_, might have been the
Effect of _Chance_, (which was shewn to be _most absurd_, and next to
absolutely _impossible_) that it should not have a corresponding
_Leg_, _Arm_, _Eye_, exactly _similar_, must be a Hazard of a Power of
_Infinite_ proportion'd to the Complication of Parts; for in
Proportion to this is the Multitude of Cases increas'd, in which it
would not have a corresponding Member _similar_; so that allowing
twenty or thirty Parts in such a Structure, it would be as the
_twentieth_ or _thirtieth_ Power of _Infinite_ to _Unity_, that the
corresponding Part should not be _similar_. What shall we say then of
the _similar Forms_ of a whole _Species_?

[Sidenote: _Gross Similarity by Chance, impossible._]

XIII. If it be objected, "That _natural_ Bodys are not _exactly
similar_, but only _grossly so_ to our Senses; as that a _Vein_, an
_Artery_, a _Bone_ is not perhaps exactly _similar_ to its
Correspondent in the same Animal, tho' it appears so to our Senses,
which judge only of the Bulk, and do not discern the small constituent
Parts; and that in the several Individuals of a Species the
_Dissimilarity_ is always sensible, often in the internal Structure,
and always in the external Appearance:" To remove this Objection it
will be sufficient to shew, "That the Multitude of Cases wherein
_sensible Dissimilitude_ could have happen'd, are still infinitely
more than all the Cases in which _sensible Similitude_ might be
retained:" so that the same Reasoning holds from _sensible
Similarity_, as from the _mathematically exact_: And again, "That the
Cases of _gross Dissimilarity_ do in the same manner surpass the Cases
of _gross Similarity_ possible, as _infinite_ does _one_."

XIV. To prove both these Assertions, let us consider a simple
Instance. Suppose a _Trapezium_ of a foot Square in _Area_ should
appear grosly _similar_ to another, while no one _Side_ differs, by
1/10 of an Inch; or no _Angle_ in one surpasses the corresponding one
in the other above ten Minutes: now this tenth of an Inch is
_infinitely_ divisible, as are also the ten Minutes, so that the Cases
of _insensible Dissimilarity_ under _apparent Similarity_ are really
_Infinite_. But then it is also plain that there are an _Infinity_ of
different sensibly dissimilar _Trapezia_, even of the same _Area_,
according as we vary a _Side_ by one Tenth, two Tenths, three Tenths,
and so on, and vary the _Angles_ and another _Side_ so as to keep the
_Area_ equal. Now in each of these infinite Degrees of _sensible
Dissimilitude_ the several Tenths are _infinitely_ divisible as well
as in then first Case; so that the Multitude of _sensible
Dissimilaritys_ are to the Multitude of _insensible Dissimilaritys_
under apparent Resemblance, still as the _second_ Power of _Infinite_
to the _first_, or as _Infinite_ to _Unity_. And then how vastly
greater must the Multitude be, of all possible _sensible
Dissimilaritys_ in such complex Bodys as _Legs_, _Arms_, _Eyes_,
_Arterys_, _Veins_, _Skeletons_?

XV. As to the _Dissimilaritys_ of Animals of the same Species, it is
in the same manner plain, that the possible Cases of _gross
Dissimilarity_ are Infinite; and then every Case of gross
_Dissimilarity_ contains also all the Cases of _insensible
Dissimilarity_. Thus, if we would count all Animals of a Species
_grosly similar_, while there was no Limb which in Length or Diameter
did exceed the ordinary Shape by above a Third of the Head; it is
plain that there are an Infinity of sensibly different _gross
Dissimilaritys_ possible, and then in each of these Cases of _gross
Dissimilarity_, there are an Infinity of Cases of _nicer
Dissimilarity_, since 1/3 of the Head may be infinitely divided. To
take a low but easy Instance; two _Cockle-Shells_ which fitted each
other naturally, may have an Infinity of _insensible Differences_, but
still there are an Infinity of possible _sensible Differences_; and
then in any one of the _sensibly different_ Forms, there may be the
same Infinity of _insensible Differences_ beside the _sensible one_:
So that still the Hazard for even _gross Similarity_ from _Chance_ is
_Infinite_ to _one_, and this always increases by a Power of Infinite
for every distinct Member of the Animal, in which even _gross
Similarity_ is retain'd; since the Addition of every Member or Part to
a complex Machine, makes a new Infinity of Cases, in which _sensible
Dissimilarity_ may happen; and this Infinity combin'd with the
infinite Cases of the former Parts, raises the Hazard by a Power of
Infinite.

Now this may sufficiently shew us the Absurdity of the _Cartesian_ or
_Epicurean Hypothesis_, even granting their _Postulatum_ of
_undirected Force_ impress'd on _Infinite Matter_; and seems almost a
Demonstration of _Design_ in the _Universe_.

XVI. One Objection more remains to be remov'd, _viz_. "That some
imagine, this Argument may hold better _ Priori_ than _ Posteriori_;
that is, we have better Reason to believe, when we see a _Cause_ about
to act, without Knowledge, that he will not attain any given, or
desir'd _End_; than we have on the other hand to believe, when we see
the _End_ actually attain'd, that he acted with Knowledge: Thus, say
they, when a particular Person is about to draw a Ticket in a
_Lottery_, where there is but one _Prize_ to a thousand _Blanks_, it
is highly probable that he shall draw a _Blank_; but suppose we have
seen him actually draw for himself the _Prize_, we have no ground to
conclude that he had _Knowledge_ or _Art_ to accomplish this End." But
the Answer is obvious: In such Contrivances we generally have, from
the very Circumstances of the Lottery, very strong moral Arguments,
which almost demonstrate that _Art_ can have no Place; so that a
Probability of a _thousand_ to _one_, may not surmount those
Arguments: But let the Probability be increas'd, and it will soon
surmount all Arguments to the contrary. For instance, If we saw a Man
ten times successively draw Prizes, in a Lottery where there were but
ten Prizes to ten thousand Blanks, I fancy few would question whether
he us'd _Art_ or not: much less would we imagine it were _Chance_, if
we saw a Man draw for his own Gain successively a hundred, or a
thousand Prizes, from among a proportionably greater Number of Blanks.
Now in the Works of _Nature_ the Case is intirely different: we have
not the least Argument against _Art_ or _Design_. An _Intelligent
Cause_ is surely at least as probable a Notion as _Chance_, _general
Force_, _Conatus ad Motum_, or the _Clinamen Principiorum_, to account
for any Effect whatsoever: And then all the _Regularity_,
_Combinations_, _Similaritys_ of Species, are so many Demonstrations,
that there was _Design_ and _Intelligence_ in the Cause of this
Universe: Whereas in fair Lotterys, all _Art_ in drawing is made, if
not actually impossible, at least highly improbable.

[Sidenote: _Irregularity does not prove want of Design._]

XVII. Let it be here observ'd also, "That a _rational Agent_ may be
capable of impressing Force without intending to produce any
particular Form, and of designedly producing _irregular_ or
_dissimilar Forms_, as well as _regular_ and _similar_:" And hence it
follows, "That altho' all the _Regularity_, _Combination_ and
_Similarity_ in the _Universe_, are Presumptions of _Design_, yet
_Irregularity_ is no Presumption of the contrary; unless we suppose
that the _Agent_ is determin'd from a Sense of _Beauty_ always to act
_regularly_, and delight in _Similarity_; and that he can have no
other inconsistent Motive of Action:" Which last is plainly absurd. We
do not want in the _Universe_ many Effects which seem to have been
left to the general _Laws_ of _Motion_ upon some great _Impulse_, and
have many Instances where _Similarity_ has been plainly design'd in
some respects, and probably neglected in others; or even
_Dissimilarity_ design'd. Thus we see the _general exact Resemblance_
between the two _Eyes_ of most Persons; and yet perhaps no other third
_Eye_ in the World is _exactly_ like them. We see a _gross Conformity_
of Shape in all Persons in innumerable Parts, and yet no two
_Individuals_ of any Species are undistinguishable; which perhaps is
intended for valuable Purposes to the whole Species.

[Sidenote: _Wisdom_, _Prudence_.]

XVIII. Hitherto the Proof amounts only to _Design_ or _Intention_,
barely, in Opposition to _blind Force_ or _Chance_; and we see the
Proof of this is independent on _the arbitrary Constitution of our
internal Sense of Beauty_. _Beauty_ is often suppos'd an Argument of
more than _Design_, to wit, _Wisdom_ and _Prudence_ in the _Cause_.
Let us inquire also into this.

Wisdom denotes _the pursuing of the best Ends by the best Means_; and
therefore, before we can from any Effect prove the _Cause_ to be
_wise_, we must know what is _best_ to the _Cause_ or _Agent_. Among
Men who have Pleasure in contemplating _Uniformity_, the _Beauty_ of
Effects is an Argument of Wisdom, because this is good to them; but
the same Argument would not hold as to a _Being void_ of this _Sense_
of _Beauty_. And therefore the _Beauty_ apparent to us in _Nature_,
will not of itself prove _Wisdom_ in the _Cause_, unless this _Cause_
or Author of _Nature_ be suppos'd Benevolent; and then indeed the
Happiness of Mankind is desirable or _Good_ to the Supreme Cause; and
that Form which pleases us, is an Argument of his _Wisdom_. And the
Strength of this Argument is increased always in proportion to the
Degree of _Beauty_ produc'd in _Nature_, and expos'd to the View of
any _rational Agents_; since upon Supposition of a _Benevolent_ Deity,
all the apparent _Beauty_ produc'd is an Evidence of the Execution of
a _Benevolent Design_, to give them the Pleasures of _Beauty_.

But what more immediately proves _Wisdom_ is this; When we see any
Machine with a great Complication of Parts actually obtaining an
_End_, we justly conclude, "That since this could not have been the
Effect of _Chance_, it must have been _intended_ for that _End_, which
is obtain'd by it;" and then the _Ends_ or _Intentions_ being in part
known, the Complication of Organs, and their nice Disposition adapted
to this _End_, is an Evidence "of a _comprehensive large
Understanding_ in the _Cause_, according to the Multiplicity of Parts,
and the Appositeness of their Structure, even when we do not know the
_Intention_ of the _Whole_."

[Sidenote: _General Causes_.]

XIX. There is another kind of _Beauty_ from which we conclude Wisdom
the Cause, as well as Design, _when we see many useful or beautiful
Effects flowing from one general Cause_. There is a very good Reason
for this Conclusion among Men. _Interest_ must lead _Beings_ of
limited Powers, who are uncapable of a great Diversity of Operations,
and distracted by them, to choose this _frugal Oeconomy_ of their
Forces, and to look upon such Management as an Evidence of _Wisdom_ in
other _Beings_ like themselves. Nor is this speculative Reason all
which influences them; for even beside this Consideration of
_Interest_, they are determin'd by a _Sense of Beauty_, where that
Reason does not hold; as when we are judging of the Productions of
other _Agents_ about whose Oeconomy we are not solicitous. Thus, who
does not approve of it as a Perfection in _Clock-work_, that three or
four Motions of the _Hour_, _Minute_, and _second Hands_, and _monthly
Plate_, should arise from _one Spring_ or _Weight_, rather than from
three or four _Springs_ or _Weights_, in a very compound Machine,
which should perform the same Effects, and answer all the same
Purposes with equal Exactness? Now the Foundation of this _Beauty_
plainly appears to be an _Uniformity_, or _Unity_ of _Cause_ amidst
_Diversity_ of Effects.

[Sidenote: _General Laws_.]

XX. We shall[16] hereafter offer some Reasons, why the Author of
_Nature_ may choose to operate in this manner by _General Laws_ and
_Universal extensive Causes_, altho' the Reason just now mention'd
does not hold with an _Almighty Being_. This is certain, That we have
some of the most delightful Instances of _Universal Causes_ in the
_Works_ of _Nature_, and that the most studious Men in these Subjects
are so delighted with the Observation of them, that they always look
upon them as Evidences of _Wisdom_ in the Administration of _Nature_,
from a Sense of Beauty.

[Footnote 16: See the last _Section_.]

XXI. The wonderfully simple _Mechanism_ which performs all Animal
Motions, was mention'd[17] already; nor is _that_ of the inanimate
Parts of _Nature_, less admirable. How innumerable are the Effects of
that one Principle of _Heat_, deriv'd to us from the _Sun_, which is
not only delightful to our Sight and Feeling, and the Means of
discerning Objects, but is the Cause of _Rains_, _Springs_, _Rivers_,
_Winds_, and the universal Cause of _Vegetation_! The _uniform
Principle of Gravity_ preserves at once the _Planets_ in their
_Orbits_, gives _Cohesion_ to the Parts of each _Globe_, and
_Stability_ to _Mountains_, _Hills_, and _artificial Structures_; it
raises the _Sea_ in Tides, and sinks them again, and restrains them in
their Channels; it drains the _Earth_ of its superfluous Moisture, by
_Rivers_; it raises the _Vapours_ by its Influence on the _Air_, and
brings them down again in _Rains_; it gives an _uniform Pressure_ to
our _Atmosphere_, necessary to our Bodys in general, and more
especially to _Inspiration_ in _Breathing_; and furnishes us with an
_universal Movement_, capable of being apply'd in innumerable Engines.
How incomparably more _beautiful_ is this Structure, than if we
suppos'd so many _distinct Volitions_ in the Deity, producing every
particular Effect, and preventing some of the accidental Evils which
casually flow from the _general Law_! We may rashly imagine that this
latter manner of Operation might have been more useful to us; and it
would have been no Distraction to _Omnipotence_: But then the great
_Beauty_ had been lost, and there had been no more Pleasure in the
Contemplation of this Scene, which is now so delightful. One would
rather choose to run the Hazard of its _casual Evils_, than part with
that _harmonious Form_, which has been an unexhausted Source of
Delight to the successive Spectators in all Ages.

[Footnote 17: See above, _Sect. ii. Art. 8_.]

[Sidenote: _Miracles._]

XXII. Hence we see, "That however _Miracles_ may prove the
Superintendency of a _voluntary Agent_, and that the _Universe_ is not
guided by _Necessity_ or _Fate_, yet that _Mind_ must be _weak_ and
_inadvertent_, which needs them to confirm the Belief of a _Wise_ and
Good Deity; since the Deviation from _general Laws_, unless upon very
extraordinary Occasions, must be a Presumption of _Inconstancy_ and
_Weakness_, rather than of _steady Wisdom_ and _Power_, and must
weaken the best Arguments we can have for the _Sagacity_ and _Power_
of the _universal_ Mind."




SECT. VI.

     _Of the_ Universality _of the_ Sense of Beauty _among_ Men.


[Sidenote: _Internal Sense not an immediate Source of Pain_.]

I. We before[18] insinuated, "That all _Beauty_ has a relation to some
_perceiving Power_;" and consequently since we know not how great a
_Variety_ of Senses there may be among Animals, there is no Form in
_Nature_ concerning which we can pronounce, "That it has no _Beauty_;"
for it may still please some _perceiving Power_. But our _Inquiry_ is
confin'd to Men; and before we examine the _Universality_ of this
_Sense of Beauty_, or their Agreement in approving _Uniformity_, it
may be proper to consider, "Whether, as the other _Senses_ which give
us Pleasure, do also give us Pain, so this _Sense of Beauty_ does make
some Objects disagreeable to us, and the Occasion of Pain."

[Footnote 18: See above _Sect. i. Art. 17; Sect. iv. Art. 1._]

That many Objects give no pleasure to our _Sense_ is obvious; many are
certainly void of _Beauty_: But then there is no Form which seems
necessarily disagreeable of itself, when we dread no other Evil from
it, and compare it with nothing better of the Kind. Many Objects are
naturally displeaseing, and distasteful to our _external Senses_, as
well as others pleasing and agreeable; as _Smells_, _Tastes_, and some
separate _Sounds_: but as to our _Sense of Beauty_, no Composition of
Objects which give not unpleasant simple Ideas, seems positively
unpleasant or painful of itself, had we never observ'd any thing
better of the Kind. _Deformity_ is only _the Absence of Beauty_, or
_Deficiency in the Beauty expected in any Species_: Thus _bad Musick_
pleases _Rusticks_ who never heard any better, and the _finest Ear_ is
not offended with _tuning_ of Instruments, if it be not too tedious,
where no _Harmony_ is expected; and yet much smaller _Dissonancy_
shall offend amidst the Performance, where _Harmony_ is expected. A
_rude Heap_ of Stones is no way offensive to one who shall be
displeas'd with _Irregularity_ in _Architecture_, where _Beauty_ was
expected. And had there been a Species of that Form which we now call
_ugly_ or _deform'd_, and had we never seen or expected greater
_Beauty_, we should have receiv'd no Disgust from it, altho' the
Pleasure would not have been so great in this Form as in those we now
admire. Our _Sense of Beauty_ seems design'd to give us positive
Pleasure, but not a positive Pain or Disgust, any farther than what
arises from Disappointment.

[Sidenote: _Approbation and Dislike from Associations of Ideas._]

II. There are indeed many Faces which at first View are apt to raise
Dislike; but this is generally not from any Deformity which of itself
is positively displeasing, but either from want of _expected Beauty_,
or much more from their carrying some natural Indications of _morally
bad Dispositions_, which we all acquire a Faculty of discerning in
_Countenances_, _Airs_, and _Gestures_. That this is not occasion'd by
any Form positively disgusting, will appear from this, That if upon
long Acquaintance we are sure of finding _Sweetness of Temper_,
_Humanity and Chearfulness_, altho' the bodily Form continues, it
shall give us no Disgust or Displeasure; whereas, if any thing were
naturally disagreeable, or the Occasion of Pain, or positive Distaste,
it would always continue so, even altho' the Aversion we might have
toward it were counter-balanc'd by other Considerations. There are
Horrors rais'd by some Objects, which are only the Effect of _Fear_
for ourselves, or _Compassion_ towards others, when either _Reason_,
or some foolish _Association of Ideas_, makes us apprehend Danger, and
not the Effect of any thing in the Form itself: for we find that most
of those Objects which excite Horror at first, when Experience or
Reason has remov'd the Fear, may become the Occasions of Pleasure; as
_ravenous Beasts_, a _tempestuous Sea_, a _craggy Precipice_, a _dark
shady Valley_.

[Sidenote: _Associations_.]

III. We shall see[19] hereafter, "That _Associations of Ideas_ make
Objects pleasant and delightful, which are not naturally apt to give
any such Pleasures; and the same way, the _casual Conjunctions of
Ideas_ may give a Disgust, where there is nothing disagreeable in the
Form itself." And this is the Occasion of many fantastick Aversions to
Figures of some Animals, and to some other Forms: Thus _Swine_,
_Serpents_ of all Kinds, and some _Insects_ really beautiful enough,
are beheld with Aversion by many People, who have got _some accidental
Ideas associated_ to them. And for _Distastes_ of this Kind, no other
Account can be given.

[Footnote 19: See below _Art_. 11, 12. of this Section.]

[Sidenote: _Universality of this Sense_.]

IV. But as to the _universal Agreement_ of Mankind in their _Sense of
Beauty_ from _Uniformity amidst Variety_, we must consult Experience:
and as we allow all Men Reason, since all Men are capable of
understanding simple Arguments, tho' few are capable of complex
Demonstrations; so in this Case it must be sufficient to prove _this
Sense of Beauty universal_, "if all Men are better pleas'd with
_Uniformity_ in the simpler Instances than _the contrary_, even when
there is no Advantage observ'd attending it; and likewise if all Men,
according as their Capacity inlarges, so as to receive and compare
more complex Ideas, have a greater Delight in _Uniformity_, and are
pleas'd with its more complex Kinds, both _Original_ and _Relative_."

Now let us consider if ever any Person was void of _this Sense_ in the
simpler Instances. Few Trials have been made in the simplest Instances
of _Harmony_, because, as soon as we find an _Ear_ incapable of
relishing complex Compositions, such as our _Tunes_ are, no farther
Pains are employ'd about such. But in _Figures_, did ever any Man make
choice of a _Trapezium_, or any irregular _Curve_, for the
_Ichnography_ or Plan of his House, without Necessity, or some great
Motive of Convenience? or to make the opposite Walls _not parallel_,
or _unequal_ in Height? Were ever _Trapeziums_, irregular _Polygons_
or _Curves_ chosen for the Forms of _Doors_ or _Windows_, tho' these
Figures might have answer'd the Uses as well, and would have often
sav'd a great Part of the Time, Labour and Expence to Workmen, which
is now employ'd in suiting the Stones and Timber to the _regular_
Forms? Among all the fantastick Modes of _Dress_, none was ever quite
void of _Uniformity_, if it were only in _the Resemblance_ of the two
Sides of the same _Robe_, and in _some general Aptitude_ to the human
Form. The _Pictish Painting_ had always _relative Beauty_, by
Resemblance to other Objects, and often those Objects were
_originally beautiful_: however justly we might here apply Horace's
Censure of impertinent Descriptions in _Poetry_,

    _Sed non erat his locus_----[20].

But never were any so extravagant as to affect such Figures as are
made by _the casual spilling_ of liquid Colours. Who was ever pleas'd
with an _Inequality_ of Heights in _Windows_ of the same Range, or
_dissimilar Shapes_ of them? with _unequal Legs_ or _Arms_, _Eyes_ or
_Cheeks_ in a _Mistress_? It must however be acknowledg'd, "That
_Interest_ may often counterbalance our _Sense of Beauty_, in this
Affair as well as in others, and superior good Qualitys may make us
overlook such Imperfections."

[Footnote 20: Hor. de Arte Poet. v. 19.]

[Sidenote: _Real Beauty alone pleases_.]

V. Nay farther, it may perhaps appear, "That _Regularity_ and
_Uniformity_ are so copiously diffus'd thro' the _Universe_, and we
are so readily determin'd to pursue _this_ as the Foundation of
_Beauty_ in _Works_ of _Art_, that there is scarcely any thing ever
fansy'd as _Beautiful_, where there is not really something of this
_Uniformity_ and _Regularity_." We are indeed often mistaken in
imagining that there is the greatest possible _Beauty_, where it is
but very imperfect; but still it is some Degree of _Beauty_ which
pleases, altho' there may be higher Degrees which we do not observe;
and our _Sense_ acts with full Regularity when we are pleas'd, altho'
we are kept by a false Prejudice from pursuing Objects which would
please us more.

A Goth, for instance, is mistaken, when from Education he imagines the
_Architecture_ of his Country to be the most perfect: and a
_Conjunction_ of some _hostile Ideas_, may make him have an Aversion
to _Roman Buildings_, and study to demolish them, as some of our
_Reformers_ did the _Popish Buildings_, not being able to separate the
Ideas of the superstitious Worship from the Forms of the Buildings
where it was practised: and yet it is still _real Beauty_ which
pleases the Goth, founded upon _Uniformity amidst Variety_. For the
_Gothick Pillars_ are _uniform_ to each other, not only in their
_Sections_, which are _Lozenge-form'd_; but also in their _Heights_
and _Ornaments_: Their _Arches_ are not one _uniform Curve_, but yet
they are _Segments_ of _similar Curves_, and generally equal in the
same Ranges. The very _Indian Buildings_ have some kind of
_Uniformity_, and many of the Eastern Nations, tho' they differ much
from us, yet have great _Regularity_ in their Manner, as well as the
Romans in their. Our _Indian Screens_, which wonderfully supply our
Imaginations with Ideas of Deformity, in which _Nature_ is very
churlish and sparing, do want indeed all the _Beauty_ arising from
Proportion of Parts, and Conformity to _Nature_; and yet they cannot
divest themselves of all _Beauty_ and _Uniformity_ in the separate
Parts: And this diversifying the human Body into various Contortions,
may give some wild Pleasure from _Variety_, since some _Uniformity_ to
the human Shape is still retained.

[Sidenote: _History pleases in like manner._]

VI. There is one sort of _Beauty_ which might perhaps have been better
mention'd before, but will not be impertinent here, because the Taste
or Relish of it is _universal_ in all Nations, and with the Young as
well as the Old, and that is the _Beauty_ of _History_. Every one
knows how dull a Study it is to read over a Collection of _Gazettes_,
which shall perhaps relate all the same Events with the _Historian_:
The superior Pleasure then of _History_ must arise, like that of
_Poetry_, from the _Manners_; when we see a _Character_ well drawn,
wherein we find the secret Causes of a great Diversity of seemingly
inconsistent Actions; or an _Interest of State_ laid open, or an
_artful View_ nicely unfolded, the Execution of which influences very
different and opposite Actions as the Circumstances may alter. Now
this reduces the whole to an _Unity_ of Design at least: And this may
be observ'd in the very Fables which entertain Children, otherwise we
cannot make them relish them.

VII. What has been said will probably be assented to, if we always
remember in our Inquirys into the _Universality_ of the _Sense of
Beauty_, "That there may be _real Beauty_, where there is not the
_greatest_; and that there are an Infinity of different Forms which
may all have some _Unity_, and yet differ from each other." So that
Men may have different Fancys of _Beauty_, and yet _Uniformity_ be the
_universal Foundation_ of our Approbation of any Form whatsoever as
_Beautiful_. And we shall find that it is so in the _Architecture_,
_Gardening_, _Dress_, _Equipage_, and _Furniture_ of Houses, even
among the most uncultivated Nations; where _Uniformity_ still pleases,
without any other Advantage than the Pleasure of the Contemplation of
it.

[Sidenote: _Diversity of Judgments concerning our Senses_.]

VIII. It will deserve our Consideration on this Subject, how, in like
Cases, we form very different Judgments concerning the _internal_ and
_external Senses_. Nothing is more ordinary among those, who after Mr.
Locke have rejected _innate Ideas_, than to alledge, "That all our
Relish for _Beauty_ and _Order_, is either from Prospect of
_Advantage_, _Custom_, or _Education_," for no other Reason but the
_Variety_ of _Fancys_ in the World: and from this they conclude, "That
our _Fancys_ do not arise from any _natural Power of Perception_, or
_Sense_." And yet all allow our _external Senses_ to be _Natural_,
and that the Pleasures or Pains of their Sensations, however they may
be increas'd or diminish'd by _Custom_ or _Education_, and
counter-balanc'd by _Interest_, yet are really antecedent to _Custom_,
_Habit_, _Education_, or Prospect of _Interest_. Now it is certain,
"That there is at least as great a Variety of Fancys about their
Objects, as the Objects of _Beauty_:" Nay, it is much more difficult,
and perhaps impossible, to bring the Fancys or Relishes of the
_external Senses_ to any general Foundation at all, or to find any
Rule for the _Agreeable_ or _Disagreeable_: and yet we all allow,
"that these are _natural_ Powers of _Perception_."

[Sidenote: _The Reason of it._]

IX. The Reason of this different Judgment can be no other than this,
That we have got distinct Names for the _external Senses_, and none,
or very few, for the _Internal_; and by this are led, as in many other
Cases, to look upon the former as some way more _fix'd_, and _real_,
and _natural_, than the latter. The _Sense_ of _Harmony_ has got its
Name, _viz._ a _good Ear_; and we are generally brought to acknowledge
this a _natural_ Power of _Perception_, or _a Sense_ some way distinct
from _Hearing_: now it is certain, "That there is as necessary a
Perception of _Beauty_ upon the Presence of _regular Objects_, as of
_Harmony_ upon hearing certain _Sounds_."

[Sidenote: _An internal Sense does not presuppose innate ideas._]

X. But let it be observ'd here once for all, "That an _internal Sense_
no more presupposes an _innate Idea_, or Principle of Knowledge, than
the _external_." Both are _natural_ Powers of _Perception_, or
_Determinations_ of _the Mind_ to receive necessarily certain Ideas
from the Presence of Objects. The _Internal Sense_ is, a _passive
Power of receiving Ideas of Beauty from all Objects in which there is
Uniformity amidst Variety_. Nor does there seem any thing more
difficult in this matter, than that the Mind should be always
determin'd to receive the Idea of _Sweet_, when Particles of such a
Form enter the Pores of the Tongue; or to have the Idea of _Sound_
upon any quick Undulation of the Air. The one seems to have as little
Connection with its Idea, as the other: And the _same Power_ could
with equal Ease constitute the former the Occasion of Ideas, as the
latter.

[Sidenote: _Associations Cause of Disagreement._]

XI. The _Association_ of Ideas[21] above hinted at, is one great Cause
of the apparent Diversity of Fancys in the _Sense of Beauty_, as well
as in the _external Senses_, and often makes Men have an Aversion to
Objects of _Beauty_, and a Liking to others void of it, but under
different Conceptions than those of _Beauty_ or _Deformity_. And here
it may not be improper to give some Instances of some of these
_Associations_. The _Beauty_ of _Trees_, their _cool Shades_, and
their _Aptness_ to conceal from Observation, have made _Groves_ and
_Woods_ the usual Retreat to those who love _Solitude_, especially to
the _Religious_, the _Pensive_, the _Melancholy_, and the _Amorous_.
And do not we find that we have so join'd the Ideas of these
Dispositions of Mind with those external Objects, that they always
recur to us along with them? The Cunning of the _Heathen Priests_
might make such obscure Places the Scene of the fictitious Appearances
of their _Deitys_; and hence we join Ideas of something _Divine_ to
them. We know the like Effect in the Ideas of our _Churches_, from the
perpetual Use of them only in _religious Exercises_. The faint Light
in _Gothick Buildings_ has had the same Association of a very foreign
Idea, which our _Poet_ shews in his _Epithet_,

[Footnote 21: See above _Art._ 3. of this Section.]


    ----_A dim religious Light_[22].


In like manner it is known, That often all the Circumstances of
_Actions_, or _Places_, or _Dresses_ of Persons, or _Voice_, or
_Song_, which have occurr'd at any time together, when we were
strongly affected by any Passion, will be so connected that any one of
these will make all the rest recur. And this is often the occasion
both of great Pleasure and Pain, Delight and Aversion to many
Objects, which of themselves might have been perfectly indifferent to
us: but these _Approbations_, or _Distastes_, are remote from the
Ideas of _Beauty_, being plainly different Ideas.

[Footnote 22: Milt. Il Penseroso.]

[Sidenote: _Musick, how it pleases differently_.]

XII. There is also another Charm in _Musick_ to various Persons, which
is distinct from the _Harmony_, and is occasion'd by its raising
agreeable Passions. The _human Voice_ is obviously vary'd by all the
stronger Passions; now, when our _Ear_ discerns any Resemblance
between the _Air_ of a _Tune_, whether sung or play'd upon an
Instrument, either in its _Time_, or _Modulation_, or any other
Circumstance, to the Sound of the _human Voice_, in any Passion, we
shall be touch'd by it in a very sensible manner, and have
_Melancholy_, _Joy_, _Gravity_, _Thoughtfulness_, excited in us by a
sort of _Sympathy_ or _Contagion_. The same Connexion is observable
between the very _Air_ of a _Tune_, and the _Words_ expressing any
Passion which we have heard it fitted to, so that they shall both
recur to us together, tho' but one of them affects our _Senses_.

Now in such a Diversity of pleasing or displeasing Ideas, which may be
join'd with Forms of _Bodys_, or _Tunes_, when Men are of such
different Dispositions, and prone to such a Variety of Passions, it is
no Wonder, "that they should often disagree in their Fancys of
Objects, even altho' their _Sense of Beauty_ and _Harmony_ were
_perfectly uniform_;" because many other Ideas may either please or
displease, according to Persons Tempers, and past Circumstances. We
know how agreeable a very _wild Country_ may be to any Person who has
spent the chearful Days of his Youth in it, and how disagreeable very
_beautiful Places_ may be, if they were the Scenes of his Misery. And
this may help us in many Cases to account for the Diversitys of Fancy,
without denying the _Uniformity_ of our _internal Sense of Beauty_.

XIII. Grandeur and _Novelty_ are two Ideas different from _Beauty_,
which often recommend Objects to us. The Reason of this is foreign to
the present Subject. See _Spectator_, N^{o} 412.




SECT. VII.

     _Of the Power of_ Custom, Education, _and_ Example, _as
     to our_ internal Senses.


I. Custom, _Education_, and _Example_ are so often alledg'd in this
Affair, as the Occasion of our Relish for _beautiful Objects_, and for
our Approbation of, or Delight in, a certain _Conduct in Life_ in a
_moral_ Species, that it is necessary to examine these three
particularly, to make it appear, "that there is a _natural_ Power of
_Perception_, or _Sense of Beauty_ in Objects, antecedent to all
_Custom, Education_, or _Example_."

[Sidenote: _Custom gives no new Sense_.]

II. Custom, as distinct from the other two, operates in this manner.
As to Actions, it only gives a Disposition to the Mind or Body more
easily to perform those Actions which have been frequently repeated;
but never leads us to apprehend them under any other View, than what
we were capable of apprehending them under at first; nor gives us any
new Power of Perception about them. We are naturally capable of
Sentiments of _Fear_, and _Dread_ of any powerful _Presence_; and so
_Custom_ may connect the Ideas of religious _Horror_ to certain
Buildings: but _Custom_ could never have made a _Being_ naturally
incapable of _Fear_, receive such Ideas. So, had we no other Power of
perceiving, or forming Ideas of Actions, but as they were
_advantageous_ or _disadvantageous_, _Custom_ could only have made us
more ready at perceiving the _Advantage_ or _Disadvantage_ of Actions.
But this is not to our present Purpose.

As to our Approbation of, or Delight in external Objects; When the
_Blood_ or _Spirits_, of which _Anatomists_ talk, are rous'd,
quicken'd, or fermented as they call it, in any agreeable manner, by
Medicine or Nutriment; or any _Glands_ frequently stimulated to
Secretion; it is certain, that to preserve the Body easy, we shall
delight in Objects of Taste, which of themselves are not immediately
pleasant to it, if they promote that agreeable State, which the Body
had been _accustom'd_ to. Farther, _Custom_ will so alter the State of
the Body, that what at first rais'd uneasy Sensations, will cease to
do so, or perhaps raise another agreeable Idea of the same Sense; but
_Custom_ can never give us any Idea of a Sense different from those we
had antecedent to it: It will never make the _Blind_ approve Objects
as _coloured_, or those who have no _Taste_ approve Meats as
_delicious_, however they might approve them as _strengthening_ or
_exhilarating_. Were our _Glands_, and the Parts about them, void of
Feeling, did we perceive no Pleasure from certain brisker Motions in
the _Blood_, _Custom_ could never make stimulating or intoxicating
Fluids or Medicines agreeable, when they were not so to the Taste: So,
by like Reasoning, had we no _natural Sense_ of _Beauty_ from
_Uniformity_, _Custom_ could never have made us imagine any _Beauty_
in Objects; if we had had no Ear, Custom could never have given us the
Pleasures of _Harmony_. When we have these _natural Senses_
antecedently, _Custom_ may make us capable of extending our Views
farther, and of receiving more complex Ideas of _Beauty_ in Bodys, or
_Harmony_ in Sounds, by increasing our Attention, and Quickness of
Perception. But however _Custom_ may increase our Power of receiving
or comparing complex Ideas, yet it seems rather to weaken than
strengthen the Ideas of _Beauty_, or the Impressions of Pleasure from
regular Objects; else how is it possible that any Person could go into
the open Air on a sunny Day, or clear Evening, without the most
extravagant Raptures, such as Milton[23] represents our _Ancestor_ in,
upon his first Creation? For such any Person would certainly fall
into, upon the first Representation of such a Scene.

[Footnote 23: See _Paradise Lost_, Book 8.]

Custom in like manner may make it easier for any Person to discern the
Use of a complex Machine, and approve it as _advantageous_; but he
would never have imagin'd it _beautiful_, had he no _natural Sense_ of
_Beauty_. _Custom_ may make us quicker in apprehending the Truth of
complex _Theorems_, but we all find the Pleasure or _Beauty_ of
_Theorems_ as strong at first as ever. _Custom_ makes us more capable
of retaining and comparing complex Ideas, so as to discern more
complicated _Uniformity_, which escapes the Observation of _Novices_
in any Art; but all this presupposes a _natural Sense_ of _Beauty_ in
_Uniformity_: for, had there been nothing in Forms, which was
constituted the necessary Occasion of Pleasure to our Senses, no
Repetition of indifferent Ideas as to Pleasure or Pain, _Beauty_ or
_Deformity_, could ever have made them grow pleasing or displeasing.

[Sidenote: _Nor Education_.]

III. The Effect of Education is this, that thereby we receive many
speculative Opinions, which are sometimes true, and sometimes false;
and are often led to believe, that Objects may be naturally apt to
give Pleasure or Pain to our external Senses, which in reality have no
such Qualitys. And farther, by _Education_ there are some strong
Associations of Ideas without any Reason, by mere Accident sometimes,
as well as by Design, which it is very hard for us ever after to
break asunder. Thus Aversions are rais'd to Darkness, and to many
kinds of Meat, and to certain innocent Actions: Approbations without
Ground are rais'd in like manner. But in all these Instances,
_Education_ never makes us apprehend any Qualitys in Objects, which we
have not _naturally_ Senses capable of perceiving. We know what
Sickness of the Stomach is, and may without Ground believe, that very
healthful Meats will raise this; we by our Sight and Smell receive
disagreeable Ideas of the Food of Swine, and their Styes, and perhaps
cannot prevent the recurring of these Ideas at Table: but never were
Men naturally _blind_ prejudic'd against Objects as of a disagreeable
Colour, or in favour of others as of a beautiful Colour; they perhaps
hear Men dispraise one Colour, and may imagine this Colour to be some
quite different sensible Quality of the other Senses, but that is all.
And the same way, a Man naturally void of _Taste_ could by no
_Education_ receive the Ideas of Taste, or be prejudic'd in favour of
Meats as delicious: So, had we no _natural Sense_ of _Beauty_ and
_Harmony_, we could never be prejudic'd in favour of Objects or Sounds
as _beautiful_ or _harmonious_. _Education_ may make an unattentive
Goth imagine that his _Countrymen_ have attain'd the Perfection of
_Architecture_; and an Aversion to their Enemys the Romans, may have
join'd some disagreeable Ideas to their very Buildings, and excited
them to their Demolition; but he had never form'd these Prejudices,
had he been void of a _Sense_ of _Beauty_. Did ever _blind Men_ debate
whether _Purple_ or _Scarlet_ were the finer _Colour_? or could any
_Education_ prejudice them in favour of either as _Colours_?

Thus _Education_ and _Custom_ may influence our _internal Senses_,
where they are antecedently, by inlarging the Capacity of our Minds to
retain and compare the Parts of complex Compositions: And then, if the
finest Objects are presented to us, we grow conscious of a Pleasure
far superior to what common Performances excite. But all this
presupposes our _Sense_ of _Beauty_ to be _natural_. Instruction in
_Anatomy_, Observation of _Nature_, and of those _Airs_ of the
Countenance, and _Attitudes_ of Body, which accompany any _Sentiment_,
_Action_, or _Passion_, may enable us to know where there is a just
Imitation: but why should an exact Imitation please upon Observation,
if we had not _naturally_ a _Sense_ of _Beauty_ in it, more than the
observing the Situation of fifty or a hundred Pebbles thrown at
random? and should we observe them ever so often, we should never
dream of their growing _beautiful_.

[Sidenote: _Prejudices how removed_.]

IV. There is something worth our Observation as to the manner of
rooting out the _Prejudices_ of _Education_, not quite foreign to the
present Purpose. When the _Prejudice_ arises from Associations of
Ideas without any natural Connection, we must frequently force
ourselves to bear Representations of those Objects, or the Use of them
when separated from the disagreeable Idea; and this may at last
disjoin the unreasonable Association, especially if we can join new
agreeable Ideas to them: Thus, Opinions of _Superstition_ are best
remov'd by pleasant Conversation of Persons we esteem for their
_Virtue_, or by observing that they despise such Opinions. But when
the _Prejudice_ arises from an Apprehension or Opinion of _natural
Evil_, as the Attendant, or Consequent of any Object or Action; if the
_Evil_ be apprehended to be the constant and immediate Attendant, a
few Trials, without receiving any Damage, will remove the _Prejudice_,
as in that against _Meats_: But where the _Evil_ is not represented as
the perpetual Concomitant, but as what may possibly or probably at
some time or other accompany the Use of the Object, there must be
frequent Reasoning with ourselves, or a long Series of Trials without
any Detriment, to remove the _Prejudice_; such is the Case of our Fear
of _Spirits_ in the _Dark_, and in _Church-yards_. And when the _Evil_
is represented as the Consequence perhaps a long time after, or in a
_future State_, it is then hardest of all to remove the _Prejudice_;
and this is only to be effected by slow Processes of Reason, because
in this Case there can be no Trials made: and this is the Case of
_superstitious Prejudices_ against Actions apprehended as offensive to
the Deity; and hence it is that they are so hard to be rooted out.

[Sidenote: _Example not the Cause of internal Sense_.]

V. Example seems to operate in this manner. We are conscious that we
act very much for _Pleasure_, or _private Good_; and are thereby led
to imagine that others do so too: hence we conclude there must be some
_Perfection_ in the Objects which we see others pursue, and _Evil_ in
those which we observe them constantly shunning. Or, the _Example_ of
others may serve to us as so many Trials to remove the Apprehension of
_Evil_ in Objects to which we had an Aversion. But all this is done
upon an Apprehension of Qualitys perceivable by the Senses which we
have; for no _Example_ will induce the _Blind_ or _Deaf_ to pursue
Objects as _colour'd_ or _sonorous_; nor could _Example_ any more
engage us to pursue Objects as _beautiful_ or _harmonious_, had we no
_natural Sense_ of _Beauty_ or _Harmony_.

Example may make us conclude without Examination, that our Countrymen
have obtain'd the Perfection of _Beauty_ in their _Works_, or that
there is less _Beauty_ in the Orders of _Architecture_ or _Painting_,
us'd in other _Nations_, and so content ourselves with very imperfect
Forms. And Fear of Contempt as void of _Taste_ or _Genius_, often
makes us join in approving the Performances of the reputed Masters in
our Country, and restrains those who have _naturally_ a fine _Genius_,
or the _internal Senses_ very acute, from studying to obtain the
greatest Perfection; it makes also those of a bad _Taste_ pretend to a
livelier Perception of _Beauty_ than in reality they have: But all
this presupposes some _natural Power_ of receiving Ideas of _Beauty_
and _Harmony_. Nor can _Example_ effect any thing farther, unless it
be to lead Men to pursue Objects by implicit Faith, for some
Perfection which the Pursuer is conscious he does not know, or which
perhaps is some very different Quality from the Idea perceiv'd by
those of a good _Taste_ in such Affairs.




SECT. VIII.

     _Of the_ Importance _of the_ internal Senses _in Life_,
     _and the_ final Causes _of them_.


[Sidenote: _Importance of the_ internal Senses.]

I. The busy part of Mankind may look upon these things as airy Dreams
of an inflam'd Imagination, which a wise Man should despise, who
rationally pursues more solid Possessions independent on Fancy: but a
little Reflection will convince us, "That the Gratifications of our
_internal Senses_ are as _natural_, _real_, and _satisfying_
Enjoyments as any sensible Pleasure whatsoever; and that they are the
chief Ends for which we commonly pursue _Wealth_ and _Power_." For how
is _Wealth_ or _Power advantageous_? How do they make us _happy_, or
prove _good_ to us? No otherwise than as they supply Gratifications to
our _Senses_, or Facultys of perceiving Pleasure. Now, are these
_Senses_ or Facultys only the _external ones_? No: Every body sees,
that a small portion of _Wealth_ or _Power_ will supply more Pleasures
of the _external Senses_ than we can enjoy; we know that Scarcity
often heightens these Perceptions more than Abundance, which cloys
that Appetite which is necessary to all Pleasure in Enjoyment: and
hence the _Poet's_ Advice is perfectly just;


    ----Tu pulmentaria qure Sudando----[24]


In short, the only Use of a great Fortune above a very small one
(except in _good Offices_, and _moral Pleasures_) must be to supply us
with the Pleasures of _Beauty_, _Order_, and _Harmony_.

It is true indeed, that the noblest Pleasures of the _internal
Senses_, in the Contemplation of the Works of Nature, are expos'd to
every one without Expence; the _Poor_ and the _Low_, may have as free
Use of these Objects, in this way, as the _Wealthy_ or _Powerful_. And
even in Objects which may be appropriated, the _Property_ is of little
Consequence to the Enjoyment of their Beauty, which is often enjoy'd
by others beside the _Proprietor_. But then there are other Objects of
these _internal Senses_, which require _Wealth_ or _Power_ to procure
the Use of them as frequently as we desire; as appears in
_Architecture_, _Musick_, _Gardening_, _Painting_, _Dress_,
_Equipage_, _Furniture_; of which we cannot have the full Enjoyment
without _Property_. And there are some confus'd _Imaginations_, which
often lead us to pursue _Property_, even in Objects where it is not
necessary to the true Enjoyment of them. These are the _ultimate
Motives_ of our pursuing the greater Degrees of _Wealth_, where there
are no generous Intentions of virtuous Actions.

[Footnote 24: Hor. Lib. 2. Sat. 2. v. 20.]

That is confirm'd by the constant Practice of the very Enemys to these
_Senses_. As soon as they think they are got above the _World_, or
extricated from the Hurrys of _Avarice_ and _Ambition_; banish'd
_Nature_ will return upon them, and set them upon Pursuits of _Beauty_
and _Order_ in their _Houses_, _Gardens_, _Dress_, _Table_,
_Equipage_. They are never easy without some Degree of this; and were
their Hearts open to our View, we should see _Regularity_, _Decency_,
_Beauty_, as what their Wishes terminate upon, either to themselves or
to their Posterity; and what their Imagination is always presenting to
them as the possible Effects of their Labours. Nor without this could
they ever justify their Pursuits to themselves.

There may perhaps be some Instances of human Nature perverted into a
thorow _Miser_, who loves nothing but Money, and whose Fancy arises no
higher than the cold dull Thought of Possession; but such an Instance
in an Age, must not be made the Standard of Mankind against the whole
Body.

If we examine the Pursuits of the _Luxurious_, who is imagin'd wholly
devoted to his Belly; we shall generally find that the far greater
part of his Expence is employ'd to procure other Sensations than those
of Taste; such as _fine Attendants_, _regular Apartments_, _Services
of Plate_, and the like. Besides, a large Share of the Preparation
must be suppos'd design'd for some sort of generous friendly Purposes,
to please _Acquaintance_, _Strangers_, _Parasites_. How few would be
contented to enjoy the same Sensations alone, in a Cottage, or out of
earthen Pitchers? To conclude this Point, however these _internal
Sensations_ may be overlook'd in our Philosophical Inquirys about the
human Facultys, we shall find in Fact, "That they employ us more, and
are more efficacious in _Life_, either to our _Pleasure_ or
_Uneasiness_, than all our _external Senses_ taken together."

[Sidenote: _Final Cause of the internal Senses_.]

II. As to the _final Causes_ of this _internal Sense_, we need not
inquire, "Whether, to an _Almighty_, and _All-knowing Being_, there be
any real Excellence in _regular Forms_, in acting by _general Laws_,
in knowing by _Theorems_?" We seem scarce capable of answering such
Questions any way; nor need we inquire, "Whether other Animals may
not discern _Uniformity_ and _Regularity_ in Objects which escape our
Observation, and may not perhaps have their Senses constituted so as
to perceive _Beauty_ from the same Foundation which we do, in Objects
which our Senses are not fit to examine or compare?" We shall confine
ourselves to a Subject where we have some certain Foundation to go
upon, and only inquire, "if we can find any Reasons worthy of the
great Author of _Nature_, for making such a Connection between regular
Objects, and the Pleasure which accompanys our Perceptions of them;
or, what Reasons might possibly influence him to create the _World_,
as it at present is, as far as we can observe, every-where full of
_Regularity_ and _Uniformity_."

Let it be here observ'd, that as far as we know concerning any of the
great Bodys of the _Universe_, we see Forms and Motions really
_beautiful_ to our Senses; and if we were plac'd in any _Planet_, the
_apparent Courses_ would still be _regular_ and _uniform_, and
consequently _beautiful_ to us. Now this gives us no small Ground to
imagine, that if the Senses of their Inhabitants are in the same
manner adapted to their Habitations, and the Objects occurring to
their View, as ours are here, their Senses must be upon the same
general Foundation with ours.

But to return to the Questions: What occurs to resolve them, may be
contain'd in the following Propositions.

1. The Manner of Knowledge by _universal Theorems_, and of Operation
by _universal Causes_, as far as we can attain it, must be most
convenient for _Beings_ of limited Understanding and Power; since this
prevents Distraction in their Understandings thro' the Multiplicity of
Propositions, and Toil and Weariness to their Powers of Action: and
consequently their _Reason_, without any _Sense_ of _Beauty_, must
approve of such Methods when they reflect upon their apparent
_Advantage_.

2. Those Objects of Contemplation in which there is _Uniformity amidst
Variety_, are more distinctly and easily comprehended and retain'd,
than _irregular Objects_; because the accurate Observation of one or
two Parts often leads to the Knowledge of the Whole: Thus we can from
a _Pillar_ or two, with an intermediate _Arch_, and _Cornice_, form a
distinct Idea of a whole _regular Building_, if we know of what
Species it is, and have its Length and Breadth: From a _Side_ and
_solid Angle_, we have the whole _regular Solid_; the measuring one
_Side_, gives the whole _Square_; one _Radius_, the whole _Circle_;
two _Diameters_, an _Oval_; one _Ordinate_ and _Abscissa_, the
_Parabola_; thus also other Figures, if they have any Regularity, are
in every Point determin'd from a few _Data_: Whereas it must be a long
Attention to a vast Multiplicity of Parts, which can ascertain or fix
the Idea of any _irregular Form_, or give any distinct Idea of it, or
make us capable of retaining it; as appears in the Forms of _rude
Rocks_, and _Pebbles_, and _confus'd Heaps_, even when the Multitude
of sensible Parts is not so great as in the _regular Forms_: for such
_irregular Objects_ distract the _Mind_ with _Variety_, since for
every sensible Part we must have a quite different Idea.

3. From these two Proportions it follows, "That _Beings_ of limited
Understanding and Power, if they act rationally for their own
_Interest_, must choose to operate by the _simplest Means_, to invent
_general Theorems_, and to study _regular Objects_, if they be as
useful as _irregular ones_; that they may avoid the endless Toil of
producing each Effect by a separate Operation, of searching out each
different Truth by a different Inquiry, and of imprinting the endless
_Variety_ of dissimilar Ideas in _irregular Objects_."

4. But then, beside this Consideration of _Interest_, there does not
appear to be any necessary Connection, antecedent to the Constitution
of the Author of _Nature_, between _regular Forms_, _Actions,
Theorems_, and that sudden sensible _Pleasure_ excited in us upon
Observation of them, even when we do not reflect upon the Advantage
mention'd in the former Proposition. And possibly, the Deity could
have form'd us so as to have receiv'd no immediate Pleasure from such
Object, or connected Pleasure to those of a quite contrary Nature. We
have a tolerable Presumption of this in the _Beautys_ of various
Animals; they give some small Pleasure indeed to every one who views
them; but then every one seems far more delighted with the peculiar
_Beautys_ of its own _Species_, than with those of a different one,
which seldom raise any Desire. This makes it probable, that the
_Pleasure_ is not the necessary Result of the _Form_ itself, otherwise
it would equally affect all Apprehensions in what Species soever, but
depends upon a voluntary _Constitution_, adapted to preserve the
_Regularity_ of the _Universe_, and is probably not the Effect of
_Necessity_, but _Choice_, in the Supreme Agent, who constituted our
_Senses_.

[Sidenote: _From the divine Goodness._]

5. But from the whole we may conclude, "That supposing the Deity so
_kind_ as to connect _sensible Pleasure_ with certain Actions or
Contemplations, beside the _rational Advantage_ perceivable in them;
there is a great _moral Necessity_, from his _Goodness_, that the
_internal Sense_ of Men should be constituted as it is at present, so
as to make _Uniformity amidst Variety_ the Occasion of Pleasure." For
were it not so, but on the contrary, if _irregular Objects_,
_particular Truths_ and _Operations_ pleased us, beside the endless
Toil this would involve us in, there must arise a perpetual
Dissatisfaction in all rational Agents with themselves; since _Reason_
and _Interest_ would lead us to simple _general Causes_, while a
_contrary Sense_ of _Beauty_ would make us disapprove them: _Universal
Theorems_ would appear to our Understanding the best Means of
increasing our Knowledge of what might be useful; while a _contrary
Sense_ would set us on the search after _particular Truths_: _Thought_
and _Reflection_ would recommend Objects with _Uniformity amidst
Variety_, and yet this _perverse Instinct_ would involve us in
Labyrinths of _Confusion_ and _Dissimilitude_. And hence we see "how
suitable it is to the _sagacious Bounty_ which we suppose in the
Deity, to constitute our _internal Senses_ in the manner in which they
are; by which Pleasure is join'd to the Contemplation of _those
Objects_ which a finite _Mind_ can best imprint and retain the Ideas
of with the least Distraction; to _those Actions_ which are most
efficacious, and fruitful in useful Effects; and to those _Theorems_
which most inlarge our _Minds_."

[Sidenote: _Reason of general Laws._]

III. As to the other Question, "What Reason might influence the Deity,
whom no Diversity of Operation could distract or weary, to choose to
operate by _simplest Means_, and _general Laws_, and to diffuse
_Uniformity_, _Proportion_, and _Similitude_ thro' all the Parts of
_Nature_ which we can observe?" Perhaps there may be some real
Excellence in this Manner of Operation, and in these Forms, which we
know not: but this we may probably say, that since the _divine
Goodness_, for the Reasons above-mention'd, has constituted our
_Sense_ of _Beauty_ as it is at present, the same _Goodness_ might
have determined the _Great_ Architect to adorn this stupendous
_Theatre_ in a manner agreeable to the Spectators, and that Part which
is expos'd to the Observation of Men, so as to be pleasant to them;
especially if we suppose, that he design'd to discover himself to them
as _Wise_ and _Good_, as well as _Powerful_: for thus he has given
them greater Evidences, thro' the whole _Earth_, of his _Art_,
_Wisdom_, _Design_, and _Bounty_, than they can possibly have for the
_Reason_, _Counsel_, and _Good-will_ of their Fellow-Creatures, with
whom they converse, with full Persuasion of these Qualities in them,
about their common Affairs.

As to the Operations of the Deity by _general Laws_, there is still a
farther Reason from a _Sense_ superior to these already consider'd,
even that of Virtue, or the _Beauty of Action_, which is the
Foundation of our greatest Happiness. For were there no _general
Laws_ fix'd in the Course of _Nature_, there could be no _Prudence_ or
_Design_ in Men, no _rational Expectation_ of Effects from Causes, no
_Schemes_ of Action projected, or any _regular Execution_. If then,
according to the _Frame_ of our _Nature_, our greatest Happiness must
depend upon our Actions, as it may perhaps be made appear it does,
"the _Universe_ must be govern'd, not by _particular Wills_, but by
_general Laws_, upon which we can found our Expectations, and project
our Schemes of Action." Nay farther, tho' _general Laws_ did
ordinarily obtain, yet if the Deity usually stopp'd their Effects
whenever it was necessary to prevent any particular Evils; this would
effectually, and justly supersede all human _Prudence_ and _Care_
about Actions; since a superior _Mind_ did thus relieve Men from their
Charge.




TREATISE II.

AN INQUIRY CONCERNING
Moral Good _and_ Evil.

    *    *    *    *    *


INTRODUCTION.

[Sidenote: _Moral Good and Evil._]

The Word Moral Goodness, in this Treatise, denotes our Idea of _some
Quality apprehended in Actions, which procures Approbation, attended
with Desire of the Agent's Happiness_. Moral Evil denotes our Idea of
_a contrary Quality, which excites Condemnation or Dislike_.
Approbation and Confirmation are probably simple Ideas, which cannot
be farther explained. We must be contented with these imperfect
Descriptions, until we discover whether we really have such Ideas, and
what general _Foundation_ there is in Nature for this Difference of
Actions, as _morally Good_ or _Evil_.

These Descriptions seem to contain an universally acknowledg'd
Difference of _Moral Good_ and _Evil_, from _Natural_. All Men who
speak of _moral Good_, acknowledge that it procures _Approbation_ and
_Good-will_ toward those we apprehend possess'd of it; whereas
_natural Good_ does not. In this matter Men must consult their own
Breasts. How differently are they affected toward these they suppose
possess'd of _Honesty_, _Faith_, _Generosity_, _Kindness_; and those
who are possess'd of the _natural Goods_, such as _Houses_, _Lands_,
_Gardens_, _Vineyards_, _Health_, _Strength_, _Sagacity_? We shall
find that we necessarily love and approve the Possessors of the
former; but the Possession of the latter procures no _Approbation_ or
_Good-will_ at all toward the Possessor, but often contrary Affections
of _Envy_ and _Hatred_. In the same manner, whatever Quality we
apprehend to be _morally evil_, raises our Dislike toward the Person
in whom we observe it, such as _Treachery_, _Cruelty_, _Ingratitude_;
whereas we heartily love, esteem, and pity many who are expos'd to
_natural Evils_, such as _Pain_, _Poverty_, _Hunger_, _Sickness_,
_Death_.

Now the first Question on this Subject is, "Whence arise these
different Ideas of Actions?"

[Sidenote: _Interest. Advantage._]

Because we shall afterwards frequently use the Words _Interest_,
_Advantage_, _natural Good_, it is necessary here to fix their Ideas.
The Pleasure in our sensible Perceptions of any kind, gives us our
first Idea of _natural Good_ or _Happiness_; and then all Objects
which are apt to excite this Pleasure are call'd _immediately good_.
Those Objects which may procure others immediately pleasant, are
call'd _Advantageous_: and we pursue both Kinds from a View of
_Interest_, or from _Self-Love_.

Our _Sense_ of Pleasure is antecedent to _Advantage_ or _Interest_,
and is the Foundation of it. We do not perceive Pleasure in Objects,
because it is our _Interest_ to do so; but Objects or Actions are
_advantageous_, and are pursu'd or undertaken from _Interest_, because
we receive _Pleasure_ from them. Our Perception of Pleasure is
necessary, and nothing is _advantageous_ or _naturally good_ to us,
but what is apt to raise Pleasure _mediately_, or _immediately_. Such
Objects as we know either from Experience of Sense, or Reason, to be
_immediately_ or _mediately advantageous_, or apt to minister
Pleasure, we are said to pursue from _Self-Interest_, when our
Intention is only to enjoy this Pleasure, which they have the Power of
exciting. Thus _Meats_, _Drink_, _Harmony_, _fine Prospects_,
_Painting_, _Statues_, are perceiv'd by our Senses to be _immediately
good_; and our Reason shews _Riches_ and _Power_ to be _mediately so_,
that is, apt to furnish us with Objects of immediate Pleasure: and
both Kinds of these _natural Goods_ are pursu'd from _Interest_, or
_Self-Love_.

[Sidenote: _Opinions about our Sense of moral Good and Evil._]

Now the greatest Part of our latter _Moralists_ establish it as
undeniable, "That all _moral Qualitys_ have necessarily some Relation
to the _Law_ of a _Superior_, of sufficient Power to make us _happy_
or _miserable_;" and since all _Laws_ operate only by Sanctions of
_Rewards_, or _Punishments_, which determine us to Obedience by
Motives of _Self-Interest_, they suppose, "that it is thus that _Laws_
do constitute some Actions _mediately Good_, or _Advantageous_, and
others the same way _disadvantageous_." They say indeed, "That a
_benevolent Legislator_ constitutes no Actions _advantageous_ to the
Agent by Law, but such as in their own Nature tend to the _natural
Good_ of the _Whole_, or, at least, are not inconsistent with it; and
that therefore we approve the _Virtue_ of others, because it has some
small Tendency to our _Happiness_, either from its own Nature, or from
this general Consideration, That Obedience to a _benevolent
Legislator_ is in general _advantageous_ to the _Whole_, and to us in
particular; and that for the contrary Reasons alone, we disapprove the
_Vice_ of others, that is, the prohibited Action, as tending to our
particular _Detriment_ in some degree." And then they maintain, "That
we are determin'd to Obedience to _Laws_, or deterr'd from
Disobedience, merely by Motives of _Self-Interest_, to obtain either
the _natural Good_ arising from the commanded Action, or the _Rewards_
promised by the Sanction; or to avoid the _natural evil_ Consequences
of Disobedience, or at least the _Penaltys_ of the _Law_."

Some other Moralists suppose "an _immediate natural Good_ in the
Actions call'd _virtuous_; that is, That we are determin'd to perceive
some _Beauty_ in the Actions of others, and to love the Agent, even
without reflecting upon any _Advantage_ which can any way redound to
us from the Action; that we have also a secret Sense of Pleasure
arising from Reflection upon such of our own Actions as we call
_virtuous_, even when we expect no other _Advantage_ from them." But
they alledge at the same time, "That we are excited to perform these
Actions, even as we pursue, or purchase _Pictures_, _Statues_,
_Landskips_, from _Self-Interest_, to obtain this Pleasure which
arises from Reflection upon the Action, or some other future
Advantage." The Design of the following Sections is to inquire into
this Matter; and perhaps the Reasons to be offered may prove,

I. "That some Actions have to Men an _immediate Goodness_; or, that by
a _superior Sense_, which I call a _Moral one_, we _approve_ the
Actions of others, and perceive them to be their Perfection and
Dignity, and are determin'd to love the Agent; a like Perception we
have in reflecting on such Actions of our own, without any View of
_natural Advantage_ from them."

II. It may perhaps also appear, "That the _Affection, Desire_, or
_Intention_, which gains _Approbation_ to the Actions flowing from it,
is not an Intention to obtain even this _sensible Pleasure_; much less
the _future Rewards_ from Sanctions of Laws, or any other _natural
Good_, which may be the Consequence of the _virtuous_ Action; but an
intirely different Principle of Action from _Self-Love_, or Desire of
private Good."




SECT. I.

     _Of the_ Moral Sense _by which we perceive_ Virtue
     _and_ Vice, _and approve or disapprove them in others_.


[Sidenote: _Different Ideas of_ Moral _and _Natural Good.]

I. That the Perceptions of _moral Good_ and _Evil_, are perfectly
different from those of _natural Good_ or _Advantage_, every one must
convince himself, by reflecting upon the different Manner in which he
finds himself affected when these Objects occur to him. Had we no
_Sense_ of _Good_ distinct from the _Advantage_ or _Interest_ arising
from the external Senses, and the Perceptions of _Beauty_ and
_Harmony_; the Sensations and Affections toward a _fruitful Field_, or
_commodious Habitation_, would be much the same with what we have
toward a _generous Friend_, or any _noble Character_; for both are or
may be _advantageous_ to us: And we should no more admire any Action,
or love any Person in a distant _Country_, or _Age_, whose Influence
could not extend to us, than we love the _Mountains_ of Peru, while we
are unconcern'd in the _Spanish Trade_. We should have the same
Sentiments and Affections toward _inanimate Beings_, which we have
toward _rational Agents_, which yet every one knows to be false. Upon
Comparison, we say, "Why should we approve or love _inanimate Beings_?
They have no Intention of _Good_ to us, or to any other Person; their
_Nature_ makes them fit for our Uses, which they neither know nor
study to serve. But it is not so with _rational Agents_: they study
the _Interest_, and desire the _Happiness_ of other Beings with whom
they converse."

We are all then conscious of the Difference between that _Approbation_
or Perception of _moral Excellence_, which _Benevolence_ excites
toward the Person in whom we observe it, and that Opinion of _natural
Goodness_, which only raises _Desire_ of Possession toward the good
Object. Now "what should make this Difference, if all Approbation, or
_Sense_ of _Good_ be from Prospect of _Advantage_? Do not _inanimate
Objects_ promote our _Advantage_ as well as _benevolent Persons_, who
do us Offices of _Kindness_ and _Friendship_? should we not then have
the same endearing Approbation of both? or only the same cold Opinion
of _Advantage_ in both?" The Reason why it is not so, must be this,
"That we have a distinct Perception of _Beauty_ or _Excellence_ in the
kind Affections of _rational Agents_; whence we are determin'd to
admire and love such _Characters_ and _Persons_."

[Sidenote: _In Actions done to ourselves._]

Suppose we reap the same _Advantage_ from two Men, one of whom serves
us from an _ultimate Desire_ of our Happiness, or Good-will toward us;
the other from Views of _Self-Interest_, or by _Constraint_: both are
in this Case equally beneficial or _advantageous_ to us, and yet we
shall have quite different Sentiments of them. We must then certainly
have other Perceptions of _moral Actions_, than those of _Advantage_:
And that Power of receiving these Perceptions may be call'd a Moral
Sense, since the Definition agrees to it, _viz._ a _Determination of
the Mind, to receive any Idea from the Presence of an Object which
occurs to us, independent on our Will_[25].

[Footnote 25: _See the Preface, Page 6._]

[Sidenote: _Of Evil, Moral and Natural._]

This perhaps will be equally evident from our Ideas of _Evil_, done to
us designedly by a _rational Agent_. Our Senses of _natural Good_ and
_Evil_ would make us receive, with equal Serenity and Composure, an
_Assault_, a _Buffet_, an _Affront_ from a _Neighbour_, a _Cheat_ from
a _Partner_, or _Trustee_, as we would an equal Damage from the Fall
of a _Beam_, a _Tile_, or a _Tempest_; and we should have the same
Affections and Sentiments on both Occasions. _Villainy_, _Treachery_,
_Cruelty_, would be as meekly resented as a _Blast_, or _Mildew_, or
an overflowing _Stream_. But I fansy every one is very differently
affected on these Occasions, tho' there may be equal _natural Evil_ in
both. Nay, Actions no way detrimental may occasion the strongest Anger
and Indignation, if they evidence only impotent Hatred or Contempt.
And, on the other hand, the Intervention of _moral Ideas_ may prevent
our _Condemnation_ of the Agent, or bad moral Apprehension of that
Action, which causes to us the greatest _natural Evil_. Thus the
Opinion of _Justice_ in any Sentence, will prevent all Ideas of _moral
Evil_ in the Execution, or Hatred toward the _Magistrate_, who is the
immediate Cause of our greatest Sufferings.

[Sidenote: _In Actions toward others_.]

II. In our Sentiments of Actions which affect ourselves, there is
indeed a Mixture of the Ideas of _natural_ and _moral Good_, which
require some Attention to separate them. But when we reflect upon the
Actions which affect other Persons only, we may observe the _moral
Ideas_ unmix'd with those of _natural Good_ or _Evil_. For let it be
here observ'd, that those Senses by which we perceive Pleasure in
natural Objects, whence they are constituted _Advantageous_, could
never raise in us any Desire of _publick Good_, but only of what was
good to ourselves in particular. Nor could they ever make us approve
an Action merely because of its promoting the Happiness of others. And
yet, as soon as any Action is represented to us as flowing from
_Love_, _Humanity_, _Gratitude_, _Compassion_, a _Study_ of the Good
of others, and an ultimate Desire of their Happiness, altho' it were
in the most distant Part of the World, or in some past Age, we feel
Joy within us, admire the lovely Action, and praise its Author. And on
the contrary, every Action represented as flowing from Ill-will,
Desire of the Misery of others without View to any prevalent Good to
the Publick, or _Ingratitude_, raises Abhorrence and Aversion.

It is true indeed, that the Actions we approve in others, are
generally imagin'd to tend to the _natural Good_ of _Mankind_, or of
some _Parts_ of it. But whence this _secret Chain_ between _each
Person_ and _Mankind_? How is my _Interest_ connected with the most
distant _Parts_ of it? And yet I must admire Actions which shew
Good-will toward them, and love the Author. Whence this _Love_,
_Compassion_, _Indignation_ and _Hatred_ toward even _feign'd
Characters_, in the most distant Ages, and Nations, according as they
appear _kind_, _faithful_, _compassionate_, or of the _opposite
Dispositions_, toward their imaginary Contemporaries? If there is no
_moral Sense_, which makes benevolent Actions appear _Beautiful_; if
all Approbation be from the _Interest_ of the Approver,

      _What's_ Hecuba _to us, or we to_ Hecuba?[26]

[Sidenote: _Moral ideas not from Interest._]

III. Some refin'd Explainers of _Self-Love_ may tell us, "That we
approve or condemn _Characters_, according as we apprehend we should
have been supported, or injur'd by them, had we liv'd in their Days."
But how obvious is the Answer, if we only observe, that had we no
Sense of _moral Good_ in _Humanity_, _Mercy_, _Faithfulness_, why
should not _Self-Love_, and our Sense of _natural Good_ engage us
always to the victorious Side, and make us admire and love the
successful _Tyrant_, or _Traitor_? Why do not we love Sinon or
Pyrrhus, in the _neid_? for, had we been Greeks, these two would have
been very _advantageous Characters_. Why are we affected with the
Fortunes of Priamus, Polites, Choroebus or neas? Would not the
_Parsimony_ of a Miser be as advantageous to his Heir, as the
_Generosity_ of a worthy Man is to his Friend? And cannot we as easily
imagine ourselves Heirs to Misers, as the Favourites of Heroes? Why
don't we then approve both alike? It is plain we have some _secret
Sense_ which determines our Approbation without regard to
_Self-Interest_; otherwise we should always favour the _fortunate_
Side without regard to _Virtue_, and suppose ourselves engaged with
that Party.

[Footnote 26: _Tragedy of_ Hamlet.]

Suppose any great Destruction occasion'd by mere _Accident_, without
any Design, or Negligence of the Person who casually was the Author of
it: This Action might have been as _disadvantageous_ to us as design'd
_Cruelty_, or _Malice_; but who will say he has the same Idea of both
Actions, or Sentiments of the Agents? Thus also an easy, indolent
_Simplicity_, which exposes a Man of Wealth as a Prey to others, may
be as advantageous a Disposition as the most _prudent Generosity_, to
those he converses with; and yet our Sentiments of this latter Temper
are far nobler than of the former. "Whence then this Difference?"

And farther, Let us make a Supposition, which perhaps is not far from
Matter of Fact, to try if we cannot approve even _disadvantageous
Actions_, and perceive _moral Good_ in them. A few ingenious
_Artisans_, persecuted in their own Country, flee to ours for
Protection; they instruct us in _Manufactures_ which support Millions
of Poor, increase the Wealth of almost every Person in the _State_,
and make us formidable to our _Neighbours_. In a _Nation_ not far
distant from us, some resolute _Burgomasters_, full of Love to their
_Country_, and Compassion toward their _Fellow-Citizens_, oppress'd in
Body and Soul by a _Tyrant_ and _Inquisition_, with _indefatigable
Diligence_, _publick Spirit_, and _Courage_, support a tedious
perilous War against the _Tyrant_, and form an _industrious
Republick_, which rivals us in _Trade_, and almost in _Power_. All the
World sees whether the _former_ or the _latter_ have been more
_advantageous_ to us: and yet let every Man consult his own Breast,
which of the two Characters he has the most agreeable Idea of? whether
of the _useful Refugee_, or the _publick-spirited Burgomaster_, by
whose Love to his own _Country_, we have often suffer'd in our
_Interests_? And I am confident he will find some other Foundation of
Esteem than _Advantage_, and will see a just Reason, why the Memory of
our _Artisans_ is so obscure among us, and yet that of our _Rivals_ is
immortal.

[Sidenote: _Self-Love not the Ground of Approbation._]


IV. Some _Moralists_, who will rather twist _Self-Love_ into a
thousand Shapes, than allow any other Principle of Approbation than
_Interest_, may tell us, "That whatever profits one Part without
Detriment to another, profits the _Whole_, and then some small Share
will redound to _each Individual_; that those Actions which tend to
the _Good_ of _the Whole_, if universally perform'd, would most
effectually secure to _each Individual_ his own Happiness; and that
consequently, we may approve such Actions, from the Opinion of their
tending ultimately to our own _Advantage_."

We need not trouble these _Gentlemen_ to shew by their nice Train of
Consequences, and Influences of Actions by way of Precedent in
particular Instances, that we in this Age reap any _Advantage_ from
Orestes's killing the _treacherous_ gysthus, or from the Actions of
Codrus or Decius. Allow their Reasonings to be perfectly good, they
only prove, that after long Reflection and Reasoning, we may find out
some Ground to judge certain Actions advantageous to us, which every
Man admires as soon as he hears of them; and that too under a quite
different Conception.

Should any of our Travellers find some old _Grecian Treasure_, the
_Miser_ who hid it, certainly perform'd an Action more to the
Traveller's _Advantage_, than Codrus or Orestes; for he must have but
a small Share of Benefit from their Actions, whose Influence is so
dispers'd, and lost in various Ages and Nations: Surely then this
_Miser_ must appear to the Traveller a prodigious Hero in _Virtue_!
For _Self-Interest_ will recommend Men to us only according to the
_Good_ they do to _our Selves_, and not give us high Ideas of _publick
Good_, but in proportion to our Share of it. But must a Man have the
Reflection of Cumberland or Pufendorf, to admire _Generosity_,
_Faith_, _Humanity_, _Gratitude_? Or reason so nicely to apprehend
the _Evil_ in _Cruelty, Treachery, Ingratitude_? Do not the _former_
excite our _Admiration_, and _Love_, and _Study_ of Imitation,
where-ever we see them, almost at first View, without any such
Reflection, and the latter, our _Contempt_, and _Abhorrence_? Unhappy
would it be for _Mankind_, if a _Sense of Virtue_ was of as narrow an
Extent, as a Capacity for such _Metaphysicks_.

[Sidenote: _Our Moral Sense cannot be brib'd_.]

V. This _moral Sense_, either of our _own_ Actions, or of those of
_others_, has this in common with our other Senses, that however our
Desire of _Virtue_ may be counter-balanc'd by _Interest_, our
Sentiment or Perception of its _Beauty_ cannot; as it certainly might
be, if the only Ground of our Approbation were Views of _Advantage_.
Let us consider this both as to our _own_ Actions, and those of
_others_.

[Sidenote: _In judging of our own Actions_.]

A Covetous _Man_ shall dislike any Branch of Trade, how useful soever
it may be to the Publick, if there is no Gain for himself in it; here
is an Aversion from _Interest_. Propose a sufficient Premium, and he
shall be the first who sets about it, with full Satisfaction in his
own Conduct. Now is it the same way with our _Sense_ of _moral
Actions_? Should any one advise us to wrong a _Minor_, or _Orphan_, or
to do an ungrateful Action, toward a _Benefactor_; we at first View
abhor it: Assure us that it will be very _advantageous_ to us, propose
even a _Reward_; our _Sense_ of the Action is not alter'd. It is true,
these Motives may make us undertake it; but they have no more
Influence upon us to make us approve it, than a Physician's Advice has
to make a nauseous Potion pleasant to the Taste, when we perhaps force
ourselves to take it for the Recovery of Health.

Had we no Notion of Actions, beside our Opinion of their _Advantage_
or _Disadvantage_, could we ever choose an Action as _advantageous_,
which we are conscious is still evil? as it too often happens in human
Affairs. Where would be the need of such _high Bribes_ to prevail with
Men to abandon the Interests of a ruin'd Party, or of _Tortures_ to
force out the Secrets of their Friends? Is it so hard to convince Mens
Understandings, if that be the only Faculty we have to do with, that
it is probably more advantageous to secure present Gain, and avoid
present Evils, by joining with the prevalent Party, than to wait for
the remote Possibility of future Good, upon a Revolution often
improbable, and sometimes unexpected? And when Men are over-persuaded
by _Advantage_, do they always approve their own Conduct? Nay, how
often is their remaining Life odious, and shameful, in their _own
Sense_ of it, as well as in that of _others_, to whom the base Action
was profitable?

If any one becomes satisfy'd with his own Conduct in such a Case, upon
what Ground is it? How does he please himself, or vindicate his
Actions to others? Never by reflecting upon his _private Advantage_,
or alledging this to others as a Vindication; but by gradually warping
into the _moral Principles_ of his _new Party_; for no Party is
without them. And thus Men become pleas'd with their Actions under
some Appearance of _moral Good_, distinct from _Advantage_.

[Sidenote: _Our Moral Sense not founded on Religion._]

It may perhaps be alledg'd, "That in those Actions of our own which we
call _good_, there is _this_ constant _Advantage_, superior to all
others, which is the Ground of our Approbation, and the Motive to them
from _Self-Love_, _viz_. That we suppose the Deity will _reward_
them." This will be more fully consider'd[27] hereafter: At present it
is enough to observe, that many have high Notions of _Honour_,
_Faith_, _Generosity_, _Justice_, who have scarce any Opinions about
the Deity, or any Thoughts of _future Rewards_; and abhor any thing
which is _treacherous_, _cruel_, or _unjust_, without any regard to
_future Punishments_.

[Footnote 27: See _Sect. ii. Art. 7_.]

But farther, tho' these _Rewards_ and _Punishments_, may make my own
Actions appear _advantageous_ to me, yet they would never make me
approve, and love _another_ Person for the like Actions, whose Merit
would not be imputed to me. Those Actions are _advantageous_ indeed to
the _Agent_; but his _Advantage_ is not my _Advantage_: and
_Self-Love_ could never recommend to me Actions as _advantageous_ to
others, or make me like the Authors of them on that account.

[Sidenote: _Our Moral Sense of the Actions of others, not to be
brib'd._]

This is the second thing to be consider'd, "Whether our _Sense_ of the
_moral Good_ or _Evil_ in the Actions of others, can be over-balanc'd,
or brib'd by Views of _Interest_." Now I may indeed easily be capable
of wishing, that another would do an Action I abhor as _morally evil_,
if it were very _advantageous_ to me: _Interest_ in that Case may
overbalance my Desire of _Virtue_ in another: But no _Interest to
myself_, will make me approve an Action as morally good, which without
that _Interest to myself_, would have appear'd morally evil; if upon
computing its whole Effects, it appears to produce as great a Moment
of Good in the Whole, when it is not beneficial to me, as it did
before, when it was. In our _Sense_ of _moral Good_ or _Evil_, our own
private Advantage or Loss is of no more moment, than the Advantage or
Loss of a third Person, to make an Action appear _Good_ or _Evil_.
This Sense therefore cannot be over-balanc'd by _Interest_. How
ridiculous an Attempt would it be, to engage a Man by Rewards or
Threatnings into a good Opinion of an Action, which was contrary to
his _moral Notions_? We may procure Dissimulation by such means, and
that is all.

[Sidenote: _Not occasion'd by Praise.]

VI. A late witty Author[28] says, "That the Leaders of Mankind do not
really admire such Actions as those of Regulus, or Decius, but only
observe, that Men of such Dispositions are very useful for the Defence
of any State; and therefore by _Panegyricks_, and _Statues_, they
encourage such Tempers in others, as the most _tractable_ and
_useful_." Here first let us consider, If a _Traitor_, who would sell
his own Country to us, may not often be as _advantageous_ to us, as an
_Hero_ who defends us: And yet we can love the Treason, and hate the
Traitor. We can at the same time praise a _gallant Enemy_, who is very
_pernicious_ to us. Is there nothing in all this but an Opinion of
_Advantage_?

[Footnote 28: See the Fable of the Bees, Page 34, 36. 3d. Edition.]

Again, upon this Scheme what could a _Statue_ or _Panegyrick_
effect?--Men love _Praise_--They will do the Actions which they
observe to be _praised_--_Praise_, with Men who have no other Idea of
_Good_ but _Self-Interest_, is _the Opinion which a Nation or Party
have of a Man as useful to them_--Regulus, or Cato, or Decius, had no
_Advantage_ by the Actions which profited their Country, and therefore
they themselves could not admire them, however the Persons who reap'd
the _Advantage_ might praise such Actions.--Regulus or Cato could not
possibly praise or love another Hero for a _virtuous Action_; for this
would not gain them the _Advantage_ of _Honour_; and their own Actions
they must have look'd upon as the hard Terms on which Honour was to be
purchas'd, without any thing amiable in them, which they could
contemplate or reflect upon with Pleasure. Nay, what should excite a
Cato or a Decius to desire Praise, if it is only the cold Opinion of
others that they were useful to the State, without any Perception of
Excellence in such Conduct?--Now how unlike is this to what the least
Observation would teach a Man concerning such Characters?

But says[29] he, "These wondrous cunning Governors made Men believe,
by their _Statues_ and _Panegyricks_, that there was _publick
Spirit_, and that this was in itself _excellent_; and hence Men are
led to admire it in others, and to imitate it in themselves,
forgetting the Pursuit of their own _Advantage_." So easy a matter it
seems to him, to quit judging of others by what we feel in
ourselves!----for a Person who is wholly _selfish_, to imagine others
to be _publick-spirited_!----for one who has no Ideas of _Good_ but in
his own _Advantage_, to be led by the Persuasions of others, into a
Conception of _Goodness_ in what is avowedly detrimental to himself,
and profitable to others; nay, so intirely, as not to approve the
Action thorowly, but so far as he was conscious that it proceeded from
a _disinterested Study_ of the _Good_ of others!----Yet this it seems
_Statues_ and _Penegyricks_ can accomplish!

[Footnote 29: See the same Author in the same Place.]

     _Nil intra est oleam, nil extra est in nuce duri!_[30]

It is an easy matter for Men to assert any thing in Words; but our own
Hearts must decide the Matter, "Whether some _moral Actions_ do not at
first View appear _amiable_ even to those who are unconcern'd in their
Influence? Whether we do not sincerely _approve_ and love a generous
kind _Friend_, or _Patriot_, whose Actions procure _Honour_ to him
only, without any _Advantage_ to ourselves?" It is true, that the
Actions which we approve, are useful to Mankind; but not always to the
Approver. It would perhaps be useful to the _Whole_, that all Men
agreed in performing such Actions; and then every one would have his
Share of the _Advantage_: But this only proves, that _Reason_ and
_calm Reflection_ may recommend to us, from _Self-Interest_, those
Actions, which at first View our _moral Sense_ determines us to
admire, without considering this _Interest_. Nay, our _Sense_ shall
operate even where the _Advantage_ to ourselves does not hold. We can
approve the Justice of a Sentence against ourselves: A condemn'd
_Traitor_ may approve the Vigilance of a Cicero in discovering
Conspiracies, tho' it had been for the Traitor's Advantage, that there
never had been in the World any Men of such Sagacity. To say that he
may still approve such Conduct as tending to the _publick Good_, is a
Jest from one whose only Idea of _Good_ is _Self-Interest_. Such a
Person has no Approbation of _publick Spirit_, nor Desire of _publick
Good_, farther than it tends to his own _Advantage_, which it does not
at all in the present Case.

[Footnote 30: Hor. Ep. 1. Lib. 2. v. 31.]

[Sidenote: _Nor Custom, Education, &c._]

VII. If what is said makes it appear, that we have some other _amiable
Idea_ of Actions than that of _advantageous_ to ourselves, we may
conclude, "That this Perception of _moral Good_ is not deriv'd from
_Custom_, _Education_, _Example_, or _Study_." These give us no new
Ideas: They might make us see _private Advantage_ in Actions whose
Usefulness did not at first appear; or give us Opinions of some
Tendency of Actions to our _Detriment_, by some nice Deductions of
Reason, or by a rash Prejudice, when upon the first View of the Action
we should have observ'd no such thing: but they never could have made
us apprehend Actions as _amiable_ or _odious_, without any
Consideration of our own _Advantage_.

VIII. It remains then, "That as the Author of _Nature_ has determin'd
us to receive, by our _external Senses_, pleasant or disagreeable
Ideas of Objects, according as they are useful or hurtful to our
Bodys; and to receive from _uniform Objects_ the Pleasures of _Beauty_
and _Harmony_, to excite us to the Pursuit of Knowledge, and to reward
us for it; or to be an Argument to us of his _Goodness_, as the
_Uniformity_ itself proves his _Existence_, whether we had a _Sense_
of _Beauty_ in _Uniformity_ or not; in the same manner he has given us
a Moral Sense, to direct our Actions, and to give us still _nobler
Pleasures_: so that while we are only intending the _Good_ of others,
we undesignedly promote our own greatest _private Good_."

[Sidenote: _This Moral Sense does not infer innate Ideas or
Propositions._]

We are not to imagine, that this _moral Sense_, more than the other
Senses, supposes any _innate Ideas_, _Knowledge_, or _practical
Proposition_: We mean by it only _a Determination of our Minds to
receive the simple Ideas of Approbation or Condemnation, from Actions
observ'd, antecedent to any Opinions of Advantage or Loss to redound
to ourselves from them_; even as we are pleas'd with a _regular Form_,
or an _harmonious Composition_, without having any Knowledge of
_Mathematicks_, or seeing any _Advantage_ in that Form or Composition,
different from the immediate Pleasure.

That we may discern more distinctly the Difference between _moral
Perceptions_ and others, let us consider, when we taste a pleasant
Fruit, we are conscious of Pleasure; when another tastes it, we only
conclude or form an Opinion that he enjoys Pleasure; and, abstracting
from some previous _Good-Will_ or _Anger_, his enjoying this Pleasure
is to us a Matter wholly indifferent, raising no new _Sentiment_ or
_Affection_. But when we are under the Influence of a virtuous Temper,
and thereby engaged in virtuous Actions, we are not always conscious
of any Pleasure, nor are we only pursuing private Pleasures, as will
appear hereafter: 'tis only by _reflex Acts_ upon our Temper and
Conduct that we enjoy the Delights of Virtue. When also we judge the
Temper of another to be virtuous, we do not necessarily imagine him
_then_ to enjoy Pleasure, tho' we know _Reflection_ will give it to
him: And farther, our Apprehension of his virtuous Temper raises
Sentiments of _Approbation_, _Esteem_ or _Admiration_, and the
Affection of _Good-will_ toward him. The Quality approved by our moral
Sense is conceived to reside in the Person approved, and to be a
Perfection and Dignity in him: _Approbation_ of another's Virtue is
not conceived as making the Approver happy, or virtuous, or worthy,
tho' 'tis attended with some small Pleasure. Virtue is then called
_amiable_ or _lovely_, from its raising _Good-will_ or _Love_ in
Spectators toward the Agent; and not from the Agent's perceiving the
virtuous Temper to be advantageous to him, or desiring to obtain it
under that View. A virtuous Temper is called _good_ or _beatifick_,
not that it is always attended with Pleasure in the Agent; much less
that some small Pleasure attends the Contemplation of it in the
Approver: but from this, that every Spectator is persuaded that the
_reflex Acts_ of the virtuous Agent upon his own Temper will give him
the highest Pleasures. The admired Quality is conceived as the
Perfection of the Agent, and such a one as is distinct from the
_Pleasure_ either in the Agent or the Approver; tho' 'tis a sure
Source of Pleasure to the Agent. The Perception of the Approver, tho'
attended with Pleasure, plainly represents something quite distinct
from this Pleasure; even as the Perception of _external Forms_ is
attended with Pleasure, and yet represents something distinct from
this Pleasure. This may prevent many Cavils upon this Subject.




SECT. II.

     _Concerning the_ immediate Motive _to_ virtuous
     Actions.


[Sidenote: _Nature_.]

The _Motives_ of human Actions, or their _immediate Causes_, would be
best understood after considering the _Passions_ and _Affections_; but
here we shall only consider the _Springs_ of the Actions which we call
_virtuous_, as far as it is necessary to settle the general Foundation
of the _Moral Sense_.

[Sidenote: _Affections, the Motives to Actions._]

I. Every Action, which we apprehend as either _morally good_ or
_evil_, is always suppos'd to flow from some _Affection_ toward
sensitive Natures; and whatever we call _Virtue_ or _Vice_, is either
some such _Affection_, or some _Action_ consequent upon it. Or it may
perhaps be enough to make an Action or Omission, appear _vitious_, if
it argues the Want of such Affection toward rational Agents, as we
expect in Characters counted _morally good_. All the Actions counted
_religious_ in any Country, are suppos'd, by those who count them so,
to flow from some Affections toward the Deity; and whatever we call
_social Virtue_, we still suppose to flow from Affections toward our
_Fellow-Creatures_: for in this all seem to agree, "That external
Motions, when accompany'd with no Affections toward God or _Man_, or
evidencing no Want of the _expected_ Affections toward either, can
have no _moral Good_ or _Evil_ in them."

Ask, for instance, the most _abstemious Hermit_, if _Temperance_ of
itself would be _morally good_, supposing it shew'd no Obedience
toward the Deity, made us no fitter for Devotion, or the Service of
Mankind, or the Search after Truth, than _Luxury_; and he will easily
grant, that it would be no _moral Good_, tho' still it might be
_naturally good_ or _advantageous_ to Health: And mere _Courage_, or
Contempt of Danger, if we conceive it to have no regard to the Defence
of the Innocent, or repairing of Wrongs or Self-Interest, would only
entitle its Possessor to _Bedlam_. When such sort of Courage is
sometimes admir'd, it is upon some secret Apprehension of a good
Intention in the Use of it, or as a natural Ability capable of an
useful Application. _Prudence_, if it was only employ'd in promoting
_private Interest_, is never imagin'd to be a _Virtue_: and _Justice_,
or observing a strict Equality, if it has no regard to the _Good_ of
_Mankind_, the Preservation of _Rights_, and securing _Peace_, is a
Quality properer for its ordinary _Gestamen_, a _Beam_ and _Scales_,
than for a _rational Agent_. So that these four Qualitys, commonly
call'd _Cardinal Virtues_, obtain that Name, because they are
Dispositions universally necessary to promote _publick Good_, and
denote _Affections_ toward _rational Agents_; otherwise there would
appear no _Virtue_ in them.

[Sidenote: _Affections disinterested._]

II. Now, if it can be made appear, that none of these Affections which
we approve as _virtuous_, are either _Self-love_, or Desire of
_private Interest_; since all _Virtue_ is either some such
_Affections_, or _Actions_ consequent upon them; it must necessarily
follow, "That _Virtue_ springs from some other Affection than
_Self-Love_, or Desire of private Advantage. And where Self-Interest
excites to the same Action, the Approbation is given only to the
disinterested Principle."

[Sidenote: _Love of Complacence, and Hatred of Displicence.]

The Affections which are of most Importance in _Morals_, are commonly
included under the Names Love and Hatred. Now in discoursing of
_Love_, we need not be caution'd not to include that _Love_ between
the _Sexes_, which, when no other Affections accompany it, is only
Desire of Pleasure, and is never counted a _Virtue_. _Love_ toward
rational Agents, is subdivided into _Love_ of _Complacence_ or
_Esteem_, and _Love_ of _Benevolence_: And _Hatred_ is subdivided
into _Hatred_ of _Displicence_ or _Contempt_, and _Hatred of Malice_.
_Complacence_ denotes _Approbation of any Person by our Moral Sense_,
and is rather a Perception than an Affection; tho' the Affection of
Good-will is ordinarily subsequent to it. _Benevolence_ is the Desire
of the Happiness of another. Their Opposites are called _Dislike_ and
_Malice_. Concerning each of these separately we shall consider,
"Whether they can be influenc'd by Motives of _Self-Interest_."

[Sidenote: _Are intirely disinterested._]

_Complacence_, _Esteem_, or _Good-liking_, at first View appears to be
_disinterested_, and so _Displicence_ or _Dislike_; and are intirely
excited by some _moral Qualitys_, _Good or Evil_, apprehended to be in
the Objects; which Qualitys the very _Frame_ of our _Nature_
determines us to approve or disapprove, according to the _moral
Sense_[31] above explain'd. Propose to a Man all the Rewards in the
World, or threaten all the Punishments, to engage him to _Esteem_ and
_Complacence_ toward a Person intirely _unknown_, or if known,
apprehended to be _cruel_, _treacherous_, _ungrateful_; you may
procure external Obsequiousness, or good Offices, or Dissimulation;
but _real Esteem_ no Price can purchase. And the same is obvious as to
_Contempt_, which no Motive of _Advantage_ can prevent. On the
contrary, represent a Character as _generous_, _kind_, _faithful_,
_humane_, tho' in the most distant Parts of the World, and we cannot
avoid _Esteem_ and _Complacence_. A _Bribe_ may possibly make us
attempt to ruin such a Man, or some strong Motive of _Advantage_ may
excite us to oppose his Interest; but it can never make us disapprove
him, while we retain the same Opinion of his Temper and Intentions.
Nay, when we consult our own Hearts, we shall find, that we can scarce
ever persuade ourselves to attempt any Mischief against such Persons,
from any Motive of _Advantage_; nor execute it without the strongest
Reluctance and Remorse, until we have blinded ourselves into a false
Opinion about his Temper.

[Footnote 31: See _Sect. i_.]

[Sidenote: _Benevolence disinterested._]

III. As to the _Love_ of _Benevolence_, the very Name excludes
_Self-Interest_. We never call that Man _benevolent_, who is in Fact
useful to others, but at the same time only intends his _own
Interest_, without any ultimate Desire of the _Good_ of _others_. If
there be any _Benevolence_ at all, it must be _disinterested_; for the
most useful Action imaginable loses all Appearance of _Benevolence_,
as soon as we discern that it only flowed from _Self-Love_, or
_Interest_. Thus, never were any human Actions more _advantageous_,
than the Inventions of _Fire_, and _Iron_; but if these were casual,
or if the _Inventor_ only intended his own _Interest_ in them, there
is nothing which can be call'd _benevolent_ in them. Where-ever then
_Benevolence_ is suppos'd, there it is imagin'd _disinterested_, and
design'd for the _Good_ of others. To raise Benevolence, no more is
required than calmly to consider any _sensitive Nature_ not pernicious
to others. _Gratitude_ arises from Benefits conferred from Good-will
on ourselves, or those we love; _Complacence_ is a Perception of the
moral Sense. Gratitude includes some _Complacence_, and Complacence
still raises a stronger Good-will than that we have toward indifferent
Characters, where there is no Opposition of Interests.

[Sidenote: Self-Love _join'd with_ Benevolence.]

But it must be here observ'd, That as all Men have _Self-Love_, as
well as _Benevolence_, these two Principles may jointly excite a Man
to the same Action; and then they are to be consider'd as two Forces
impelling the same Body to Motion; sometimes they conspire, sometimes
are indifferent to each other, and sometimes are in some degree
opposite. Thus, if a Man have such strong _Benevolence_, as would have
produc'd an Action without any Views of _Self-Interest_; that such a
Man has also in View _private Advantage_, along with _publick Good_,
as the Effect of his Action, does no way diminish the _Benevolence_ of
the Action. When he would not have produc'd so much _publick Good_,
had it not been for Prospect of _Self-Interest_, then the Effect of
_Self-Love_ is to be deducted, and his _Benevolence_ is proportion'd
to the Remainder of _Good_, which pure _Benevolence_ would have
produc'd. When a Man's _Benevolence_ is hurtful to himself, then
_Self-Love_ is opposite to _Benevolence_, and the _Benevolence_ is
proportion'd to the Sum of the _Good_ produc'd, added to the
Resistance of _Self-Love_ surmounted by it. In most Cases it is
impossible for Men to know how far their Fellows are influenc'd by the
one or other of these Principles; but yet the general Truth is
sufficiently certain, That this is the way in which the _Benevolence_
of Actions is to be computed.

[Sidenote: _Benevolence is disinterested._]

IV. There are two ways in which some may deduce _Benevolence_ from
_Self-Love_, the one supposing that "we voluntarily bring this
Affection upon ourselves, whenever we have an Opinion that it will be
for our Interest to _have this Affection_, either as it may be
immediately pleasant, or may afford pleasant Reflection afterwards by
our Moral Sense, or as it may tend to procure some external Reward
from God or Man." The other Scheme alledges no such Power in us of
raising Desire or Affection of any kind by our _Choice_ or _Volition_;
but "supposes our Minds determined by the Frame of their Nature to
desire whatever is apprehended as the _Means_ of any private
Happiness; and that the _Observation of the Happiness of other
Persons_, in many Cases is made the necessary Occasion of Pleasure to
the Observer, as their _Misery_ is the Occasion of his Uneasiness: and
in consequence of this Connexion, as soon as we have observed it, we
begin to desire the Happiness of others as the _Means_ of obtaining
this Happiness to ourselves, which we expect from the Contemplation of
others in a happy State. They alledge it to be impossible to desire
either the Happiness of another, or any Event whatsoever, without
conceiving it as the _Means_ of some Happiness or Pleasure to
_ourselves_; but own at the same time, that Desire is not raised in us
directly by any _Volition_, but arises necessarily upon our
apprehending any Object or Event to be conducive to our Happiness."

[Sidenote: _The first contrary Opinion confuted._]

That the former Scheme is not just, may appear from this general
Consideration, that "neither Benevolence nor any other Affection or
Desire can be directly raised by _Volition_." If they could, then we
could be bribed into any Affection whatsoever toward any Object, even
the most improper: we might raise _Jealousy_, _Fear_, _Anger_, _Love_,
toward any sort of Persons indifferently by an Hire, even as we engage
Men to external Actions, or to the Dissimulation of Passions; but
this every Person will by his own Reflection find to be impossible.
The Prospect of any Advantage to arise to us _from having any
Affection_, may indeed turn our Attention to those _Qualitys_ in the
Object, which are naturally constituted the necessary _Causes_ or
_Occasions_ of the advantageous Affection; and if we find such
Qualitys in the Object, the Affection will certainly arise. Thus
_indirectly_ the Prospect of Advantage may tend to raise any
Affection; but if these Qualitys be not found or apprehended in the
Object, no _Volition_ of ours, nor _Desire_, will ever raise any
Affection in us.

But more particularly, _that Desire_ of the Good of others, which we
approve as virtuous, cannot be alledged to be voluntarily raised from
Prospect of any _Pleasure accompanying_ the Affection itself: for 'tis
plain that our Benevolence is not always accompanied with _Pleasure_;
nay, 'tis often attended with Pain, when the Object is in Distress.
Desire in general is rather uneasy then pleasant. 'Tis true, indeed,
all the Passions and Affections _justify themselves_; while they
continue, (as _Malebranch_ expresses it) we generally approve our
being thus affected on this Occasion, as an innocent Disposition, or a
just one, and condemn a Person who would be otherwise affected on the
like Occasion. So the _Sorrowful_, the _Angry_, the _Jealous_, the
_Compassionate_, approve their several Passions on the apprehended
Occasion; but we should not therefore conclude, that _Sorrow_,
_Anger_, _Jealousy_ or _Pity_ are pleasant, or chosen for their
concomitant Pleasure. The Case is plainly thus: The Frame of our
Nature on the Occasions which move these Passions, determines us to be
thus affected, and to approve our Affection at least as innocent.
_Uneasiness_ generally attends our Desires of any kind; and this
_Sensation_ tends to fix our Attention, and to continue the Desire.
But the Desire does not terminate upon the _Removal of the Pain
accompanying the Desire_, but upon some other Event: the concomitant
Pain is what we seldom reflect upon, unless when it is very violent.
Nor does any Desire or Affection terminate upon the Pleasure which may
accompany the Affection; much less is it raised by an Act of our Will,
with a View to obtain this Pleasure.

The same Reflection will shew, that we do not by an Act of our Will
raise in ourselves that Benevolence which we approve as virtuous, with
a View to obtain future Pleasures of _Self-Approbation_ by our Moral
Sense. Could we raise Affections in this manner, we should be engaged
to any Affection by the _Prospect of an Interest_ equivalent to this
of _Self-Approbation_, such as Wealth or sensual Pleasure, which with
many Tempers are more powerful; and yet we universally own, that
_that_ Disposition to do good Offices to others, which is raised by
these Motives, is not virtuous: how can we then imagine, that the
virtuous Benevolence is brought upon us by a Motive equally _selfish_?

But what will most effectually convince us of the Truth on this Point,
is Reflection upon our own Hearts, whether we have not a _Desire_ of
the Good of others, generally without any Consideration or Intention
of obtaining these _pleasant Reflections_ on our own Virtue: nay,
often this Desire is strongest where we least imagine Virtue, in
_natural Affection_ toward Offspring, and in Gratitude to a great
Benefactor; the _Absence_ of which is indeed the greatest _Vice_, but
the Affections themselves are not esteemed in any considerable degree
virtuous. The same Reflection will also convince us, that these
Desires or Affections are not produced by _Choice_, with a View to
obtain this private Good.

In like manner, if no _Volition_ of ours can directly raise Affections
from the former Prospects of Interest, no more can any _Volition_
raise them from Prospects of _eternal Rewards_, or to avoid _eternal
Punishments_. The former Motives differ from these only as smaller
from greater, shorter from more, durable. If Affections could be
directly raised by Volition, the same Consideration would make us
_angry_ at the most innocent or virtuous Character, and _jealous_ of
the most faithful and affectionate, or _sorrowful_ for the Prosperity
of a Friend; which we all find to be impossible. The Prospect of a
_future State_, may, no doubt, have a greater indirect Influence, by
turning our Attention to the Qualitys in the Objects naturally apt to
raise the required Affection, than any other Consideration[32].

[Footnote 32: _These several_ Motives of Interest, _which, some
alledge, do excite us to Benevolence, operate upon us in a very
different Manner_. _Prospect of_ external Advantage _of any kind in
this Life from our Fellows, is only a Motive to the_ Volition of
external Actions _immediately, and not to raise Desire of the
Happiness of others_. _Now being_ willing to do external Actions
_which we know do in Fact promote the Happiness of others, without
any_ Desire _of their Happiness, is not approved as virtuous:
Otherwise it were Virtue to do a beneficent Action for a Bribe of
Money._

_The Prospect of_ Rewards from the Deity, _of future Pleasures from
the_ Self-Approbation _of our Moral Sense, or of any Pleasure
attending an Affection itself, are only Motives to us to_ desire _or_
wish to have the Affection of Benevolence _in our Hearts; and
consequently, if our Volition could raise Affections in us, these
Motives would make us will or choose to raise_ benevolent Affections:
_But these Prospects cannot be Motives to us from Self-Love, to desire
the_ Happiness of others; _for, from Self-Love we only desire what we
apprehend to be the Means of private Good_. _Now the_ having those
Affections _is the Means of obtaining these private Goods, and not the
actual Happiness of others; for the Pleasure of Self Approbation, and
Divine Rewards, are not obtained or lost according as others are
happy or miserable, but according to the_ Goodness of our Affections.
_If therefore Affections are not directly raised by Volition or
Choice, Prospects of future Rewards, or of Self-Approbation, cannot
directly raise them_.]

'Tis indeed probably true in Fact, that those who are engaged by
Prospect of future Rewards to do good Offices to Mankind, have
generally the _virtuous Benevolence_ jointly exciting them to Action;
because, as it may appear hereafter, Benevolence is natural to
Mankind, and still operates where there is no _Opposition of apparent
Interest_, or where any contrary apparent Interest is overbalanced by
a greater _Interest_. Men, conscious of this, do generally approve
good Offices, to which Motives of a future State partly excited the
Agent. But that the Approbation is founded upon the Apprehension of a
_disinterested Desire_ partly exciting the Agent, is plain from this,
that not only Obedience to an _evil Deity_ in doing Mischief, or even
in performing trifling Ceremonies, only from Hope of Reward, or
Prospect of avoiding Punishment, but even Obedience to a good Deity
only from the same Motives, without any _Love_ or _Gratitude_ towards
him, and with a perfect Indifference about the Happiness or Misery of
Mankind, abstracting from this private Interest, would meet with no
_Approbation_. We plainly see that a Change of _external
Circumstances_ of Interest under an evil Deity, without any Change in
the _Disposition_ of the Agent, would lead him into every Cruelty and
Inhumanity.

Gratitude toward the Deity is indeed disinterested, as it will appear
hereafter. This Affection therefore may obtain our Approbation, where
it excites to Action, tho' there were no other Benevolence exciting
the Agent. But this Case scarce occurs among Men. But where the
_Sanction of the Law_ is the only Motive of Action, we could expect no
more _Benevolence_, nor no other _Affection_, than those in one forced
by the _Law_ to be _Curator_ to a Person for whom he has not the least
Regard. The Agent would so manage as to save himself harmless if he
could, but would be under no Concern about the _Success_ of his
Attempts, or the _Happiness_ of the Person whom he served, provided he
performed the Task required by Law; nor would any Spectator approve
this Conduct.

[Sidenote: _The Second Opinion confuted._]

V. The other Scheme is more plausible: That Benevolence is not raised
by any _Volition_ upon Prospect of Advantage; but that we desire the
Happiness of others, as conceiving it necessary to procure some
_pleasant Sensations_ which we expect to feel upon seeing others
happy; and that for like Reason we have Aversion to their Misery. This
Connection between the Happiness of others and our Pleasure, say they,
is chiefly felt among _Friends_, _Parents_ and _Children_, and
eminently virtuous Characters. But this Benevolence flows as directly
from _Self-Love_ as any other Desire.

To shew that this Scheme is not true in Fact, let us consider, that if
in our Benevolence we only desired the Happiness of others as the
_Means_ of this Pleasure to ourselves, whence is it that no Man
_approves_ the Desire of the Happiness of others as a means of
procuring _Wealth_ or _sensual Pleasure_ to ourselves? If a Person had
_wagered_ concerning the future Happiness of a Man of such Veracity,
that he would sincerely confess whether he were happy or not; would
this Wagerer's Desire of the Happiness of another, in order to win the
Wager, be _approved as virtuous_? If not, wherein does this Desire
differ from the former? except that in one case there is one pleasant
Sensation expected, and in the other case other Sensations: For by
increasing or diminishing the Sum wagered, the Interest in this Case
may be made either greater or less than that in the other.

Reflecting on our own Minds again will best discover the Truth. Many
have never thought upon this _Connection_: nor do we ordinarily
intend the obtaining of any such Pleasure when we do generous Offices.
We all often _feel_ Delight upon seeing others happy, but during our
Pursuit of their Happiness we have no _Intention_ of obtaining this
Delight. We often feel the Pain of Compassion; but were our sole
ultimate Intention or Desire the _freeing ourselves_ from this Pain,
would the Deity offer to us either wholly to blot out all Memory of
the Person in Distress, to take away this Connection, so that we
should be easy during the Misery of our Friend on the one hand, or on
the other would relieve him from his Misery, we should be as ready to
choose the former way as the latter; since either of them would free
us from _our Pain_, which upon this Scheme is the _sole End_ proposed
by the compassionate Person.----Don't we find in ourselves that our
Desire does not terminate upon the Removal of our own Pain? Were this
our sole Intention, we would run away, shut our Eyes, or divert our
Thoughts from the miserable Object, as the readiest way of removing
our Pain: This we seldom do, nay, we croud about such Objects, and
voluntarily expose ourselves to this Pain, unless _calm Reflection_
upon our Inability to relieve the Miserable, countermand our
Inclination, or some _selfish Affection_, as _Fear of Danger_,
overpower it.

To make this yet clearer, suppose that theDeity should declare to a
good Man that he should be suddenly _annihilated_, but at the Instant
of his Exit it should be left to his Choice whether his Friend, his
Children, or his Country should be made happy or miserable for the
future, when he himself could have no Sense of either Pleasure or Pain
from their State. Pray would he be any more indifferent about their
State now, that he neither hoped or feared any thing to himself from
it, than he was in any prior Period of his Life? Nay, is it not a
pretty common Opinion among us, that after our Decease we know nothing
of what befalls those who survive us? How comes it then that we do not
lose, at the Approach of Death, all Concern for our Families, Friends,
or Country? Can there be any Instance given of our desiring any Thing
only as the _Means of private Good_, as violently when we know that we
shall not enjoy this Good many Minutes, as if we expected the
Possession of this Good for many Years? Is this the way we compute the
Value of _Annuities_?

How the disinterested Desire of the Good of others should seem
inconceivable, 'tis hard to account: perhaps 'tis owing to the
Attempts of some great Men to give Definitions of _simple
Ideas_.----_Desire_, say they, _is Uneasiness, or uneasy Sensation
upon the Absence of any Good_.----Whereas Desire is as distinct from
_Uneasiness_, as _Volition_ is from Sensation. Don't they themselves
often speak of our _desiring to remove Uneasiness_? _Desire_ then is
different from _Uneasiness_, however a Sense of Uneasiness accompanies
it, as _Extension_ does the Idea of _Colour_, which yet is a very
distinct Idea. Now wherein lies the Impossibility of desiring the
Happiness of another without conceiving it as the Means of obtaining
any thing farther, even as we desire our own Happiness without farther
View? If any alledge, that we desire our own Happiness as the _Means_
of removing the Uneasiness we feel in the Absence of Happiness, then
at least the Desire of _removing our own Uneasiness_ is an _ultimate
Desire_: and why may we not have other _ultimate Desires_?

"But can any Being be _concerned_ about the Absence of an Event which
gives it no _Uneasiness_?" Perhaps superior Natures desire without
_uneasy Sensation_. But what if we cannot? We may be uneasy while a
desired Event is in Suspence, and yet not desire this Event only as
the _Means_ of removing this Uneasiness: Nay, if we did not desire the
Event without View to this _Uneasiness_, we should never have brought
the Uneasiness upon ourselves by _desiring_ it. So likewise we may
_feel Delight_ upon the Existence of a desired Event, when yet we did
not desire the Event only as the _Means_ of obtaining this Delight;
even as we often receive Delight from Events which we had an Aversion
to.

VI. If any one should ask, since none of these Motives of
Self-Interest excite our Benevolence, but we are in virtuous Actions
intending solely the Good of others, to what Purpose serves our _moral
Sense_, our _Sense of Pleasure from the Happiness of others_? To what
Purpose serves the _wise Order of Nature_, by which Virtue is even
made generally advantageous in this Life? To what End are _eternal
Rewards_ appointed and revealed? The Answer to these Questions was
given partly already: all these Motives may make us desire to have
_benevolent Affections_, and consequently turn our _Attention_ to
those Qualities in Objects which excite them; they may overbalance all
apparent _contrary Motives_, and all Temptations to Vice. But farther,
I hope it will be still thought an End worthy of the Deity, to make
the Virtuous happy, by a wise Constitution of Nature, whether the
Virtues were in every Action intending to obtain this Happiness or
not. Beneficent Actions tend to the publick Good; it is therefore good
and kind to give all possible _additional Motives_ to them; and to
excite Men, who have some weak Degrees of good _Affection_, to promote
the publick Good more vigorously by Motives of _Self-Interest_, or
even to excite those who have no Virtue at all to external _Acts of
Beneficence_, and to restrain them from Vice[33].

[Footnote 33: _Let it be also remembered, that every Consideration
suggested in the Gospel, as an_ additional Motive _to beneficent
Actions, is not immediately to be looked upon as the proper_ Motive
_to Virtue, or what would engage our Approbation of Actions flowing
from it alone. We have the_ Promises of this Life _as well as of the
next, and yet the former alone was never thought a virtuous Principle.
Some Texts are also brought to confute this Scheme of disinterested
Affections as the only truly virtuous Principle, such as_ 1 Corinth.
Ch. XV. ver. 32. _which imports no more than this, "That if there were
no Resurrection, and consequently_ Christ _had not risen, and
therefore his Religion only an Imposture, it had been the greatest
Folly in the Apostle to have exposed himself to Persecution:" Not that
the Prospect of a future Reward was the only Motive to Virtue, or that
the only Affection of Mind which made the Apostle bear Persecution
was, Hope of Reward_.

_Another Text insisted on is_, Heb. XI. ver. 6. _But this only means,
either "that no Man can perform religious Acts acceptably to God, who
does not believe his Existence and Goodness," which is self-evident:
Or it is to be understood of "embracing the true Religion, and
adhering to it under the most severe Persecutions, which we may allow
no Man could do without Hopes of future Reward." Now this does not
prove either that our fate, or our_ strongest Incitement _to virtuous
Actions is a Prospect of Interest, nor even that any Action is
approved, because it springs from Hope of Reward_.

Heb. XII. ver. 2. _is chiefly urged, but with least Ground: if we have
it well translated, it only asserts, "That the Hope of future Joy was
one Incitement to our Saviour in enduring Sufferings," not that this
was the_ principal Spring _of his beneficent Actions, or that they
were made amiable by arising from it. Nay, this Joy may be understood
metonymically, for its Object_, viz. the Salvation of Mankind. _Not to
mention another Translation long ago known to Criticks; some of whom
insist that [Greek: atti] is seldom used for the_ final Cause;
_but means instead of, in this Place, as well as in Texts debated with
the_ Socinians: _And then this Verse may be thus translated_.

_"Who instead of that Joy which was ready at hand, or in his Power to
have enjoyed, as he had from the Beginning, he submitted to the
Cross." Nor is there any thing to confute this Translation; save that
same_ Antithesis _between our suffering from Faith in a Reward, and
his suffering in like manner, is not kept up so well; as if it were a
necessary Perfection in the Scriptures to abound in such_ Antitheses.
_For in this Translation there is good Reasoning, in shewing how our
Saviour's Sufferings are enhanced by his exchanging a State of Joy for
them, parallel to_ Philip. II. ver. 6, 7.

Whoever _would appeal to the general Strain of the Christian
Exhortations, will find disinterested Love more inculcated, and_
Motives of Gratitude _more frequently suggested, than any others_.]

From the Whole it may appear, that there is in human Nature a
_disinterested ultimate Desire_ of the Happiness of others; and that
our _Moral Sense_ determines us only to approve Actions as virtuous,
which are apprehended to proceed partly at least from such Desire.

[Sidenote: _Human Nature incapable of sedate Malice._]

VII. As to Malice, _Human Nature_ seems scarce capable of _malicious
disinterested Hatred_, or a sedate ultimate Desire of the Misery of
others, when we imagine them no way pernicious to us, or opposite to
our _Interest_: And for that Hatred which makes us oppose _those_
whose Interests are opposite to _ours_, it is only the Effect of
_Self-Love_, and not of _disinterested Malice_. A sudden Passion may
give us wrong Representations of our Fellow-Creatures, and for a
little time represent them as _absolutely evil_; and during this
Imagination perhaps we may give some Evidences of _disinterested
Malice_: but as soon as we reflect upon _human Nature_, and form just
Conceptions, this _unnatural_ Passion is allay'd, and only _Self-Love_
remains, which may make us, from _Self-Interest_, oppose our
Adversarys.

Every one at present rejoices in the Destruction of our _Pirates_; and
yet let us suppose a Band of such Villains cast in upon some desolate
Island, and that we were assur'd some Fate would confine them there
perpetually, so that they should disturb Mankind no more: Now let us
calmly reflect, that these Persons are capable of Knowledge and
Counsel, may be happy and joyful, or may be involv'd in Misery,
Sorrow, and Pain; that they may return to a State of _Love_,
_Humanity_, _Kindness_, and become _Friends_, _Citizens_, _Husbands_,
_Parents_, with all the sweet Sentiments which accompany these
Relations: then let us ask ourselves, when _Self-Love_, or Regard to
the Safety of better Men, no longer makes us desire their Destruction,
and when we cease to look upon them under the Ideas suggested by fresh
Resentment of Injurys done to us or our Friends, as utterly incapable
of any good _moral Quality_; whether we would wish them the Fate of
Cadmus's _Army_, by plunging their Swords in each others Breast, or a
worse Fate by the most exquisite Tortures; or rather, that they
should recover the ordinary Affections of Men, become _kind_,
_compassionate_, and _friendly_; contrive _Laws_, _Constitutions_,
_Governments_, _Propertys_; and form an honest happy Society with
_Marriages_, and


    _Relations dear, and all the Charities
    Of Father, Son, and Brother_----[34]?


I fansy the latter would be the Wish of every Mortal, notwithstanding
our present just Abhorrence of them from _Self-Interest_, or _publick
Love_, and Desire of promoting the Interest of our Friends who are
expos'd to their Fury. Now this plainly evidences, that we scarce ever
have any _sedate Malice_ against any Person, or ultimate Desire of his
Misery. Our calm Ill-will is only from Opposition of _Interest_; or if
we can entertain _sedate Malice_, it must be toward a Character
apprehended _necessarily_ and _unalterably Evil_ in a _moral Sense_;
such as a sudden Passion sometimes represents our Enemies to us: yet
perhaps no _such Being_ occurs to us among the Works of a _good_
Deity.

[Footnote 34: Milt. Par. Lost. B. iv. ver. 756.]

[Sidenote: _Other Affections disinterested_.]

VIII. Having offer'd what may perhaps prove, That neither our _Esteem_
or _Benevolence_ is founded on _Self-Love_, or Views of _Interest_;
let us see "if some _other Affections_, in which _Virtue_ may be
plac'd, do arise from _Self-Love_;" such as _Fear_, or _Reverence_,
arising from an Apprehension of _Goodness_, _Power_, and _Justice_.
For no body apprehends any _Virtue_ in _base Dread_ and _Servitude_
toward a _powerful evil Being_: This is indeed the _meanest
Selfishness_. Now the same Arguments which prove _Esteem_ to be
_disinterested_, will prove this _honourable Reverence_ to be so too;
for it plainly arises from an Apprehension of _amiable Qualitys_ in
the Person, and _Love_ toward him, which raises an _Abhorrence_ of
offending him. Could we reverence a _Being_ because it was our
_Interest_ to do so, a third Person might bribe us into Reverence
toward a _Being_ neither _good_, nor _powerful_, which every one sees
to be a Jest. And this we might shew to be common to all other
Passions, which have been reputed virtuous.

[Sidenote: _Objections._]

IX. There is one Objection against _disinterested Good-Will_, which
occurs from considering, "That nothing so effectually excites our
_Love_ toward rational Agents, as their _Beneficence_, and especially
toward ourselves; whence we are led to imagine, that our Love of
Persons, as well as irrational Objects, flows intirely from
_Self-Interest_." But let us here examine ourselves more narrowly. Do
we only wish well to the _Beneficent_, because it is our _Interest_ to
do so? Or do we choose to love them, because our _Love_ is the means
of procuring their _Bounty_? If it be so, then we could indifferently
love any Character, even to obtain the Bounty of a third Person; or we
could be brib'd by a third Person to love the greatest Villain
heartily, as we may be brib'd to external Offices: Now this is plainly
impossible. Nay, farther, is not our _Good will_ the Consequent of
_Bounty_, and not the Means of procuring it? External Shew,
Obsequiousness, and Dissimulation may precede an Opinion of
_Beneficence_; but _real Love_ always presupposes it, and will
necessarily arise even when we expect no more, from Consideration of
past Benefits.

Or can any one say he only loves the _Beneficent_, as he does a
_Field_ or _Garden_, because of its _Advantage_? His _Love_ then must
cease toward one who has ruin'd himself in kind Offices to him, when
he can do him no more; as we cease to love an inanimate Object which
ceases to be useful, unless a Poetical _Prosopopoeia_ animate it, and
raise an imaginary Gratitude, which is indeed pretty common.
_Beneficence_ then must increase our Good-will, as it raises
_Complacence_, which is still attended with stronger Degrees of
Benevolence: and hence we love even those who are _beneficent_ to
others.

In the Benefits which we receive ourselves, we are more fully sensible
of their Value, and of the Circumstances of the Action, which are
Evidences of a generous Temper in the _Donor_; and from the good
Opinion we have of ourselves, we are apt to look upon the Kindness as
better employ'd, than when it is bestow'd on others, of whom perhaps
we have less favourable Sentiments. It is however sufficient to remove
the Objection, that _Bounty_ from a _Donor_ apprehended as _morally
evil_, or extorted by _Force_, or conferr'd with some View of
_Self-Interest_, will not procure _real Good-will_; nay, it may raise
_Indignation_, if we suspect Dissimulation of Love, or a Design to
allure us into any thing dishonourable: whereas wisely employ'd
_Bounty_ is always approv'd, and gains Love to the Author from all who
hear of it.

[Sidenote: _Virtue disinterested_.]

If then no _Good-will_ toward Persons arises from _Self-Love_, or
Views of _Interest_, and all _Virtue_ flows from _Good-will_, or some
other Affection equally _disinterested_; it remains, "That there must
be some other Affection than _Self-Love_, or _Interest_, which excites
us to the Actions we call _Virtuous_."

Had we no other _ultimate Desire_ but that of _private Advantage_, we
must imagine that every _rational Being_ acts only for its own
_Advantage_; and however we may call a _beneficent Being_ a _good
Being_, because it acts for our Advantage, yet upon _this Scheme_ we
should not be apt to think there is any _beneficent Being_ in
_Nature_, or a _Being_ who acts for the _Good_ of others.
Particularly, If there is no _Sense_ of Excellence in _publick Love_,
and promoting the Happiness of others, whence should this Persuasion
arise, "That the Deity will make the _Virtuous_ happy?" Can we prove
that it is for the _Advantage_ of the Deity to do so? This I fansy
will be look'd upon as very absurd, by many who yet expect Mercy and
Beneficence in the Deity. And if there be such Dispositions in the
Deity, where is the Impossibility of some small Degree of this
_publick Love_ in his Creatures? And why must they be suppos'd
incapable of acting but from _Self-Love_?

In short, without acknowledging some other Principle of Action in
rational Agents than _Self-Love_, I see no Foundation to expect
_Beneficence_, or _Rewards_ from _God_ or _Man_, farther than it is
the _Interest_ of the _Benefactor_; and all Expectation of Benefits
from a _Being_ whose Interests are independent on us, must be
_perfectly ridiculous_. What should engage the Deity to reward
_Virtue_? _Virtue_ is commonly suppos'd, upon _this Scheme_, to be
only _a consulting our own Happiness in the most artful way,
consistently with the Good of the Whole_; and in _Vice_ the _same
thing_ is foolishly pursu'd, in a manner which will not so probably
succeed, and which is contrary to the _Good_ of the _Whole_. But how
is the Deity concern'd in this _Whole_, if every Agent always acts
from _Self-Love_? And what Ground have we, from the Idea of infinite
Power and Art, to believe the Deity is _good_ in the _Christian
Sense_, that is, _studious of the Good of his Creatures_? Perhaps the
_Misery_ of his Creatures may give him as much Pleasure, as their
_Happiness_: And who can find fault, or blame such a _Being_ to study
their _Misery_? for what else should we expect? A _Manichean evil
God_, is a Notion which Men would as readily run into, as that of a
_good one_, if there is no Excellence in _disinterested Love_, and no
Being acts but for its own _Advantage_; unless we prov'd, that the
Happiness of _Creatures_ was _advantageous_ to the Deity.

[Sidenote: _The true Spring of Virtue_.]

X. Having remov'd these _false Springs_ of _virtuous Actions_, let us
next establish the _true one_, viz. _some Determination of our Nature
to study the Good of others_; or _some Instinct, antecedent to all
Reason from Interest, which influences us to the Love of others_; even
as the _moral Sense_, [35]above explain'd, determines us to _approve_
the Actions which flow from _this Love_ in ourselves or others. This
_disinterested Affection_, may appear strange to Men impress'd with
Notions of _Self-Love_, as the _sole_ Spring of Action, from the
Pulpit, the Schools, the Systems, and Conversations regulated by them:
but let us consider it in its strongest and simplest Kinds; and when
we see the Possibility of it in these Instances, we may easily
discover its _universal Extent_.

[Footnote 35: See _Sect. i._]

[Sidenote: _Natural Affection_.]

An honest _Farmer_ will tell you, that he studies the _Preservation_
and _Happiness_ of his Children, and loves them without any Design of
Good to himself. But say some of our _Philosophers_, "The Happiness of
their Children gives Parents Pleasure, and their Misery gives them
Pain; and therefore to obtain the _former_, and avoid the _latter_,
they study, from _Self-Love_, the Good of their Children." Suppose
several Merchants join'd in Partnership of their whole Effects; one of
them is employ'd abroad in managing the Stock of the Company; his
Prosperity occasions Gain to all, and his Losses give them Pain for
their Share in the Loss: Is this then the _same_ Kind of Affection
with _that_ of Parents to their Children? Is there the same tender,
personal Regard? I fancy no Parent will say so. In this Case of
Merchants there is a plain Conjunction of Interest; but whence the
Conjunction of Interest between the _Parent_ and _Child_? Do the
Child's _Sensations_ give Pleasure or Pain to the Parent? Is the
Parent _hungry_, _thirsty_, _sick_, when his Children are so? No, but
_his_ naturally implanted Desire of their Good, and Aversion to their
Misery, makes him be affected with Joy or Sorrow from their Pleasures
or Pains. This Desire then is antecedent to the Conjunction of
Interest, and the Cause of it, not the Effect: it then must be
_disinterested_. "No, says another _Sophist_, Children are _Parts_ of
ourselves, and in loving them we but love _ourselves_ in them." A very
good Answer! Let us carry it as far as it will go. How are they
_Parts_ of ourselves? Not as a _Leg_ or an _Arm_: We are not conscious
of their Sensations. "But _their_ Bodys were form'd from Parts of
_ours_." So is a _Fly_, or a _Maggot_, which may breed in any
discharg'd Blood or Humour: Very dear Insects surely! there must be
something else then which makes Children _Parts_ of ourselves; and
what is this but _that Affection_, which Nature determines us to have
toward them? _This Love_ makes them _Parts_ of ourselves, and
therefore does not flow from their being so before. This is indeed a
good Metaphor; and where-ever we find a Determination among several
rational Agents to _mutual Love_, let _each Individual_ be look'd upon
as a _Part_ of a great _Whole_, or _System_, and concern himself in
the _publick Good_ of it.

But a later Author observes, [36]"That _natural Affection_ in Parents
is _weak_, till the Children begin to give Evidences of _Knowledge_
and _Affections_." Mothers say they feel it strong from the very
first: and yet I could wish, for the Destruction of his Hypothesis,
that what he alledges was true; as I fansy it is in some measure, tho'
we may find in some Parents an Affection toward Idiots. The observing
of _Understanding_ and _Affections_ in Children, which make them
appear _moral Agents_, can increase Love toward them without Prospect
of _Interest_; for I hope, this Increase of Love is not from Prospect
of Advantage from the Knowledge or Affections of Children, for whom
Parents are still toiling, and never intend to be refunded their
Expences, or recompens'd for their Labour, but in Cases of extreme
Necessity. If then the observing a _Moral Capacity_ can be the
occasion of increasing Love without _Self-Interest_, even from the
_Frame_ of our _Nature_; pray, may not _this_ be a Foundation of
_weaker_ degrees of Love, where there is no preceding Tie of
Parentage, and extend it to _all Mankind_?

[Footnote 36: See the Fable of the Bees, _Pag. 68. 3d Ed._]

[Sidenote: _Publick Affections, natural_.]

XI. And that this is so in Fact, will appear by considering some more
distant Attachments. If we observe any Neighbours, from whom perhaps
we have receiv'd no good Offices, form'd into _Friendships_,
_Familys_, _Partnerships_, and with Honesty and Kindness assisting
each other; pray ask any Mortal, if he would not more desire their
_Prosperity_, when their Interests are no way inconsistent with his
own, than their _Misery_ and _Ruin_? and you shall find a _Bond_ of
_Benevolence_ farther extended than a _Family_ and _Children_, altho'
the Ties are not so strong. Again, suppose a Person, for Trade, had
left his _native Country_, and with all his Kindred had settled his
Fortunes abroad, without any View of returning; and only imagine he
had receiv'd no Injurys from his Country: ask such a Man, would he not
rather desire the _Prosperity_ of his Country? Or could he, now that
his Interests are separated from that of his Nation, as readily wish
that it was laid waste by _Tyranny_, or a _foreign_ Power? I fansy his
Answer would shew us _a Benevolence_ extended beyond _Neighbourhoods_
or _Acquaintances_. Let a Man of a _compos'd_ Temper, out of the Hurry
of his _private_ Affairs, only read of the _Constitution_ of a
_foreign_ Country, even in the _most distant_ Parts of the Earth, and
observe _Art_, _Design_, and a _Study_ of _publick Good_ in the _Laws_
of this Association; and he shall find his Mind _mov'd_ in their
Favour; he shall be _contriving_ Rectifications and Amendments in
their Constitution, and _regret_ any unlucky Part of it, which may be
pernicious to their Interest; he shall _bewail_ any Disaster which
befalls them, and _accompany_ all their Fortunes with the Affections
of a Friend. Now this proves _Benevolence_ to be in some degree
extended to all Mankind, where there is no _interfering_ Interest,
which from _Self-Love_ may obstruct it. And had we any Notions of
_rational Agents_, capable of moral Affections, in the _most distant_
Planets, our _good Wishes_ would still attend them, and we should
desire their Happiness. And that all these Affections, whether more or
less extensive, are properly _disinterested_, not even founded on any
Desire of that Happiness we may expect in seeing their prosperous
Condition; may appear from this, that they would continue even at the
Instant of our Death, or intire Destruction, as was already observed,
_Art. IV._ of this Section.

[Sidenote: _National Love_.]

XII. Here we may transiently remark the Foundation of what we call
_national Love_, or Love of one's _native Country_. Whatever Place we
have liv'd in for any considerable time, there we have most distinctly
remark'd the _various Affections_ of _human Nature_; we have known
many _lovely Characters_; we remember the _Associations_,
_Friendships_, _Familys_, _natural Affections_, and other _human
Sentiments_: our _moral Sense_ determines us to approve these _lovely
Dispositions_, where we have most distinctly observ'd them; and our
_Benevolence_ concerns us in the Interests of those Persons possess'd
of them. When we come to observe the like as distinctly in _another_
Country, we begin to acquire a _national Love_ toward it also; nor has
our _own_ Country any other Preference in our Idea, unless it be by an
_Association_ of the pleasant Ideas of our Youth, with the
_Buildings_, _Fields_, and _Woods_ where we receiv'd them. This may
let us see how _Tyranny_, _Faction_, a _Neglect_ of Justice, a
_Corruption_ of Manners, and _any thing_ which occasions the Misery of
the Subjects, destroys this _national Love_, and the _dear Idea_ of a
Country.

[Sidenote: _The Reason why natural Affections do not always appear_.]

We ought here to observe, That the only Reason of that _apparent Want_
of natural Affection, among _collateral Relations_, is, that these
_natural Inclinations_, in many Cases, are overpower'd by _Self-Love_,
where there happens any _Opposition_ of Interests; but where this does
not happen, we shall find all Mankind under its Influence, tho' with
different Degrees of Strength, according to the _nearer_ or _more
remote_ Relations they stand in to each other; and according as the
_natural Affection_ of _Benevolence_ is join'd with and strengthen'd
by _Esteem_, _Gratitude_, _Compassion_, or _other kind Affections_; or
on the contrary, weaken'd by _Displicence_, _Anger_, or _Envy_.




SECT. III.

     _The_ Sense _of_ Virtue, _and the_ various Opinions
     _about it, reducible to_ one general Foundation. _The
     Manner of computing the_ Morality _of_ Actions.


[Sidenote: _All Virtue benevolent_.]

I. If we examine all the Actions which are counted _amiable_
any-where, and inquire into the Grounds upon which they are
_approv'd_, we shall find that in the Opinion of the Person who
approves them, they always appear as Benevolent, or flowing from
_Good-will to others_, and a Study of their Happiness, whether the
_Approver_ be one of the Persons belov'd, or profited, or not; so that
all those _kind Affections_ which incline us to make others happy, and
all Actions suppos'd to flow from _such_ Affections, appear _morally
good_, if, while they are _benevolent_ towards some Persons, they be
not _pernicious_ to others. Nor shall we find any thing amiable in any
Action whatsoever, where there is no _Benevolence_ imagin'd; nor in
any Disposition, or Capacity, which is not suppos'd applicable to, and
design'd for, _benevolent_ Purposes. Nay, as was before observ'd[37],
the Actions which in Fact are exceedingly useful, shall appear void of
_moral Beauty_, if we know they proceeded from no kind Intentions
towards others; and yet an unsuccessful Attempt of Kindness, or of
promoting _publick Good_, shall appear as amiable as the most
successful, if it flow'd from as _strong Benevolence_.

[Sidenote: _Religion_.]

II. Hence _those_ Affections, which would lead us to do Good to our
Benefactor, shall appear _amiable_, and the _contrary_ Affections
_odious_, even when our Actions cannot possibly be of any Advantage or
Hurt to him. Thus a _sincere Love_ and _Gratitude_ toward our
Benefactor, a _chearful Readiness_ to do whatever he shall require,
how burdensom soever, a _hearty Inclination_ to comply with his
Intentions, and _Contentment_ with the State he has plac'd us in, are
the strongest Evidences of _Benevolence_ we can shew to such a Person;
and therefore they must appear exceedingly _amiable_. And under these
is included all the _rational Devotion_, or _Religion_ toward a Deity
apprehended as _good_, which we can possibly perform.

[Footnote 37: See _Sect._ ii. _Art._ 3. _Par._ 1. _Art._ 9. _Par._ 2.

We may here transiently observe one Circumstance in the _Frame_ of our
_Nature_, which is wonderfully adapted to promote _Benevolence_,
_viz._ That as a Benefit conferr'd necessarily raises _Gratitude_ in
the Person who receives it, so the Expressions of this Gratitude, even
from the meanest of Mankind, are _wonderfully delightful_ to the
Benefactor. Never were there any Mortals so poor, so inconsiderable,
whose grateful Praise would not be some way delightful; and by whom we
would not rather choose to be belov'd than hated, if their Love no way
evidenc'd us to be Partners in their Vices, or concern'd in their
Meanness. And thus the _most abject Person oblig'd_ is capable, and
inclin'd to make no small Addition to our Happiness by his _Love_ and
_Gratitude_, when he is utterly incapable of any other Return, and
when we expect none from him: Thus,


    ----_A grateful Mind
    By owing owes not, but still pays, at once
    Indebted and discharg'd_----[38]


As to _external Performances_ of Religion, they are no doubt very
various in different Nations and Ages; and _Education_ may give Men
Opinions, that certain Actions are pleasing, and others displeasing to
the Deity: but then, where-ever any external Rite of Worship is
approv'd, there also it is look'd upon to proceed from _Love_ toward
the Deity, or some other Affection necessarily join'd with _Love_, as
_Reverence_, _Repentance_, or _Sorrow_ to have offended. So that the
general Principle of _Love_ is the Foundation of all the _apparent
moral Excellence_, even in the most fantastick Rites of Worship which
were ever approv'd. For as to Rites design'd only to appease a
_furious Being_, no Mortal, I fansy, apprehends there is any _Virtue_,
or _Excellence_ in them; but that they are chosen only as the
dishonourable Means of avoiding a greater Evil. Now as there are
various speculative Opinions about what is acceptable to the Deity, it
necessarily follows, "That, accordingly, _Practices_, and
_Approbation_, must be _various_; tho' all the _moral Goodness_ of
Actions is still presum'd to flow from _Love_."

[Footnote 38: Par. Lost. _B._ iv. _l. 55_.]

[Sidenote: _Social Virtues_.]

III. Again, that we may see how _Benevolence_ is the Foundation of all
apprehended _Excellence_ in _social Virtues_, let us only observe,
That amidst the Diversity of Sentiments on this Head among various
Sects, this is still allow'd to be the way of deciding the Controversy
about any disputed Practice, _viz._ to inquire whether this Conduct,
or the contrary, will most effectually promote the _publick Good_. The
_Morality_ is immediately adjusted, when the natural Tendency, or
Influence of the Action upon the _universal natural Good_ of
_Mankind_, is agreed upon. That which produces more _Good_ than _Evil_
in the _Whole_, is acknowledg'd _good_; and what does not, is counted
_evil_. In this Case, we no other way regard the Good of the _Actor_,
or that of those who are thus inquiring, than as they make a Part of
the great _System_.

In our late Debates about _Passive Obedience_, and the Right of
_Resistance_ in Defence of _Privileges_, the Point disputed among Men
of Sense was, "Whether _universal Submission_ would probably be
attended with greater _natural Evils_, than _temporary Insurrections_,
when Privileges are invaded? and not, Whether what tended in the Whole
to the _publick natural Good_, was also _morally good_?" And if a
_divine Command_ was alledg'd in Favour of the Doctrine of _Passive
Obedience_, this would, no doubt, by its eternal Sanctions cast the
Balance of _natural Good_ to its own Side, and determine our Election
from _Interest_; and yet _our Sense_ of the _moral Good_ in _Passive
Obedience_, would still be founded upon some Species of _Benevolence_,
such as _Gratitude_ toward the Deity, and _Submission_ to his Will to
whom we are so much oblig'd. But I fansy those, who believe the Deity
to be _good_, would not rashly alledge such a Command, unless they
also asserted, that the thing commanded did tend more to the
_universal Good_, than the contrary, either by preventing the external
Evils of _Civil War_, or by enuring Men to _Patience_, or some _other
Quality_ which they apprehended necessary to their everlasting
Happiness. And were it not so, _Passive Obedience_ might be
recommended as an _inglorious Method_ of escaping a greater Mischief,
but could never have any thing _morally amiable_ in it.

But let us quit the Disputes of the _Learned_, on whom, it may be
alledg'd, _Custom_ and _Education_ have a powerful Influence; and
consider upon what Grounds, in common Life, Actions are _approv'd_ or
_condemn'd_, _vindicated_ or _excus'd_. We are universally asham'd to
say an Action is _just_, because it tends to my _Advantage_, or to the
_Advantage_ of the _Actor_: And we as seldom condemn a _beneficent
kind Action_, because it is not _advantageous_ to us, or to the
_Actor_. _Blame_ and _Censure_ are founded on a Tendency to _publick
Evil_, or a Principle of _private Malice_ in the _Agent_, or _Neglect_
at least of the _Good_ of others; on _Inhumanity_ of Temper, or at
least such _strong Selfishness_ as makes the _Agent_ careless of the
Sufferings of others: and thus we _blame_ and _censure_ when the
Action no way affects ourselves. All the moving and persuasive
Vindications of Actions, which may, from some _partial_ evil Tendency,
appear _evil_, are taken from this, that they were necessary to some
_greater Good_, which counter-balanc'd the _Evil_: "_Severity_ toward
a few, is _Compassion_ toward Multitudes.--_Transitory Punishments_
are necessary for avoiding more _durable Evils_.-- Did not _some_
suffer on such Occasions, there would be _no living_ for honest
Men",--and such like. And even when an Action cannot be intirely
justify'd, yet how greatly is the Guilt extenuated, if we can alledge,
"That it was only the Effect of _Inadvertence_ without _Malice_, or of
_partial good Nature_, _Friendship_, _Compassion_, _natural
Affection_, or _Love_ of a _Party_?" All these Considerations shew,
what is the _universal Foundation_ of _our Sense_ of _moral Good_, or
_Evil_, viz. _Benevolence_ toward others on the one hand, and
_Malice_, or even _Indolence_, and _Unconcernedness_ about the
_apparent publick Evil_ on the other. And let it be here observ'd,
that we are so far from imagining all Men to act only from
_Self-Love_, that we universally expect in others a Regard for the
_Publick_; and do not look upon the Want of this, as barely the
Absence of _moral Good_, or _Virtue_, but even as _positively evil_
and _hateful_.

[Sidenote: _Moral Evil not always Malice_.]

IV. Contrarys may illustrate each other; let us therefore observe the
_general Foundation_ of _our Sense_ of _moral Evil_ more particularly.
_Disinterested Malice_, or ultimate Desire of the Misery of others, is
the highest Pitch of what we count _vicious_; and every Action appears
=evil=, which is imagin'd to flow from any Degree of _this Affection_.
Perhaps a _violent Passion_ may hurry Men into it for a few Moments,
and our _rash angry Sentiments_ of our Enemys, may represent them as
having such _odious Dispositions_; but it is very probable, from the
Reasons offer'd above[39], that there is no such Degree of Wickedness
in _human Nature_, as, in _cold Blood_, to desire the _Misery_ of
others, when it is conceiv'd no way useful to _our Interests_.

[Footnote 39: See _Sect._ ii. _Art._ 4.]

The frequent, and seemingly unprovoked Cruelties of the Nero's and
Domitian's, are often alleged in Opposition to all this; but perhaps
unjustly. Such Tyrants are conscious that they are hated by all those
whom the World repute virtuous, and they apprehend Danger from them: A
Tyrant looks upon such Men as designing, artful, or ambitious, under a
false Shew of Virtue. He imagines the surest Means of his own Safety
is to appear terrible, and to deprive his Enemys of all Hopes of
escaping by his Compassion. The Fame of Virtue in eminent Subjects is
matter of Envy, and is a Reproach upon the Tyrant: It weakens his
Power, and makes them dangerous to him. _Power_ becomes the Object of
Delight to the Tyrant; and in Ostentation of it, he may break through
all Regards to Justice and Humanity. Habits of Cruelty can be acquired
in such a Course. Any of these apparent Interests seem better to
account for the Crueltys of Tyrants, than the supposing in them a
Principle of _calm Malice_ without _Interest_, of which the _rest_ of
_Mankind_ seem intirely incapable.

[Sidenote: _Temper of a_ Tyrant.]

The Temper of a _Tyrant_ seems a continu'd State of _Anger_, _Hatred_,
and _Fear_. To form our Judgment then of his Motives of Action, and
those of Men of like Tempers in lower Stations, let us reflect upon
the Apprehensions we form of Mankind, when we are under any of those
Passions which to the _Tyrant_ are _habitual_. When we are under the
fresh Impressions of an Injury, we find, that our Minds are wholly
fill'd with Apprehensions of the Person who injur'd us, as if he were
_absolutely evil_, and _delighted_ in doing Mischief: We overlook the
Virtues, which, when calm, we could have observ'd in him: we forget
that perhaps he acted from _Self-Love_, and not _Malice_, or, it may
be, some _generous_ or _kind Intention_ toward others. These,
probably, are the Opinions which a _Tyrant_ constantly forms
concerning _Mankind_; and having very much weaken'd all _kind
Affections_ in himself, however he may pretend to them, he judges of
the Tempers of others by his own. And were Men really such as he
apprehends them, his Treatment of them would not be very unreasonable.
We shall generally find our Passions arising suitably to the
Apprehensions we form of others: if they are rashly form'd upon some
sudden slight Views, it is no Wonder if we find Dispositions
following upon them, very little suited to the _real State of human
Nature_.

[Sidenote: _Ordinary Springs of Vice_.]

The ordinary Spring of _Vice_ then among Men, must be a _mistaken
Self-Love_, made so violent, as to overcome _Benevolence_; or such
strong _Appetites_, or Passions either selfish, or toward some narrow
Systems, as overcome our Regard to Publick Good; or _Affections_
arising from _false_, and _rashly form'd Opinions_ of _Mankind_; which
we run into thro' the Weakness of our _Benevolence_. When Men, who had
good Opinions of each other, happen to have _contrary Interests_, they
are apt to have their _good Opinions_ of each other _abated_, by
imagining a _design'd Opposition_ from _Malice_; without this, they
can scarcely hate one another. Thus two _Candidates_ for the same
Office wish each other _dead_, because that is an ordinary way by
which Men make room for each other; but if there remains any
Reflection on each other's Virtue, as there sometimes may in
benevolent Tempers, then their Opposition may be without _Hatred_; and
if another better Post, where there is no Competition, were bestow'd
on one of them, the other shall rejoice at it.

[Sidenote: Self-Love indifferent.]

V. Actions which flow solely from _Self-Love_, and yet evidence no
want of _Benevolence_, having no hurtful Effects upon others, seem of
a middle Nature, neither virtuous nor vitious, and neither raise the
_Love_ or _Hatred_ of the Observer. Our Reason can indeed discover
certain Bounds, within which we may not only act from _Self-Love_,
consistently with the _Good_ of the _Whole_; but every Mortal's acting
thus within these Bounds for his own _Good_, is absolutely necessary
for the _Good_ of the _Whole_; and the Want of such _Self-Love_ would
be _universally pernicious_. Hence, he who pursues his own _private
Good_, with an Intention also to concur with that Constitution which
tends to the _Good_ of the _Whole_; and much more he who promotes his
_own Good_, with a direct View of making himself more capable of
serving God, or doing good to _Mankind_; acts not only _innocently_,
but also _honourably_, and _virtuously_: for in both these Cases,
_Benevolence_ concurs with _Self-Love_ to excite him to the Action.
And thus _a Neglect_ of our _own Good_ may be _morally evil_, and
argue a Want of _Benevolence_ toward the _Whole_. But when _Self-Love_
breaks over the Bounds above-mentioned, and leads us into Actions
detrimental to _others_, and to the _Whole_; or makes us insensible of
the _generous kind Affections_; then it appears _vitious_, and is
_disapprov'd_. So also, when upon any small Injurys, or sudden
Resentment, or any weak superstitious Suggestions, our _Benevolence_
becomes so faint, as to let us entertain odious Conceptions of _Men_,
or any Part of them, without just Ground, as if they were _wholly
evil_, or _malicious_, or as if they were a worse Sort of Beings than
they really are; these Conceptions must lead us into _malevolent
Affections_, or at least weaken our _good ones_, and make us _really
vitious_.

[Sidenote: _Benevolence of different Kinds_.]

VI. Benevolence is a Word fit enough in general, to denote the
internal Spring of Virtue, as Bishop _Cumberland_ always uses it. But
to understand this more distinctly, 'tis highly necessary to observe,
that under this Name are included very different Dispositions of the
Soul. Sometimes it denotes a _calm, extensive Affection_, or Good-will
toward all Beings capable of Happiness or Misery: Sometimes, 2. A calm
deliberate Affection of the Soul toward the Happiness of certain
smaller Systems or Individuals; such as Patriotism, or Love of a
Country, Friendship, Parental-Affection, as it is in Persons of Wisdom
and Self-Government: Or, 3. The several kind particular Passions of
Love, Pity, Sympathy, Congratulation. This Distinction between the
calm Motions of the Will, Affections, Dispositions, or Instincts of
the Soul, and the several turbulent Passions, is elsewhere more fully
considered[40].

[Footnote 40: See _Treatise_ III. _Sect_. ii. _Art_. 3. and _Treatise_
IV. _Sect_. vi. _Art_. 4.]

Now tho' all these different Dispositions come under the general
Character of Benevolent, yet as they are in Nature different, so they
have very different Degrees of Moral Beauty. The first Sort is above
all amiable and excellent: 'Tis perhaps the sole Moral Perfection of
some superior Natures; and the more this prevails and rules in any
human Mind, the more amiable the Person appears, even when it not only
checks and limits our lower Appetites, but when it controuls our kind
particular Passions, or counteracts them. The second Sort of
_Benevolence_ is more amiable than the third, when it is sufficiently
strong to influence our Conduct: And the third Sort, tho' of a lesser
Moral Dignity, is also beautiful, when it is no way opposite to these
more noble Principles. And when it is opposite, tho' it does not
justify such Actions as are really detrimental to greater Systems, yet
it is a strong extenuating Circumstance, and much alleviates the Moral
Deformity. We are all sensible of this, when any Person from
Friendship, Parental-Affection, or Pity, has done something hurtful to
larger Societies.

[Sidenote: Self-Love _not excluded by Benevolence_.]

VII. Here we must also observe, that every _moral Agent_ justly
considers himself as a _Part_ of this _rational System_, which may be
useful to the _Whole_; so that he may be, in part, an Object of his
own universal _Benevolence_. Nay farther, as was hinted above, he may
see, that the Preservation of the _System_ requires every one to be
_innocently solicitous_ about himself. Hence he may conclude, that an
Action which brings _greater Evil_ to the _Agent_, than _Good_ to
others, however it may evidence the Strength of some particular kind
Attachment, or of a _virtuous Disposition_ in the _Agent_, yet it must
be founded upon a mistaken Opinion of its Tendency to _publick Good_;
so that a Man who reason'd justly, and consider'd the Whole, would not
be led into it, by the calm extensive _Benevolence_, how strong soever
it were; nor would he recommend it to the Practice of others; however
he might acknowledge, that the Detriment arising to the _Agent_ from a
_kind Action_, did evidence a strong virtuous Disposition. Nay
farther, if any _Good_ was propos'd to the Pursuit of an _Agent_, and
he had a _Competitor_ in every respect _only equal_ to himself; the
_highest_ universal _Benevolence_ possible would not lead a wise Man
to prefer another to himself, were there no Ties of Gratitude, or some
other external Circumstance, to move him to yield to his _Competitor_.
A Man surely of the _strongest Benevolence_, may just treat himself as
he would do a third Person, who was a Competitor of _equal Merit_ with
the other; and as his preferring one to another, in such a Case,
would argue no Weakness of _Benevolence_; so no more would he evidence
it by preferring himself to a Man of only _equal Abilitys_.

Where-ever a Regard to _myself_ tends as much to the Good of the
_Whole_, as Regard to _another_; or where the _Evil_ to myself is
equal to the _Good_ obtain'd for another; tho' by acting, in such
Cases, for the Good of _another_, I really shew a very amiable
Disposition; yet by acting in the contrary manner, from Regard to
_myself_, I evidence no evil Disposition, nor any want of the most
extensive _Benevolence_; since the _Moment_ of Good to the _Whole_ is,
in both Cases, exactly equal. And let it be here observ'd, that this
does not supersede the Necessity of _Liberality_, or _gratuitous
Gifts_, altho' in such Actions the Giver loses what the other
receives; since the _Moment_ of Good to any Person, in any given Case,
is in a compound Proportion of the _Quantity_ of the Good itself, and
the _Indigence_ of the Person. Hence it appears, that a Gift may make
a much greater _Addition_ to the Happiness of the _Receiver_, than the
_Diminution_ it occasions in the Happiness of the _Giver_: And that
the most useful and important Gifts are those from the _Wealthy_ to
the _Indigent_. Yet Gifts from _Equals_ are not useless, since they
often increase the Happiness of both, as they are strong Evidences of
_mutual Love_: but Gifts from the _Poor_ to the _Wealthy_ are really
foolish, unless they be only little Expressions of _Gratitude_, which
are also fruitful of Joy on both Sides: for these Expressions of
Gratitude are really delightful and acceptable to the _Wealthy_, if
they have any Humanity; and their Acceptance of them is matter of Joy
to the poor _Giver_.

In like manner, when an Action does more Harm to the _Agent_, than
Good to the _Publick_; the doing it evidences an amiable and truly
virtuous Disposition in the _Agent_, tho' 'tis plain he acts upon a
mistaken View of his Duty. But if the private Evil to the _Agent_ be
so great, as to make him incapable, at another time, of promoting a
_publick Good_ of greater moment than what is attain'd by this Action;
the Action may really be evil, so far as it evidences a prior Neglect
of a greater attainable _publick Good_ for a smaller one; tho' at
present this Action also flows from a virtuous Disposition.

[Sidenote: Benevolence, _how affected by the Qualitys of its Object_.]

VII. The _moral Beauty_, or _Deformity_ of Actions, is not alter'd by
the _moral Qualitys_ of the Objects any farther than the Qualitys of
the Objects increase or diminish the _Benevolence_ of the Action, or
the _publick Good_ intended by it. Thus _Benevolence_ toward the
_worst_ Characters, or the Study of their _Good_, may be as _amiable_
as any whatsoever; yea, often more so than _that_ toward the _Good_,
since it argues such a strong Degree of _Benevolence_ as can surmount
the greatest Obstacle, the _moral Evil_ in the Object. Hence the
_Love_ of _unjust Enemys_, is counted among the _highest Virtues_.
Yet, when our _Benevolence_ to the _Evil_ encourages them in their bad
Intentions, or makes them more capable of Mischief; this diminishes or
destroys the _Beauty_ of the Action, or even makes it _evil_, as it
betrays _a Neglect_ of the _Good of others_ more valuable; Beneficence
toward _whom_, would have tended more to the _publick Good_, than
_that_ toward our _Favourites_: But _Benevolence_ toward _evil_
Characters, which neither encourages nor enables them to do Mischief,
nor diverts our _Benevolence_ from Persons more useful, has as much
_moral Beauty_ as any whatsoever.

[Sidenote: _Qualitys of regulating our_ Election.]

VIII. In comparing the _moral Qualitys_ of Actions, in order to
regulate our _Election_ among various Actions propos'd, or to find
which of them has the greatest _moral Excellency_, we are led by _our
moral Sense_ of _Virtue_ to judge thus; that in _equal Degrees_ of
Happiness, expected to proceed from the Action, the _Virtue_ is in
proportion to the _Number_ of Persons to whom the Happiness shall
extend; (and here the _Dignity_, or _moral Importance_ of Persons,
may compensate Numbers) and in equal _Numbers_, the _Virtue_ is as the
_Quantity_ of the Happiness, or natural Good; or that the _Virtue_ is
in a _compound Ratio_ of the _Quantity_ of Good, and _Number_ of
Enjoyers. In the same manner, the _moral Evil_, or _Vice_, is as the
Degree of Misery, and _Number_ of Sufferrers; so that _That Action_ is
_best_, which procures the _greatest Happiness_ for the _greatest
Numbers_; and _that worst_, which, in _like manner_, occasions
_Misery_.

[Sidenote: _Consequences, how they affect the Morality of Actions._]

Again, when the _Consequences_ of Actions are of a _mix'd_ Nature,
partly _advantageous_, and partly _pernicious_; _that Action_ is
_good_, whose _good_ Effects preponderate the _evil_ by being useful
to many, and pernicious to few; and _that evil_, which is otherwise.
Here also the _moral Importance_ of Characters, or _Dignity_ of
Persons may compensate Numbers; as may also the _Degrees_ of Happiness
or Misery: for to procure an _inconsiderable Good_ to many, but an
_immense Evil_ to few, may be _evil_; and an _immense Good_ to few,
may preponderate _small Evil_ to many.

But the _Consequences_ which affect the _Morality_ of Actions, are not
only the direct and natural Effects of the Actions themselves; but
also all those _Events_ which otherwise would not have happen'd. For
many Actions which have no immediate or natural _evil Effects_, nay,
which actually produce _good Effects_, may be _evil_; if a man
foresees, that the evil Consequences, which will probably flow from
the _Folly_ of others, upon his doing of such Actions, are so great as
to overbalance all the _Good_ produc'd by those Actions, or all the
_Evils_ which would flow from the Omission of them: And in such Cases
the _Probability_ is to be computed on both sides. Thus, if an Action
of mine will probably, thro' the Mistake or Corruption of others, be
made a _Precedent_ in unlike Cases, to very evil Actions; or when my
Action, tho' good in itself, will probably provoke Men to very evil
Actions, upon some _mistaken Notion_ of their Right; any of these
Considerations foreseen by me, may make such an Action of mine _evil_,
whenever the Evils which will probably be occasion'd by the _Action_,
are greater than the Evils occasion'd by the _Omission_.

And this is the Reason, that many _Laws_ prohibit Actions in general,
even when some particular _Instances_ of those Actions would be very
useful; because an universal _Allowance_ of them, considering the
Mistakes Men would probably fall into, would be more pernicious than
an universal _Prohibition_; nor could there be any more _special
Boundarys_ fix'd between the right and wrong Cases. In such Cases, it
is the Duty of Persons to comply with the generally useful
Constitution; or if in some very important Instances, the Violation of
the Law would be of less _evil Consequence_, than Obedience to it,
they must patiently resolve to undergo those Penalties, which the
State has, for valuable Ends to the Whole, appointed: and this
Disobedience will have nothing criminal in it.

IX. 'Tis here to be observed, that tho' every _kind Affection_
abstractly considered, is approved by our moral Sense, yet all sorts
of Affections or Passions which pursue the Good of others are not
equally approved, or do not seem in the same degree virtuous. Our
_calm Affections_, either private or publick, are plainly distinct
from our _particular Passions_; _calm Self-Love_ quite distinct from
_Hunger_, _Thirst_, _Ambition_, _Lust_, or _Anger_; so _calm
Good-will_ toward others is different from _Pity_, _passionate Love_,
_the parental Affection_, or the Passion of _particular Friends_. Now
every kind Passion, which is not pernicious to others, is indeed
approved as virtuous and lovely: And yet a calm Good-will toward the
same Persons appears more lovely. So calm Good-will toward a small
System is lovely and preferable to more passionate Attachments; and
yet a more extensive calm Benevolence is still more beautiful and
virtuous; and the highest Perfection of Virtue is _an universal calm
Good-will_ toward all sensitive Natures. Hence it is, that we condemn
particular Attachments, when inconsistent with the Interest of great
Societies, because they argue some Defect in that more noble
Principle, which is the Perfection of Virtue[41].

[Footnote 41: _See Essay on Passions,_ Sect. 2_, Art. 3. _And
Illustrations, Sect._ 6. _Art._ 4.]

[Sidenote: _Partial Benevolence, how virtuous_.]

X. From these Observations, we may see what Actions our _moral Sense_
would most recommend to our Election, as the most _perfectly
virtuous_: _viz._ such as appear to have the most universal unlimited
Tendency to the _greatest_ and _most extensive Happiness_ of all the
_rational Agents_, to whom our Influence can reach. All _Beneficence_,
even toward a _Part_, is amiable, when not inconsistent with the
_Good_ of the _Whole_: But this is a smaller Degree of _Virtue_,
unless our Beneficence be restrain'd by want of Power, and not want of
Love to the _Whole_. All strict Attachments to Partys, Sects,
Factions, have but an imperfect Species of _Beauty_, even when the
_Good_ of the _Whole_ requires a stricter Attachment to a _Part_, as
in _natural Affection_, or _virtuous Friendships_; except when _some
Parts_ are so eminently useful to the _Whole_, that even _universal
Benevolence_ does determine us with special Care and Affection to
study their Interests. Thus _universal Benevolence_ would incline us
to a more strong Concern for the Interests of _great_ and _generous
Characters_ in a high Station, or make us more earnestly study the
Interests of any _generous Society_, whose whole Constitution was
contriv'd to promote _universal Good_. Thus a good Fancy in
_Architecture_ would lead a Man, who was not able to bear the Expence
of a completely regular Building, to choose such a Degree of Ornament
as he could keep uniformly thro' the _Whole_, and not move him to make
a vain unfinish'd Attempt in _one Part___, of what he foresaw he could
not succeed in as to _the Whole_. And he would condemn a great
Profusion of Ornament on _one Part_, above the Proportion of _the
Whole_, unless _that Part_ be some eminent Place of the _Edifice_,
such as the _chief Front_, or _publick Entrance_; the adorning of
which would beautify the _Whole_ more than an equal Expence of
Ornament on any _other Part_.

This Constitution of our _Sense_, whereby the _moral Beauty_ of
Actions, or Dispositions, increases according to the _Number_ of
Persons to whom the good Effects of them extend; whence also Actions
which flow from the _nearer Attachments_ of _Nature_, such as _that_
between the _Sexes_, and the _Love_ of _our Offspring_, do not appear
_so virtuous_ as Actions of _equal Moment_ of _Good_ towards Persons
less attach'd to us; has been chosen by the Author of Nature for this
good Reason, "That the more limited _Instincts_ tend to produce a
smaller Moment of Good, because confined to small Numbers. Whereas
the more _extensive calm Instinct_ of Good-will, attended with Power,
would have no Bounds in its good Effects, and would never lead into
any Evil, as the particular Passions may: and hence it is made more
lovely to our _Sense_, that we might be induced to cultivate and
strengthen it; and make it check even _kind Passions_, when they are
opposite to a greater Good."

[Sidenote: _Moral Dispositions and Abilitys_.]

X. From this primary Idea of _moral Good_ in Actions, may arise a
Notion of moral _Good_ in those Dispositions, whether _natural_ or
_acquir'd_, which enable us to do good to others; or which are
presum'd to be design'd, and acquir'd or cultivated for that purpose;
or are natural Indications of a good Temper, and usually accompany it.
And hence those Abilitys, while nothing appears contrary to our
Presumption, may increase our Approbation of the Possessor of them;
but when they are imagin'd to be intended for _publick Mischief_, they
make us hate him the more: Such are a _penetrating Judgment_, a
_tenacious Memory_, a _quick Invention_; _Patience of Labour_, _Pain_,
_Hunger_, _Watching_; a _Contempt_ of _Wealth_, _Rumour_, _Death_.
These may be rather call'd _natural Abilitys_, than _moral Qualitys_:
And we seem to have a natural Relish for them distinct from moral
Approbation. But if we plainly see them _maliciously_ employ'd, they
make the Agent more detestable.

[Sidenote: _How we compute the Morality of Actions in our Sense of
them_.]

XI. To find a _universal Rule_ to compute the _Morality_ of any
Actions, with all their Circumstances, when we judge of the Actions
done by ourselves, or by others, we must observe the following
_Propositions_ or _Axioms_.

1. The moral _Importance_ of any Agent, or the Quantity of publick
Good he produces, is in a compound Proportion of his _Benevolence_ and
_Abilitys_. For 'tis plain that his good Offices depend upon these two
jointly. In like manner, the Quantity of private Good which any Agent
obtains for himself, is in a like compound Proportion of his _selfish
Principles_, and his _Abilitys_. We speak here only of the external
Goods of this World, which one pursues from some selfish Principles.
For as to internal Goods of the Mind, these are most effectually
obtain'd by the Exercise of other Affections than those called
_Selfish_, even those which carry the Agent beyond himself toward the
Good of others.

2. In comparing the Virtues of different Agents, when the Abilitys are
equal, the _Moments_ of publick Good are proportioned to the Goodness
of the Temper, or the _Benevolence_; and when the _Tempers_ are equal,
the Quantitys of Good are as the _Abilitys_.

3. The Virtue then or Goodness of Temper is directly as the _Moment of
Good_, when other Circumstances are equal, and _inversly_ as the
Abilitys. That is to say, where the Abilitys are greatest, there is
less Virtue evidenced in any given Moment of Good produced.

4. But as the natural Consequences of our Actions are various, some
_good_ to ourselves, and _evil_ to the Publick; and others _evil_ to
ourselves, and _good_ to the Publick; or either _useful_ both to
ourselves and others, or _pernicious_ to both; the intire Spring of
good Actions is not always _Benevolence alone_; or of Evil, _Malice
alone_ (nay, sedate Malice is rarely found); but in most Actions we
must look upon _Self-Love_ as another Force, sometimes conspiring with
_Benevolence_, and assisting it, when we are excited by Views of
_private Interest_, as well as _publick Good_; and sometimes opposing
_Benevolence_, when the good Action is any way _difficult_ or
_painful_ in the Performance, or _detrimental_ in its Consequences to
the _Agent_.

These _selfish Motives_ shall be[42] hereafter more fully explain'd;
here we may in general denote them by the Word _Interest_: which when
it concurs with _Benevolence_, in any Action capable of Increase or
Diminution, must produce a greater Quantity of _Good_, than
_Benevolence_ alone in the same _Abilitys_; and therefore when the
_Moment_ of _Good_, in an Action partly intended for the _Good_ of the
_Agent_, is but equal to the _Moment_ of _Good_ in the Action of
_another Agent_, influenc'd only by _Benevolence_, the former is less
_virtuous_; and in this Case the _Interest_ must be deducted to find
the true Effect of the _Benevolence_ or _Virtue_. In the same manner,
when _Interest_ is opposite to _Benevolence_, and yet is surmounted by
it; this _Interest_ must be added to the _Moment_, to increase the
_Virtue_ of the Action, or the Strength of the _Benevolence_. By
_Interest_, in this last Case, is understood all the _Advantage_ which
the _Agent_ might have obtain'd by omitting the Action, which is a
_negative Motive_ to it; and this, when subtracted, becomes
_positive_.

[Footnote 42: Vide _Sect._ v.]

[Sidenote: _Intention and Foresight affect Actions_.]

But here we must observe, that no _Advantage_, not _intended_, altho'
casually, or naturally, redounding to us from the Action, does at all
affect its _Morality_ to make it less _amiable_: nor does any
_Difficulty_ or _Evil_ unforeseen, or not resolved upon, make a kind
Action more _virtuous_; since in such Cases _Self-Love_ neither
assists nor opposes _Benevolence_. Nay, _Self-Interest_ then only
diminishes the _Benevolence_, when without this View of _Interest_ the
Action would not have been undertaken, or so much _Good_ would not
have been produc'd by the _Agent_; and it extenuates the _Vice_ of an
_evil_ Action, only when without this _Interest_ the Action would not
have been done by the _Agent_, or so much _Evil_ have been produc'd by
him.

The sixth Axiom only explains the external Marks by which Men must
judge, who do not see into each other's Hearts; for it may really
happen in many Cases, that Men may have _Benevolence_ sufficient to
surmount any Difficulty, and yet they may meet with none at all: And
in that Case, it is certain there is as much _Virtue_ in the _Agent_,
tho' he does not give such Proof of it to his Fellow-Creatures, as if
he had surmounted Difficultys in his kind Actions. And this too must
be the Case with the Deity, to whom nothing is difficult.

[Sidenote: _Perfect Virtue_.]

Since then, in judging of the Goodness of Temper in any Agent, the
Abilitys must come into Computation, as is above-mentioned, and none
can act beyond their natural Abilitys; that must be the Perfection of
Virtue, where the _Moment_ of Good produced equals the Ability, or
when the _Being_ acts to the utmost of his Power for the _publick
Good_; and hence the Perfection of _Virtue_, in this Case, is as
_Unity_. And this may shew us the only Foundation for the boasting of
the _Stoicks_, "That a Creature suppos'd innocent, by pursuing
_Virtue_ with his utmost Power, may in _Virtue_ equal the _Gods_." For
in their Case, if the _Ability_ be _infinite_, unless the _Good_ to
be produced in the whole, be so too, the _Virtue_ is not _absolutely
perfect_; and the _Quotient_ can never surmount _Unity_.

[Sidenote: _Moral Evil how computed_.]

XII. In the same Manner we may compute the Degree of Depravity of any
Temper, _directly_ as the Moment of Evil effected, and _inversly_ as
the Abilitys. The Springs of vicious Actions however are seldom any
real ultimate Intention of Mischief, and never ultimate deliberate
Malice; but only sudden Anger, Self-Love, some selfish Passion or
Appetite, some kind Attachments to Parties, or particular kind
Passions.

The Motives of Interest may sometimes strongly cooperate with a
depraved Temper, or may oppose it, in the same Manner that they
cooperate with or oppose a good Temper. When they cooperate, they
diminish the Moral Evil; when they oppose, they may argue the
Depravity of Temper to be greater, which is able to surmount such
Motives of Interest.

[Sidenote: _Intention, Foresight_.]

But we must observe, that not only _Innocence_ is expected from all
Mortals, but they are presum'd, from their _Nature_, in some measure
inclin'd to _publick Good_[43]; so that a bare Absence of this Desire
is enough to make an _Agent_ be reputed _evil_: Nor is a direct
Intention of _publick Evil_ necessary to make an Action _evil_; it is
enough that it flows from _Self-Love_, with a plain Neglect of the
_Good_ of others, or an Insensibility of their Misery, which we either
_actually_ foresee, or have a probable _Presumption_ of.

[Footnote 43: See _Treatise_ IV.  6.]

It is true indeed, that _that publick Evil_ which I neither certainly
foresee, nor have actual Presumptions of, as the Consequence of my
Action, does not make my _present Action_ criminal or odious; even
altho' I might have foreseen this Evil by a serious Examination of my
own Actions; because such Actions do not, at present, evidence either
_Malice_, or _want of Benevolence_. But then it is also certain, that
my _prior Negligence_, in not examining the Tendency of my Actions, is
a plain Evidence of the Want of _that_ Degree of good Affections which
is necessary to a virtuous Character; and consequently the _Guilt_
properly lies in this _Neglect_, rather than in an _Action_ which
really flows from a _good Intention_. _Human Laws_ however, which
cannot examine the _Intentions_, or secret Knowledge of the _Agent_,
must judge in gross of the Action itself; presupposing all that
Knowledge as actually attain'd, which we are oblig'd to attain.

In like manner, no good Effect, which I did not actually foresee and
intend, makes my Action _morally good_; however _Human Laws_ or
_Governors_, who cannot search into Mens _Intentions_, or know their
secret _Designs_, justly reward Actions which tend to the publick
Good, altho' the Agent was engag'd to those Actions only by _selfish
Views_; and consequently had no virtuous Disposition influencing him
to them.

The Difference in _Degree of Guilt_ between _Crimes of Ignorance_,
when the Ignorance is _vincible_, and _faulty_, as to the natural
Tendency of the Action; and _Crimes of Malice_, or direct evil
Intention; consists in this, that the former, by a _prior Neglect_,
argues a want of the due Degree of _Benevolence_, or _right
Affection_; the latter evidences direct _evil Affections_, which are
vastly more odious.

[Sidenote: _Morality distinct from Interest_.]

XIII. From the former Reasonings we may form almost a demonstrative
Conclusion, "That we have a _Sense_ of _Goodness_ and _moral Beauty_
in Actions, distinct from _Advantage_;" for had we no other Foundation
of Approbation of Actions, but the _Advantage_ which might arise to us
from them, if they were done toward ourselves, we should make no
Account of the _Abilitys_ of the _Agent_, but would barely esteem them
according to their _Moment_. The _Abilitys_ come in only to shew the
Degree of _Benevolence_, which supposes _Benevolence_ necessarily
_amiable_. Who was ever the better pleas'd with a _barren rocky
Farm_, or an _inconvenient House_, by being told that the _poor Farm_
gave as great Increase as it could; or that the _House_ accommodated
its Possessor as well as it could? And yet in our Sentiments of
Actions, whose _Moment_ is very inconsiderable, it shall wonderfully
increase the _Beauty_ to alledge, "That it was all the _poor Agent_
could do for the _Publick_, or his _Friend_."

[Sidenote: _Morality of Characters_.]

XIV. The _moral Beauty_ of _Characters_ arises from their Actions, or
sincere Intentions of the _publick Good_, according to their Power. We
form our Judgment of them according to what appears to be their _fix'd
Disposition_, and not according to any _particular Sallys_ of _unkind
Passions_; altho' these abate the _Beauty_ of _good Characters_, as
the Motions of the _kind Affections_ diminish the _Deformity_ of the
_bad ones_. What then properly constitutes a _virtuous Character_, is
not some few accidental Motions of _Compassion_, _natural Affection_,
or _Gratitude_; but such a _fix'd Humanity_, or _Desire_ of the
_publick Good_ of all, to whom our Influence can extend, as uniformly
excites us to all Acts of _Beneficence_; and makes us careful of
informing ourselves right, concerning the truest Methods of serving
their Interests. Every Motion indeed of the _kind Affections_ appears
in some degree _amiable_; but we denominate the _Character_ from the
_prevailing Principle_.

[Sidenote: _Instinct may be the Spring of Virtue_.]

XV. Some will not allow that Virtue can spring from Passions,
Instincts, or Affections of any Kind. 'Tis true, kind particular
Passions are but a lower kind of Goodness, even when they are not
opposite to the general Good. Those _calmer Determinations_ of the
Will, whether of greater or less Extent, or sedate strong Affections,
or Desires of the Good of others, are more amiable. These may be as
much rooted in the Frame of the Soul, or there may be as natural a
Disposition to them as to particular Passions. They tell us, That
"Virtue should wholly spring from Reason;" as if Reason or Knowledge
of any true Proposition could ever move to Action where there is no
_End_ proposed, and no Affection or Desire toward that End[44]. For
this see _Treatise_ IV. _Sect_. i. and ii.

[Footnote 44: _These Gentlemen should either remember the common
Doctrine of the Schools, or else confute it better; that the_
[Greek: psoairesis] _which is necessary in virtuous Actions
is_ [Greek: orexis bouleulich]: _And that Virtue
needs not only the_ [Greek: logon alth] _but the_
[Greek: orexinosthn]. _These very Authors who deny any_
Affections _or Motions of the Will to be the proper Springs of sublime
Virtue, yet, inconsistently with themselves, must allow in Men of
sublime Virtue, and even in the Deity too, a settled_ Disposition of
Will, _or a constant_ Determination, _or_ Desire _to act in Conformity
to Reason, or a fixed Affection toward a certain Manner of Conduct.
Now an ill-natur'd Adversary would call this an_ Instinct, _an
Essential or Natural_ Disposition of Will, _an_ Affectionate
Determination _toward a very sublime Object presented by the
Understanding._ _See_ Aristotle's Magn. Moral. Lib. i. c. 18, 35.
_and_ Lib. ii. c. 7 & 8. _and in many other Places._]

The ultimate End, according to many of our Moralists, is to each one
_his own Happiness_; and yet this he seeks by Instinct. Now may not
another _Instinct_ toward the _Publick_, or the _Good_ of others, be
as proper a Principle of _Virtue_, as the _Instinct_ toward _private
Happiness_? This is certain, that whereas we behold the _selfish_
Actions of others, with _Indifference_ at best, we see something
_amiable_ in every Action which flows from _kind Affections_ or
_Passions_ toward others; if they be conducted by Prudence, so as any
way to attain their End, consistently with the general Good. If it be
said, "That Actions from _Instinct_ are not the Effect of _Prudence_
and _Choice_," this Objection holds full as strongly against the
Actions which flow from _Self-Love_; since the Use of our Reason is as
requisite to find the proper Means of promoting _publick Good_, as
_private Good_. And as it must be an _Instinct_, or _a Determination
previous to Reason_, which makes us pursue _private Good_, as well as
_publick Good_ as our _End_; there is the same Occasion for _Prudence_
and _Choice_, in the Election of proper Means for promoting of either.
I see no Harm in supposing, "That Men are _naturally_ dispos'd to
_Virtue_, and not left _merely indifferent_, until some Prospect of
Interest allures them to it." Surely, the Supposition of a _benevolent
universal Instinct_ would recommend _human Nature_, and its Author,
more to the _Love_ of a _good Man_, and leave Room enough for the
Exercise of our _Reason_, in contriving and settling _Rights_,
_Laws_, _Constitutions_; in _inventing_ Arts, and _practising_ them so
as to gratify, in the most effectual manner, that _generous
Inclination_. And if we must bring in _Self-Love_ to make _Virtue
rational_, a little Reflection will discover, as shall appear
hereafter, that this _Benevolence_ is our _greatest Happiness_; and
thence we may resolve to cultivate, as much as possible, this _sweet
Disposition_, and to despise every _opposite Interest_. Not that we
can be _truly virtuous_, if we intend only to obtain the Pleasure
which arises from _Beneficence_, without the _Love_ of _others_: Nay,
this very Pleasure is founded on our being conscious of _disinterested
Love_ to _others_, as the _Spring_ of our Actions. But _Self-Interest_
may be our _Motive_ in studying to raise these kind Affections, and to
continue in this _agreeable State_; tho' it cannot be the _sole_ or
_principal Motive_ of any Action, which to our _moral Sense_ appears
_virtuous_[45].

[Footnote 45: _Tis thus we must understand many Places of_ Plato,
Aristotle, Cicero, _and others of the Antients, when they speak of "a
natural Instinct or Disposition in each Being, toward his own
Preservation and highest Perfection, as the Spring of Virtue." 'Tis
acknowledged by all, that we have such an Instinct, which must operate
very indistinctly at first, till we come to consider our Constitution,
and our several Powers. When we do so, we find, according to them, the
natural Principles of Virtue, or the_ [Greek: phusichai
arelai], _implanted in us: They appear to us the noblest Parts of our
Nature; such are our_ Desires of Knowledge, _our_ Relish for Beauty,
_especially of the_ Moral _Kind, our_ Sociable Affections. _These upon
Reflection we find to be natural Parts of our Constitution, and we
desire to bring them to Perfection from the first-mentioned general
Instinct. We must not thence conclude, that all our Affections spring
from Self-Love, or are ultimately pursuing private Good_.
Disinterested Affections _are presupposed as natural Parts of our
Constitution, and found in it upon Reflection, not raised by an Act of
Choice for some private Good, nor ultimately pursuing it_. (_See_
Cicer. de Finib. Lib. iii. & Lib. v.) _This would be manifestly
contrary to the most express Words of these great Men on Friendship,
Patriotism, and other Subjects._ _See_ Aristotle _in the_ Magn. Moral.
& Nicom. _on Friendship_; _and_ Cicero de Finib. Lib. ii. & Lib. v.]

[Sidenote: _Heroism in all Stations_.]

From the preceding _Reasonings_ we shall only draw this one Inference,
which seems the most joyful imaginable, even to the lowest Rank of
Mankind, _viz._ "That no external Circumstances of Fortune, no
involuntary Disadvantages, can exclude any Mortal from the _most
heroick Virtue_." For how small soever the _Moment_ of _publick Good_
be, which any one can accomplish, yet if his _Abilitys_ are
proportionably small, the _Virtue_ may be as great as any whatsoever.
Thus, not only the _Prince_, the _Statesman_, the _General_, are
capable of _true Heroism_, tho' these are the chief Characters, whose
Fame is diffus'd thro' various Nations and Ages: but when we find in
an _honest Trader_, the _kind Friend_, the _faithful prudent Adviser_,
the _charitable_ and _hospitable Neighbour_, the _tender Husband_, and
_affectionate Parent_, the _sedate_ yet _chearful Companion_, the
_generous Assistant_ of _Merit_, the _cautious Allayer_ of
_Contention_ and _Debate_, the _Promoter_ of _Love_ and _good
Understanding_ among Acquaintances; if we consider, that these were
_all_ the _good Offices_ which his Station in the World gave him an
Opportunity of performing to Mankind, we must judge _this Character_
really as _amiable_, as those, whose external Splendor dazzles an
injudicious World into an Opinion, "That they are the _only Heroes_ in
_Virtue_."




SECT. IV.

     _All Mankind agree in_ this general Foundation _of
     their Approbation of_ moral Actions. _The Grounds of
     the_ different Opinions _about_ Morals.


[Sidenote: _This Moral Sense universal_.]

I. To shew how far Mankind agree in that which we have made the
_universal Foundation_ of this _moral Sense, viz._ Benevolence, we
have observ'd already[46], that when we are ask'd the Reason of our
Approbation of any Action, we universally alledge its _Usefulness_ to
the _Publick_, and not to the _Actor_ himself. If we are vindicating a
censur'd Action, and maintaining it lawful, we generally make this one
Article of our Defence, "That it injur'd nobody, or did more _Good_
than _Harm_." On the other hand, when we blame any Piece of Conduct,
we shew it to be _prejudicial_ to others, besides the _Actor_; or to
evidence at least a _Neglect_ of their Interest, when it was in our
Power to serve them; or when _Gratitude_, _natural Affection_, or some
other _disinterested Tye_ should have rais'd in us a Study of their
Interest. If we sometimes blame foolish Conduct in others, without any
Reflection upon its Tendency to _publick Evil_, it is generally
occasion'd by our _Benevolence_, which makes us concern'd for the
Evils befalling others[47]. We all know how great an Extenuation of
Crimes it is, to allege, "That the poor Man does harm to nobody but
himself;" and how often this turns Hatred into Pity. And yet we shall
find, that the greatest part of the Actions which are _immediately
prejudicial_ to ourselves, and are often look'd upon as _innocent_
toward others, do really tend to the _publick Detriment_, by making us
incapable of performing the good Offices we could otherwise have done,
and perhaps would have been inclin'd to do. This is the Case of
_Intemperance_ and _extravagant Luxury_.

[Footnote 46: See above, _Sect._ iii. _Art._ 3. _Par._ 3.]

[Footnote 47: _Beside that moral Approbation or Commendation, we have
also an immediate natural Relish for certain Powers and Abilitys, and
the regular Exercise of them; and a Dislike and Contempt of a Person
who wants them, or has not cultivated them; when we don't think of any
Subserviency to a publick Good. But this is rather perceiving a_
vigorous _or a_ mean _Character, than a_ virtuous _or_ vitious _one_.]

[Sidenote: _Benevolence the sole ground of Approbation_.]

II. And farther, we may observe, that no Action of any other Person
was ever approv'd by us, but upon some Apprehension, well or
ill-grounded, of some _really good moral Quality_. If we observe the
Sentiments of Men concerning Actions, we shall find, that it is always
some _really amiable_ and _benevolent Appearance_ which engages their
Approbation. We may perhaps commit Mistakes, in judging that Actions
tend to the publick Good, which do not; or be so inadvertent, that
while our Attention is fix'd on some _partial good Effects_, we may
quite overlook many _evil Consequences_ which counterbalance the
_Good_. Our _Reason_ may be very deficient in its Office, by giving us
partial Representations of the Tendency of Actions; but it is still
some _apparent Species_ of _Benevolence_ which commands our
Approbation. And _this Sense_, like our other Senses, tho'
counteracted by stronger Motives of _external Advantage_, ceases not
to operate, but makes us _uneasy_ and _dissatisfy'd_ with ourselves;
even as the _Sense_ of _Tasting_ makes us loath and dislike the
nauseous Potion, which we may force ourselves, from Interest, to
swallow.

[Sidenote: _False Approbations_.]

It is therefore to no purpose to allege here, "That many Actions are
really done, and approv'd, which tend to the _universal Detriment_."
For the same way, Actions are often perform'd, and in the mean time
approv'd, which tend to the _Hurt_ of the _Actor_. But as we do not,
from the _latter_, infer the _Actor_ to be void of _Self-Love_, or a
_Sense_ of _Interest_; no more should we infer from the _former_, that
such Men are void of a _Sense_ of _Morals_, or a Desire of _publick
Good_. The Matter is plainly this: Men are often mistaken in the
Tendency of Actions either to _publick_, or _private Good_: Nay,
sometimes _violent Passions_, while they last, will make them approve
very bad Actions by their _Moral Sense_, and conceive very
_pernicious ones_ to the _Agent_, to be _advantageous_: But this
proves only, "That sometimes there may be some more _violent Motive_
to Action, than a _Sense_ of _moral Good_; or that Men by Passion may
become blind even to their own _Interest_."

But to prove that Men are void of a _moral Sense_, we should find some
Instances of _cruel_, _malicious Actions_, done without any _Motive_
of _Interest_, _real_ or _apparent_; and approv'd without any Opinion
of _Tendency to publick Good_, or _flowing from Good-will_: We must
find a Country where _Murder_ in cold Blood, _Tortures_, and _every
thing malicious_, without any _Advantage_, is, if not _approv'd_, at
least look'd upon with _Indifference_, and raises _no Aversion_ toward
the Actors in the unconcern'd Spectators: We must find Men with whom
the _Treacherous_, _Ungrateful_, _Cruel_, are in the same account with
the _Generous_, _Friendly_, _Faithful_, and _Humane_; and who approve
the _latter_, no more than the _former_, in all Cases where they are
not affected by the Influence of these Dispositions, or when the
_natural Good_ or _Evil_ befals other Persons. And it may be
question'd, whether the _Universe_, tho' large enough, and stor'd with
no inconsiderable Variety of Characters, will yield us any Instance,
not only of a _Nation_, but even of a _Club_, or a _single Person_,
who will think all Actions _indifferent_, but those which regard his
_own Concerns_.

[Sidenote: _Diversity of Manners accounted for_.]

III. From what has been said, we may easily account for the _vast
Diversity_ of _moral Principles_, in _various Nations_ and _Ages_; and
the Grounds of _this Diversity_ are principally these:

[Sidenote: _From various Notions of_ Happiness.]

1st. Different Opinions of _Happiness_, or _natural Good_, and of the
most effectual Means to advance it. Thus in one Country, where there
prevails a _courageous Disposition_, where _Liberty_ is counted a
_great Good_, and _War_ an _inconsiderable Evil_, all Insurrections in
Defence of Privileges will have the Appearance of _moral Good_ to our
_Sense_, because of their appearing _benevolent_; and yet the _same
Sense_ of _moral Good_ in _Benevolence_, shall in another Country,
where the Spirits of Men are more _abject_ and _timorous_, where
_Civil War_ appears the _greatest natural Evil_, and _Liberty_ no
_great Purchase_, make the same Actions appear _odious_. So in Sparta,
where thro' Contempt of Wealth the Security of Possessions was not
much regarded, but the Thing chiefly desir'd, as _naturally good to
the State_, was to abound in a _hardy shifting Youth_; _Theft_, if
dexterously perform'd, was so little odious, that it receiv'd the
Countenance of a Law to give it Impunity.

But in these, and all other Instances of the like Nature, the
Approbation is founded on _Benevolence_, because of some real, or
apparent Tendency to the _publick Good_. For we are not to imagine,
that this _Sense_ should give us, without Observation, Ideas of
complex Actions, or of their natural Tendencys to _Good_ or _Evil_: it
only determines us to approve _Benevolence_, whenever it appears in
any Action, and to hate _the contrary_. So our _Sense_ of _Beauty_
does not, without Reflection, Instruction or Observation, give us
Ideas of the _regular Solids_, _Temples_, _Cirques_, and _Theatres_;
but determines us to approve and delight in _Uniformity amidst
Variety_, where-ever we observe it. Let us read the _Preambles_ of any
Laws we count unjust, or the Vindications of any disputed Practice by
the _Moralists_, and we shall find, no doubt, that Men are often
mistaken in computing the Excess of the _natural good_ or _evil
Consequences_ of certain Actions; but the Ground on which any Action
is approv'd, is still some Tendency to the _greater natural Good_ of
others, apprehended by those who approve it.

[Sidenote: _Travellers Accounts of barbarous Customs_.]

The same Reason may remove also the Objections against the
_Universality of this Sense_, from some Storys of Travellers,
concerning _strange Crueltys_ practis'd toward the _Aged_, or
_Children_, in certain Countrys. If such Actions be done in such angry
Passions, they only prove, that other Motives, or Springs of Action,
may overpower _Benevolence_ in its _strongest Ties_: and if they
really be universally allow'd, look'd upon as innocent, and
vindicated; it is certainly under some Appearance of _Benevolence_;
such as to secure them from Insults of Enemys, to avoid the
Infirmity's of Age, which perhaps appear greater Evils than Death, or
to free the vigorous and useful Citizens from the Charge of
maintaining them, or the Troubles of Attendance upon them. A Love of
Pleasure and Ease, may in the immediate Agents be stronger in some
Instances, than _Gratitude_ toward Parents, or _natural Affection_ to
Children. But that such Nations are continu'd, notwithstanding all the
Toil in educating their Young, is still a sufficient Proof of _natural
Affection_: For I fansy we are not to imagine any nice Laws in such
Places, compelling Parents to a proper Education of some certain
Number of their Offspring. We know very well that an Appearance of
_publick Good_ was the Ground of Laws equally barbarous, enabled by
Lycurgus and Solon, of killing the Deform'd, or Weak, to prevent a
burdensome Croud of useless Citizens.

A late ingenious Author[48] has justly observ'd the Absurdity of the
_monstrous Taste_, which has possess'd both the _Readers_ and
_Writers_ of _Travels_. They are sparing enough in Accounts of the
_natural Affections_, _the Familys_, _Associations_, _Friendships_,
_Clans_, of the _Indians_; and as transiently do they mention their
Abhorrence of _Treachery_ among themselves; their _Proneness_, to
mutual Aid, and to the Defence of their several _States_; their
Contempt of Death in Defence of their Country, or upon Points of
_Honour_. "These are but _common Storys_.--No need to travel to the
_Indies_ for what we see in _Europe_ every Day." The Entertainment
therefore in these ingenious Studys consists chiefly in exciting
_Horror_, and making Men _stare_. The ordinary Employment of the Bulk
of the _Indians_ in Support of their Wives and Offspring, or
Relations, has nothing of the _Prodigious_: But a _Human Sacrifice_, a
Feast upon Enemys Carcases, can raise an Horror and Admiration of the
wondrous Barbarity of _Indians_, in Nations no Strangers to the
_Massacre_ at _Paris_, the _Irish Rebellion_, or the Journals of the
_Inquisition_. These they behold with religious Veneration; but the
_Indian Sacrifices_, flowing from a like Perversion of _Humanity_ by
_Superstition_, raise the highest Abhorrence and Amazement. What is
most surprizing in these Studys, is the wondrous _Credulity_ of some
Gentlemen of great Pretensions in other Matters to Caution of Assent,
for these _marvellous Memoirs_ of Monks, Friars, Sea-Captains,
Pirates; and for the _Historys_, _Annals_, _Chronologys_, receiv'd by
oral Tradition, or Hieroglyphicks.

[Footnote 48: Ld. Shaftsbury, Vol. i, p. 346, 7, 8, 9, &c.]

[Sidenote: _Use of Reason in Morals_.]

Men have _Reason_ given them, to judge of the Tendencys of their
Actions, that they may not stupidly follow the first Appearance of
_publick Good_; but it is still some Appearance of _Good_ which they
pursue. And it is strange, that _Reason_ is universally allow'd to
Men, notwithstanding all the stupid ridiculous Opinions receiv'd in
many Places; and yet absurd Practices, founded upon those very
_Opinions_, shall seem an Argument against any _moral Sense_, altho'
the bad Conduct is not owing to any Irregularity in the _moral Sense_,
but to a wrong _Judgment_ or _Opinion_. If putting the _Aged_ to
_Death_, with all its Consequences, really tends to the _publick
Good_, and the _lesser Misery_ of the _Aged_, it is, no doubt,
_justifiable_; nay, perhaps the _Aged_ choose it, in Hopes of a
_future State_. If a _deform'd_ or _weak Race_ could never, by
Ingenuity and Art, make themselves useful to Mankind, but should grow
an absolutely unsupportable Burden, so as to involve a whole State in
Misery, it is _just_ to put them to Death. This all allow to be
_just_, in the Case of an over-loaded Boat in a Storm. And as for
_killing_ of their Children, when Parents are sufficiently stock'd, it
is perhaps practis'd, and allow'd from _Self-Love_; but I can scarce
think it passes for a good Action any-where. If _Wood_ or _Stone_, or
_Metal_ be Deities, have _Government_, and _Power_, and have been the
_Authors_ of _Benefits_ to us; it is _morally amiable_ to praise and
worship them. Or if the true Deity be pleas'd with Worship before
_Statues_, or any _other Symbol_ of some more _immediate Presence_ or
_Influence_; _Image-Worship_ is _virtuous_. If _he_ delights in
_Sacrifices_, _Penances_; _Ceremonys_, _Cringings_; they are _all
laudable_. Our _Sense_ of _Virtue_ generally leads us exactly enough
according to our Opinions; and therefore the absurd Practices which
prevail in the World, are much better Arguments that Men have no
_Reason_, than that they have no _moral Sense_ of _Beauty_ in Actions.

[Sidenote: _Narrow Systems pervert the moral Sense_.]

IV. The next _Ground_ of _Diversity_ in Sentiments, is the _Diversity_
of _Systems_, to which Men, from foolish Opinions, confine their
_Benevolence_. We intimated above[49], that it is _regular_ and
_beautiful_, to have _stronger Benevolence_ toward the _morally good_
Parts of Mankind, who are _useful_ to the _Whole_, than toward the
_useless_ or _pernicious_. Now, if Men receive a _low_ or _base
Opinion_ of any _Body_, or _Sect_ of Men; if they imagine them bent
upon the Destruction of the more valuable Parts, or but useless
_Burdens_ of the Earth; _Benevolence_ itself will lead them to neglect
the Interests of such, and to suppress them. This is the Reason why,
among Nations who have high Notions of _Virtue_, every Action toward
an Enemy may pass for _just_; why Romans and Greeks could approve of
making those they call'd _Barbarians_, _Slaves_.

[Footnote 49: See _Sect._ iii. _Art._ 10. _Par._ 1.]

[Sidenote: _Sects pernicious to Virtue_.]

A late ingenious Author[50] justly observes, "That the various
_Sects_, _Partys_, _Factions_, _Cabals_ of Mankind in larger Societys,
are all influenc'd by a _publick Spirit_: That some generous Notions
of _publick Good_, some strong friendly Dispositions, raise them at
first, and excite Men of the same _Faction_ or _Cabal_ to the most
disinterested mutual Succour and Aid: That all the Contentions of the
different Factions, and even the fiercest Wars against each other, are
influenc'd by a sociable _publick Spirit_ in a limited System." But
certain it is, that Men are little oblig'd to those, who often
artfully raise and foment this Party Spirit; or cantonize them into
several Sects for the Defence of very trifling Causes. Associations
for innocent _Commerce_, or _Manufactures_, Cabals for Defence of
_Liberty_, against a _Tyrant_; or even lower Clubs for _Pleasantry_,
or _Improvement_ by Conversation, are very amiable and good. But when
Mens Heads are filled with some trifling Opinions; when designing Men
raise in their Minds some unaccountable Notion of _Sanctity_ and
_Religion_, in Tenets or Practices, which neither increase our Love to
God, or our own _Species_; when the several Factions are taught to
look upon each other as _odious_, _contemptible_, _profane_, because
of their different Tenets or Opinions; even when these Tenets,
whether true or false, are perhaps perfectly useless to the publick
Good; when the keenest Passions are rais'd about such Trifles, and Men
begin to hate each other for what, of itself, has no Evil in it; and
to love the Zealots of their own Sect for what is no way valuable;
nay, even for their Fury, Rage, and Malice against opposite Sects;
(which is what all Partys commonly call _Zeal_) 'tis then no Wonder,
if our _moral Sense_ be much impair'd, and our _natural Notions_ of
_Good_ and _Evil_ almost lost, when our _Admiration_, and _Love_ or
_Contempt_, and _Hatred_, are thus perverted from their natural
Objects.

[Footnote 50: Ld. Shaftesbury's Essay on Wit and Humour, _Part_ iii.
_Sect._ ii. _Vol._ 1. p. 110.]

If any Mortals are so happy as never to have heard of the
_Party-Tenets_ of most of our Sects; or, if they have heard of them,
have either never espous'd any Sect, or all equally; they bid fairest
for a truly _natural_ and _good_ Disposition, because their _Tempers_
have never been soured about vain Trifles; nor have they contracted
any _Sullenness_ or _Rancour_ against any Part of their own _Kind_. If
any _Opinions_ deserve to be contended for, they are those which give
us lovely Ideas of the Deity, and of our _Fellow-Creatures_: If any
Opinions deserve Opposition, they are such as raise Scruples in our
Minds about the _Goodness_ of Providence, or represent our
Fellow-Creatures as _base_ and _selfish_, by instilling into us some
ill-natur'd, cunning, shrewd Insinuations, "That our most generous
Actions proceed wholly from _selfish Views_." This wise _Philosophy_
of some _Moderns_, after Epicurus, must be fruitful of nothing but
_Discontent_, _Suspicion_, and _Jealousy_; a State infinitely worse
than any little transitory _Injurys_, to which we might be expos'd by
a good-natur'd _Credulity_. But Thanks be to the kind Author of our
Nature, that in spite of such Opinions, our _Nature_ itself leads us
into _Friendship_, _Trust_, and _mutual Confidence_.

Were we freely conversant with _Robbers_, who shew a _moral Sense_ in
the _equal_ or _proportionable Division_ of their Prey, and in _Faith_
to each other, we should find they have their own sublime _moral
Ideas_ of their Party, as _generous_, _courageous_, _trusty_, nay
_honest_ too; and that those we call _honest_ and _industrious_, are
imagin'd by them to be _mean-spirited_, _selfish_, _churlish_, or
_luxurious_; on whom that Wealth is ill bestow'd, which therefore they
would apply to better Uses, to maintain gallanter Men, who have a
Right to a Living as well as their Neighbours, who are their profess'd
Enemys. Nay, if we observe the Discourse of our _profess'd
Debauchees_, our _most dissolute Rakes_, we shall find their Vices
cloath'd, in their Imaginations, with some amiable Dress of _Liberty_,
_Generosity_, _just Resentment_ against the Contrivers of artful Rules
to enslave Men, and rob them of their Pleasures.

Perhaps never any Men pursu'd Vice long with Peace of Mind, without
some such deluding Imagination of _moral Good_[51], while they may be
still inadvertent to the _barbarous_ and _inhuman Consequences_ of
their Actions. The Idea of an _ill-natur'd Villain_ is too frightful
ever to become familiar to any Mortal. Hence we shall find, that the
_basest Actions_ are dress'd in some _tolerable Mask_. What others
call _Avarice_, appears to the _Agent_ a _prudent Care_ of a _Family_,
or _Friends_; _Fraud_, _artful Conduct_; _Malice_ and _Revenge_, a
_just Sense_ of _Honour_, and a _Vindication_ of our Right in
Possessions, or Fame; _Fire_ and _Sword_, and _Desolation_, among
Enemys, a _just thorow Defence_ of _our Country_; _Persecution_, a
_Zeal_ for the _Truth_, and for the _eternal Happiness_ of Men, which
_Hereticks_ oppose. In all these Instances, Men generally act from a
_Sense_ of _Virtue_ upon _false Opinions_, and _mistaken Benevolence_;
upon _wrong_ or _partial Views_ of _publick Good_, and the Means to
promote it; or upon very _narrow Systems_ form'd by like _foolish
Opinions_. It is not a _Delight_ in the Misery of others, or _Malice_,
which occasions the horrid Crimes which fill our Historys; but
generally an _injudicious_, _unreasonable Enthusiasm_ for some kind of
_limited Virtue_.

[Footnote 51: See below, _Sect._ vi. _Art._ 2. _Par._ 1.]


    _Insani sapiens nomen ferat, quus iniqui,
     Ultra, quam satis est,_ virtutem _si petat ipsam_.[52]

[Sidenote: _False Opinions of the divine Laws_.]

V. The last Ground of _Diversity_ which occurs, are the _false
Opinions_ of the _Will_ or _Laws_ of the Deity. To obey these we are
determin'd from _Gratitude_, and a _Sense_ of _Right_ imagin'd in the
Deity, to dispose at Pleasure the Fortunes of his Creatures. This is
so abundantly known to have produc'd _Follys_, _Superstitions_,
_Murders_, _Devastations_ of Kingdoms, from a Sense of _Virtue_ and
_Duty_, that it is needless to mention particular Instances. Only we
may observe, "That all those _Follys_, or _Barbaritys_, rather confirm
than destroy the Opinion of a _moral Sense_;" since the Deity is
believ'd to have a _Right_ to dispose of his Creatures; and
_Gratitude_ to him, if he be conceiv'd _good_, must move us to
Obedience to his Will: if he be not conceiv'd _good_, _Self-Love_ may
overcome our _moral Sense_ of the Action which we undertake to avoid
his Fury.

[Footnote 52: Hor. _Ep._ 6. _Lib._ 1. _Ver._ 15.]

As for the Vices which commonly proceed from _Love_ of _Pleasure_, or
any _violent Passion_, since generally the _Agent_ is soon sensible of
their _Evil_, and that sometimes amidst the Heat of the Action, they
only prove,

"That this _moral Sense_ and _Benevolence_ may be overcome by the more
importunate Solicitations of _other Desires_."

[Sidenote: _Objection from Incest_.]

VI. Before we leave this Subject, it is necessary to remove one of the
strongest Objections against what has been said so often, _viz._ "That
this _Sense_ is _natural_, and independent on _Custom_ and
_Education_." The Objection is this, "That we shall find _some
Actions_ always attended with the strongest Abhorrence, even at first
View, in some whole Nations, in which there appears nothing contrary
to _Benevolence_; and that the _same Actions_ shall in another Nation
be counted _innocent_, or _honourable_. Thus Incest, among
_Christians_, is abhorr'd at first Appearance as much as _Murder_;
even by those who do not know or reflect upon any necessary Tendency
of it to the Detriment of Mankind. Now we generally allow, that what
is from _Nature_ in one Nation, would be so in all. This Abhorrence
therefore cannot be from _Nature_, since in Greece, the marrying
Half-sisters was counted _honourable_; and among the _Persian_ Magi,
the marrying of Mothers. Say they then, may not all our _Approbation_
or _Dislike_ of Actions arise the same way from _Custom_ and
_Education_?"

The Answer to this may be easily found from what is already said. Had
we no _moral Sense natural_ to us, we should only look upon _Incest_
as hurtful to ourselves, and shun it, and never disapprove other
_incestuous Persons_, more than we do a _broken Merchant_; so that
still this Abhorrence supposes a _Sense_ of _moral Good_. And farther,
it is true, that many who abhor _Incest_ do not know, or reflect upon
the natural Tendency of some sorts of _Incest_ to the _publick
Detriment_: but where-ever it is hated, it is apprehended as offensive
to the Deity, and that it exposes the Person concern'd to his just
Vengeance. Now it is universally acknowledg'd to be the grossest
Ingratitude and Baseness, in any Creature, to counteract the Will of
the Deity, to whom it is under such Obligations. This then is plainly
_a moral evil Quality_ apprehended in _Incest_, and reducible to the
general Foundation of _Malice_, or rather Want of _Benevolence_. Nay
farther, where this Opinion, "That _Incest_ is offensive to the
Deity," prevails, _Incest_ must have another direct Contrariety to
_Benevolence_; since we must apprehend the _Incestuous_, as exposing
an Associate, who should be dear to him by the Ties of _Nature_, to
the lowest State of _Misery_ and _Baseness_, _Infamy_ and
_Punishment_. But in those Countrys where no such Opinion prevails of
the Deity's abhorring or prohibiting _Incest_; if no obvious _natural
Evils_ attend it, it may be look'd upon as _innocent_. And farther, as
Men who have the _Sense_ of _Tasting_, may, by _Company_ and
_Education_, have Prejudices against Meats they never tasted, as
_unsavoury_; so may Men who have a _moral Sense_, acquire an Opinion
by implicit Faith, of the _moral Evil_ of Actions, altho' they do not
themselves discern in them any Tendency to _natural Evil_; imagining
that others do: or, by Education, they may have some Ideas associated,
which raise an Abhorrence without Reason. But without a _moral Sense_
we could receive no Prejudice against Actions, under any other View
than as _naturally disadvantageous_ to ourselves.

[Sidenote: _Moral Sense not from Education_.]

VII. The _Universality_ of this _moral Sense_, and that it is
antecedent to _Instruction_, may appear from observing the Sentiments
of _Children_, upon hearing the Storys with which they are commonly
entertain'd as soon as they understand Language. They always
passionately interest themselves on that side where _Kindness_ and
_Humanity_ are found; and detest the _Cruel_, the _Covetous_, the
_Selfish_, or the _Treacherous_. How strongly do we see their Passions
of _Joy_, _Sorrow_, _Love_, and _Indignation_, mov'd by these _moral
Representations_, even tho' there have been no Pains taken to give
them Ideas of a Deity, of _Laws_, of a _future State_, or of the more
intricate Tendency of the _universal Good_ to that of each
_Individual_!




SECT. V.

     _A farther Confirmation, that we have_ practical
     Dispositions _to_ Virtue _implanted in our_ Nature;
     _with a farther Explication of our Benevolent_
     Instincts _of various Kinds, with the_ additional
     Motives _of_ Interest, _viz._ Honour, Shame _and_ Pity.


[Sidenote: _Degrees of Benevolence_.]

I. We have already endeavoured to prove, "That there is a _universal
Determination_ to _Benevolence_ in _Mankind_, even toward the most
distant Parts of the Species:" But we are not to imagine, that all
benevolent Affections are of one Kind, or alike strong. There are
nearer and stronger Kinds of _Benevolence_, when the Objects stand in
some nearer Relations to ourselves, which have obtain'd distinct
Names; such as _natural Affection_, _Gratitude_, _Esteem_.

[Sidenote: _Natural Affection_.]

One Species of _natural Affection_, viz. that in _Parents_ towards
their _Children_, has been consider'd already[53]; we shall only
observe farther, That there is the same kind of _Affection_ among
_collateral Relations_, tho' in a weaker Degree; which is universally
observable, where no Opposition of _Interest_ produces contrary
Actions, or counterbalances the Power of this _natural Affection_.

[Footnote 53: See above, _Sect._ ii. _Art._ 9. _Par._ 2, 3.]

[Sidenote: _Not founded on Merit, or Acquaintance_.]

We may also observe, that as to the _Affection_ of _Parents_, it
cannot be entirely founded on _Merit_ and _Acquaintance_; not only
because it is antecedent to all Acquaintance, which might occasion
_Esteem_; but because it operates where Acquaintance would produce
_Hatred_, even toward _Children_ apprehended to be _vitious_. And this
_Affection_ is farther confirm'd to be from Nature, because it is
always observ'd to _descend_, and not _ascend_ from _Children_ to
_Parents_ mutually. Nature, who seems sometimes frugal in her
Operations, has strongly determin'd _Parents_ to the Care of their
_Children_, because they universally stand in absolute need of Support
from them; but has left it to _Reflection_, and a _Sense_ of
_Gratitude_, to produce Returns of _Love in Children_, toward such
_tender kind Benefactors_, who very seldom stand in such absolute Need
of Support from their Posterity, as their Children did from them. Now,
did _Acquaintance_ or _Merit_ produce _natural Affection_, we surely
should find it strongest in _Children_, on whom all the Obligations
are laid by a thousand good Offices; which yet is quite contrary to
Observation. Nay, this Principle seems not confin'd to _Mankind_, but
extends to other _Animals_, where yet we scarcely ever suppose any
Ideas of Merit; and is observ'd to continue in them no longer than the
Necessitys of their Young require. Nor could it be of any Service to
the Young that it should, since when they are grown up, they can
receive little Benefit from the Love of their _Dams_. But as it is
otherwise with _rational Agents_, so _their Affections_ are of longer
Continuance, even during their whole Lives.

[Sidenote: _Gratitude_.]

II. But nothing will give us a juster Idea of the _wise Order_ in
which _human Nature_ is form'd for _universal Love_, and _mutual good
Offices_, than considering _that strong Attraction_ of _Benevolence_,
which we call _Gratitude_. Every one knows that _Beneficence_ toward
ourselves makes a much deeper Impression upon us, and raises
_Gratitude_, or a _stronger Love_ toward the _Benefactor_, than _equal
Beneficence_ toward a _third Person_[54]. Now because of the great
Numbers of Mankind, their distant Habitations, and the Incapacity of
any one to be remarkably useful to great Multitudes; that our
_Benevolence_ might not be quite distracted with Maultiplicity of
Objects, whose equal Virtues would equally recommend them to our
Regard; or become useless, by being equally extended to Multitudes,
whose Interests we could not understand, nor be capable of promoting,
having no Intercourse of Offices with them; Nature has so well ordered
it, that as our Attention is more raised by those good Offices which
are done to ourselves or our Friends, so they cause a stronger Sense
of Approbation in us, and produce a stronger Benevolence toward the
Authors of them. This we call _Gratitude_. And thus a Foundation is
laid for _joyful Associations_ in all kinds of _Business_, and
_virtuous Friendships_.

[Footnote 54: See above, _Sect._ ii. _Art._ 6. _Par._ 3.]

By _this Constitution_ also the _Benefactor_ is more encourag'd in his
_Beneficence_, and better secur'd of an _Increase_ of Happiness by
_grateful Returns_[55], than if his _Virtue_ were only to be honour'd
by the colder general Sentiments of Persons unconcern'd, who could not
know his Necessitys, nor how to be profitable to him; especially, when
they would all be equally determin'd to love innumerable Multitudes,
whose equal Virtues would have the same Pretensions to their Love.

[Footnote 55: See above, _Sect._ iii. _Art._ 2. _Par._ 2.]

The _universal Benevolence_ toward all Men, we may compare to that
Principle of _Gravitation_, which perhaps extends to all Bodys in the
_Universe_; but _increases_ as the Distance is diminish'd, and is
_strongest_ when Bodys come to touch each other. Now this _Increase_,
upon nearer Approach, is as necessary as that there should be any
_Attraction_ at all. For a _general Attraction_, equal in all
Distances, would by the Contrariety of such Multitudes of equal
Forces, put an End to all Regularity of Motion, and perhaps stop it
altogether. Beside this general Attraction, the Learned in these
Subjects shew us a great many other Attractions among several Sorts of
Bodys, answering to some particular Sorts of Passions, from some
special Causes. And that Attraction or Force by which the Parts of
each Body cohere, may represent the Self-Love of each Individual.

These different Sorts of Love to Persons according to their _nearer
Approaches_ to _ourselves_ by their _Benefits_, is observable in the
high Degree of _Love_, which _Heroes_ and _Lawgivers_ universally
obtain in their own Countrys, above what they find abroad, even among
those who are not insensible of their Virtues; and in all the strong
Ties of _Friendship_, _Acquaintance_, _Neighbourhood_, _Partnership_;
which are exceedingly necessary to the Order and Happiness of Human
Society.

[Sidenote: _Love of Honour_.]

III. From considering that _natural Gratitude_, and _Love_ toward our
_Benefactors_, which was already shewn to be _disinterested_[56]; we
are easily led to consider _another Determination_ of our _Minds_,
equally _natural_ with the _former_, which is to desire and delight in
the _good Opinion_ and _Love of others_, even when we expect no other
_Advantage_ from them, except what flows from _this Constitution_,
whereby Honour is made an _immediate Good_. This Desire of _Honour_ I
would call Ambition, had not _Custom_ join'd some evil Ideas to that
Word, making it denote such a _violent Desire_ of _Honour_, and of
_Power_ also, as will make us stop at no base Means to obtain them. On
the other hand, we are by Nature subjected to a _grievous Sensation_
of _Misery_, from the unfavourable Opinions of others concerning us,
even when we dread no other _Evil_ from them. This we call Shame;
which in the same manner is constituted an _immediate Evil_, as we
said _Honour_ was an _immediate Good_.

[Footnote 56: See above, _Sect._ ii. _Art._ 6.]

Now, were there no _moral Sense_, or had we no other Idea of Actions
but as _advantageous_ or _hurtful_, I see no Reason why we should be
_delighted_ with _Honour_, or subjected to the _Uneasiness_ of
_Shame_; or how it could ever happen, that a Man, who is secure from
Punishment for any Action, should ever be _uneasy_ at its being known
to _all the World_. The _World_ may have an Opinion of him as
pernicious to his Neighbours; but what subjects his Ease to this
Opinion of the _World_? Why, perhaps, he shall not be so much trusted
henceforward in Business, and so suffer Loss. If this be the only
Reason of _Shame_, and it has no _immediate Evil_ or _Pain_ in it,
distinct from Fear of Loss, then, where-ever we expose ourselves to
Loss, we should be _asham'd_, and endeavour to conceal the Action: and
yet it is quite otherwise.

A Merchant, for Instance, lest it should impair his Credit, conceals a
_Ship-wreck_, or a very bad _Market_, which he has sent his Goods to.
But is this the same with the Passion of Shame? Has he that _Anguish_,
that _Dejection_ of _Mind_, and _Self-condemnation_, which one shall
have whose _Treachery_ is detected? Nay, how will Men sometimes glory
in their Losses, when in a Cause imagin'd _morally good_, tho' they
really weaken their Credit in the Merchant's Sense; that is, the
Opinion of their _Wealth_, or _Fitness_ for Business? Was any Man ever
_asham'd_ of impoverishing himself to serve his _Country_, or his
_Friend_?

[Sidenote: _The Foundation of Morals not the Opinions of our
Country_.]

IV. The _Opinions_ of our Country are by some made the first Standard
of _Virtue_. They alledge, "That by comparing Actions to them, we
first distinguish between _moral Good_ and _Evil_: And then, say
they, Ambition, or the _Love_ of Honour, is our _chief Motive_." But
what is _Honour_? It is not the being universally known, no matter
how. A _covetous Man_ is not _honour'd_ by being universally known as
_covetous_; nor a _weak_, _selfish_, or _luxurious Man_, when he is
known to be so: Much less can a _treacherous_, _cruel_ or _ungrateful
Man_, be said to be _honour'd_ for his being known as such. A
_Posture-master_, a _Fire-eater_, or _Practiser_ of _Leger-de-main_,
is not _honour'd_ for these publick Shews, unless we consider him as a
Person capable of giving the Pleasures of _Admiration_ and _Surprize_
to Multitudes. _Honour_ then is _the Opinion of others concerning our
morally good Actions, or Abilitys presum'd to be apply'd that way_;
for _Abilitys_ constantly apply'd to other Purposes, procure the
greatest Infamy. Now it is certain, that _Ambition_, or Love of
_Honour_, is really _selfish_; but then this Determination to love
_Honour_, presupposes a _Sense_ of _moral Virtue_, both in the Persons
who confer the Honour, and in him who pursues it.

And let it be observ'd, that if we knew an _Agent_ had no other Motive
of Action than _Ambition_, we should apprehend no Virtue even in his
most useful Actions, since they flow'd not from any _Love_ to others,
or _Desire_ to their Happiness. When _Honour_ is thus constituted by
Nature _pleasant_ to us, it may be an _additional Motive_ to
_Virtue_, as, we said above[57], the Pleasure arising from
_Reflection on our Benevolence_ was: but the Person whom we imagine
_perfectly virtuous_, acts immediately from the _Love_ of others;
however these refin'd Interests may be _joint Motives_ to him to set
about such a Course of Actions, or to cultivate every _kind
Inclination_, and to despise every _contrary Interest_, as giving a
smaller Happiness than _Reflection_ on his own Virtue, and
_Consciousness_ of the Esteem of others.

Shame is in the same manner constituted an _immediate Evil_, and
influences us the same way to abstain from _moral Evil_: not that any
Action or Omission would appear _virtuous_, where the _sole Motive_
was Fear of _Shame_.

[Footnote 57: See _Sect._ iii. _Art._ 15. _Par._ 2.]

[Sidenote: _Opinions flow from the Moral Sense_.]

V. But to inquire farther, how far the Opinions of our Company can
raise a Sense of _moral Good or Evil_: If any Opinion be universal in
any Country, Men of little Reflection will probably embrace it. If an
Action be believ'd to be _advantageous_ to the _Agent_, we may be led
to believe so too, and then _Self-Love_ may make us undertake it; or
may, the same way, make us shun an Action reputed _pernicious_ to the
_Agent_. If an Action pass for _advantageous_ to the _Publick_, we may
believe so too; and what next?

If we have no _disinterested Benevolence_, what shall move us to
undertake it? "Why, we love _Honour_; and to obtain this Pleasure, we
will undertake the Action from _Self-Interest_." Now, is _Honour_ only
the Opinion of our Country, that an Action is _advantageous_ to the
_Publick_? No: we see no Honour paid to the _useful Treachery_ of an
Enemy, whom we have brib'd to our Side, to _casual undesign'd
Services_, or to the most useful Effects of _Compulsion_ on _Cowards_;
and yet we see Honour paid to _unsuccessful Attempts_ to serve the
Publick from sincere Love to it. _Honour_ then presupposes a _Sense_
of something _amiable_ besides _Advantage_, _viz._ a _Sense_ of
_Excellence_ in a _publick Spirit_; and therefore the _first Sense_ of
_moral Good_ must be antecedent to _Honour_; for _Honour_ is founded
upon it[58]. The Company we keep may lead us, without examining, to
believe that certain Actions tend to the _publick Good_; but that our
Company _honours_ such Actions, and loves the _Agent_, must flow from
a _Sense_ of _some Excellence_ in this Love of the _Publick_, and
serving its Interests.

[Footnote 58: _This should be considered by those who talk much of_
Praise, high Opinion, or Value, Esteem, Glory, _as Things much
desired; while yet they allow no_ moral Sense.]

"We therefore, say they again, pretend to _love_ the _Publick_, altho'
we only desire the Pleasure of _Honour_; and we will applaud all who
seem to act in that manner, either that we may reap _Advantage_ from
their Actions, or that others may believe we _really love_ the
_Publick_." But shall any Man ever be heartily _approved_ and
_admired_, when we know that _Self-Love_ is the only Spring of his
Actions? No: that is impossible. Or, shall we ever really admire Men
who appear to _love_ the _Publick_, without a _moral Sense_? No: we
could form no Idea of such a Temper; and as for these Pretenders to
_publick Love_, we should hate them as Hypocrites, and our Rivals in
Fame. Now this is all which could be effected by the Opinions of our
Country, even supposing they had a _moral Sense_, provided we had none
ourselves: They never could make us admire _Virtue_, or _virtuous
Characters_ in others; but could only give us Opinions of _Advantage_
or _Disadvantage_ in Actions, according as they tended to procure to
us the Pleasures of _Honour_, or the Pain of Shame.

But if we suppose that Men have, by Nature, a _moral Sense_ of
_Goodness_ in Actions; and that they are capable of _disinterested
Love_; all is easy. The Opinions of our Company may make us rashly
conclude, that certain Actions tend to the universal Detriment, and
are _morally evil_, when perhaps they are not so; and then _our Sense_
may determine us to have an Aversion to them, and their Authors; or we
may, the same way, be led into implicit Prejudices in favour of
Actions as _good_; and then our Desire of _Honour_ may cooperate with
_Benevolence_, to move us to such Actions. But, had we no _Sense_ of
_moral Qualitys_ in Actions, nor any Conceptions of them, except as
_advantageous_ or _hurtful_, we never could have _honour'd_ or _lov'd
Agents_ for _publick Love_, or had any Regard to their Actions,
farther than they affected ourselves in particular. We might have
form'd the metaphysical Idea of _publick Good_, but we had never
desir'd it, farther than it tended to our own _private Interest_,
without a Principle of _Benevolence_; nor admir'd and lov'd those who
are studious of it, without a _moral Sense_. So far is _Virtue_ from
being (in the Language of a late Author[59]) _the Offspring of
Flattery, begot upon Pride_; that _Pride_, in the bad Meaning of that
Word, is _the spurious Brood of Ignorance by our moral Sense_, _and
Flattery_ only _an Engine, which the Cunning may use to turn this
moral Sense in others, to the Purposes of Self-Love in the Flatterer_.

[Footnote 59: Author of the Fable of the Bees, _Pag._ 37. 3_d Ed._]

[Sidenote: _Moral Sense, not from Love of Honour_.]

VI. To explain what has been said of the Power of _Honour_: Suppose a
State or Prince, observing the Money which is drawn out of _England_
by _Italian Musicians_, should decree _Honours_, _Statues_, _Titles_,
for _great Musicians_: This would certainly excite all who had Hopes
of Success, to the Study of _Musick_; and all Men would look upon the
good Performers as useful Subjects, as well as very entertaining. But
would this give all Men a _good Ear_, or make them delight in
_Harmony_? Or could it ever make us really love a _Musician_, who
study'd nothing but his own Gain, in the same manner we do a
_Patriot_, or a _generous Friend_? I doubt, not. And yet _Friendship_,
without the Assistance of Statues, or Honours, can make Persons appear
_exceedingly amiable_.

Let us take another Instance: Suppose _Statues_ and _triumphal Arches_
were decreed, as well as a _large Sum_ of _Money_, to the Discoverer
of the _Longitude_, or any other useful Invention in Mathematicks:
This would raise an universal Desire of such Knowledge from
_Self-Love_; but would Men therefore love a _Mathematician_, as they
do a _virtuous Man_? Would a _Mathematician_ love every Person who had
attain'd Perfection in that Knowledge, where-ever he observ'd it,
altho' he knew that it was not accompany'd with any _Love_ to
_Mankind_, or _Study_ of their _Good_, but with _Ill-nature_, _Pride_,
_Covetousness_? In short, let us honour other Qualitys by external
Shew as much as we please; if we do not discern a _benevolent
Intention_ in the Application, or presume upon it, we may look upon
these Qualitys as useful, enriching, or otherwise advantageous to any
one who is possess'd of them; but they shall never meet with those
endearing Sentiments of _Esteem_ and _Love_, which our _Nature_
determines us to appropriate to _Benevolence_ or _Virtue_.

Love of _Honour_, and Aversion to _Shame_, may often move us to do
Actions, for which others profess to honour us, even tho' we see no
Good in them ourselves: And _Compliance_ with the Inclinations of
others, as it evidences Humanity, may procure some Love to the
_Agent_, from Spectators who see no _moral Good_ in the Action itself.
But without some _Sense_ of _Good_ in the Actions, Men shall never be
fond of such Actions in Solitude, nor ever love any one for Perfection
in them, or for practising them in Solitude; and much less shall they
be dissatisfy'd with themselves, when they act otherwise in Solitude.
Now this is the Case with us, as to _Virtue_; and therefore we must
have, by Nature, a _moral Sense_ of it antecedent to _Honour_.

[Footnote 60: See the Fable of the Bees, _Page_ 38. 3_d Ed._]

This will shew us with what Judgment a late Author[60] compares the
Original of our Ideas of _Virtue_, and Approbation of it, to _the
manner of regulating the Behaviour of_ aukward _Children by
Commendation_. It shall appear hereafter[61], that our Approbation of
some _Gestures_, and what we call _Decency_ in Motion, depends upon
some _moral Ideas_ in People of advanc'd Years. But before Children
come to observe this Relation, it is only _good Nature_, an
_Inclination_ to please, and _Love_ of _Praise_, which makes them
endeavour to behave as they are desir'd; and not any Perception of
_Excellence_ in this Behaviour. Hence they are not solicitous about
Gestures when alone, unless with a View to please when they return to
Company; nor do they ever love or approve others for any Perfection of
this kind, but rather envy or hate them; till they either discern the
Connexion between _Gestures_ and _moral Qualitys_; or reflect on the
_good Nature_, which is evidenc'd by such a Compliance with the Desire
of the Company.

[Footnote 61: See _Sect._ vi. _Art._ 4.]

[Sidenote: _False Honour_.]

VII. The considering _Honour_ in the manner above explain'd may shew
us the Reason, why Men are often _asham'd_ for things which are not
_vitious_, and _honour'd_ for what is not _virtuous_. For, if any
Action only appears _vitious_ to any Persons or Company, altho' it be
not so, they will have a bad Idea of the _Agent_; and then he may be
asham'd, or suffer Uneasiness, in being thought _morally evil_. The
same way, those who look upon an Action as _morally good_, will
honour the _Agent_; and he may be pleas'd with the _Honour_, altho' he
does not himself perceive any _moral Good_ in what has procur'd it.

[Sidenote: _Moral Incapacity, matter of Shame_.]

Again, we shall be _asham'd_ of every Evidence of _moral Incapacity_,
or Want of _Ability_; and with good Ground, when this Want is
occasion'd by our own Negligence. Nay farther, if any Circumstance be
look'd upon as _indecent_ in any Country, _offensive_ to others, or
_deform'd_; we shall, out of our Desire of the good Opinions of
others, be _asham'd_ to be found in such Circumstances, even when we
are sensible that this Indecency or Offence is not founded on
_Nature_, but is merely the Effect of _Custom_. Thus being observ'd in
those Functions of Nature which are counted _indecent_ and
_offensive_, will make us _uneasy_, altho' we are sensible that they
really do not argue any _Vice_ or _Weakness_. But on the contrary,
since _moral Abilitys_ of any kind, upon the general Presumption of a
good Application, and of having been acquired by Virtue, procure the
Esteem of others, we shall value ourselves upon them, or grow proud of
them, and be asham'd of any Discovery of our Want of such _Abilitys_.
This is the Reason that _Wealth_ and _Power_, the great _Engines_ of
_Virtue_, when presum'd to be intended for _benevolent_ Purposes,
either toward our Friends or our Country, procure _Honour_ from
others, and are apt to beget _Pride_ in the _Possessor_; which, as it
is a general Passion, which may be either _good_ or _evil_, according
as it is grounded, we may describe to be _the Joy which arises from
the real or imagin'd Possession of Honour, or Claim to it_. The same
are the Effects of _Knowledge_, _Sagacity_, _Strength_; and hence it
is that Men are apt to boast of them.

But, whenever it appears that Men have only their _private Advantage_
in View, in the Application of these _Abilitys_, or _natural
Advantages_, the _Honour_ ceases, and we study to conceal them, or at
least are not fond of displaying them; and much more, when there is
any Suspicion of an _ill-natur'd_ Application. Thus some _Misers_ are
asham'd of their _Wealth_, and study to conceal it; as the _Malicious_
or _Selfish_ do their _Power_: Nay, this is very often done, where
there is no positive evil Intention; because the diminishing their
_Abilitys_, increases the _moral Good_ of any little kind Action,
which they can find in their Hearts to perform.

[Sidenote: _Selfishness shameful_.]

In short, we always see Actions which flow from _publick Love_,
accompany'd with generous Boldness and Openness; and not only
_malicious_, but even _selfish ones_, the matter of Shame and
Confusion; and that Men study to conceal them. The Love of _private
Pleasure_ is the ordinary Occasion of _Vice_; and when Men have got
any lively Notions of _Virtue_, they generally begin to be asham'd of
every thing which betrays _Selfishness_, even in Instances where it is
innocent. We are apt to imagine, that others observing us in such
Pursuits, form mean Opinions of us, as too much set on private
Pleasure; and hence we shall find such Enjoyments, in most polite
Nations, conceal'd from those who do not partake with us. Such are
_venereal Pleasures_ between _Persons marry'd_, and even _eating_ and
_drinking_ alone, any nicer sorts of Meats or Drinks: whereas a
_hospitable Table_ is rather matter of boasting; and so are all other
kind generous Offices between _marry'd Persons_, where there is no
Suspicion of _Self-Love_ in the _Agent_; but he is imagin'd as acting
from Love to his _Associate_. This, I fansy, first introduc'd Ideas of
_Modesty_ in polite Nations, and _Custom_ has strengthen'd them
wonderfully; so that we are now asham'd of many things, upon some
confus'd implicit Opinions of _moral Evil_, tho' we know not upon what
account.

[Sidenote: _Honour and Shame often from some Associations of Ideas_.]

Here too we may see the Reason, why we are not asham'd of any of the
Methods of _Grandeur_, or _High-Living_. There is such a Mixture of
_moral Ideas_, of _Benevolence_, of _Abilitys_ kindly employ'd; so
many Dependants _supported_, so many Friends _entertain'd_,
_assisted_, _protected_; such a _Capacity_ imagin'd for _great_ and
_amiable Actions_, that we are never asham'd, but rather boast of
such _things_. We never affect Obscurity or Concealment, but rather
desire that our _State_ and _Magnificence_ should be known. Were it
not for this Conjunction of _moral Ideas_, no Mortal could bear the
Drudgery of _State_, or abstain from laughing at those who did. Could
any Man be pleas'd with a Company of _Statues_ surrounding his Table,
so artfully contriv'd as to consume his various Courses, and inspir'd
by some Servant, like so many Puppets, to give the usual trifling
Returns in Praise of their Fare? Or with so many _Machines_ to perform
the Cringes and Whispers of a Levee?

The _Shame_ we suffer from the Meanness of _Dress_, _Table_,
_Equipage_, is intirely owing to the same Reason. This Meanness is
often imagin'd to argue _Avarice_, _Meanness_ of _Spirit_, Want of
_Capacity_, or _Conduct_ in Life, of _Industry_, or _moral Abilitys_
of one kind or other. To confirm this, let us observe that Men will
glory in the Meanness of their Fare, when it was occasion'd by a
_good_ Action. How many would be asham'd to be surpriz'd at a Dinner
of _cold Meat_, who will boast of their having fed upon _Dogs_ and
_Horses_ at the Siege of _Derry_? And they will all tell you, that
they were not, nor are asham'd of it.

This ordinary Connexion in our Imagination, between _external
Grandeur_, _Regularity_ in _Dress_, _Equipage_, _Retinue_, _Badges_
of _Honour_, and some _moral Abilitys_ greater than ordinary, is
perhaps of more Consequence in the World than some _recluse
Philosophers_ apprehend, who pique themselves upon despising these
external Shews. This may possibly be a great, if not the only Cause of
what some count _miraculous_, _viz._ That _civil Governors_ of no
greater Capacity than their Neighbours, by some inexpressible _Awe_
and _Authority_, quell the Spirits of _Vulgar_, and keep them in
Subjection by such small Guards, as might easily be conquer'd by those
Associations which might be rais'd among the _Disaffected_, or
_Factious_ of any _State_; who are daring enough among their _Equals_,
and shew a Sufficient Contempt of Death for undertaking such an
Enterprize.

Hence also we may discover the Reason, why the gratifying our
_superior Senses_ of _Beauty_ and _Harmony_, or the Enjoyment of the
Pleasure of _Knowledge_, never occasions any Shame or Confusion, tho'
our Enjoyment were known to all the _World_. The Objects which furnish
this Pleasure, are of such a Nature, as to afford the same Delights to
Multitudes; nor is there any thing in the Enjoyment of them by one,
which excludes any Mortal from a like Enjoyment. So that, altho' we
pursue these Enjoyments from _Self-Love_, yet, since our Enjoyment
cannot be prejudicial to others, no Man is imagin'd any way
_inhumanly selfish_, from the fullest Enjoyment of them which is
possible. The same _Regularity_ or _Harmony_ which delights me, may at
the same time delight Multitudes; the same _Theorem_ shall be equally
fruitful of Pleasure, when it has entertain'd Thousands. Men therefore
are not asham'd of such Pursuits, since they never, of themselves,
seduce us into any thing _malicious_, _envious_, or _ill-natur'd_; nor
does any one apprehend another _too selfish_, from his pursuing
Objects of unexhausted universal Pleasure[62].

This View of _Honour_ and _Shame_ may also let us see the Reason, why
most Men are uneasy at being prais'd, when they themselves are
present. Every one is delighted with the Esteem of others, and must
enjoy great Pleasure when he hears himself commended; but we are
unwilling others should observe our Enjoyment of this Pleasure, which
is really _selfish_; or that they should imagine us fond of it, or
influenc'd by Hopes of it in our good Actions: and therefore we choose
Secrecy for the Enjoyment of it, as we do with respect to other
Pleasures, in which others do not share with us.

[Footnote 62: See another Reason of this, perhaps more probably true,
in the _Essay on the Passions_, p. 6.]

[Sidenote: _Compassion a Motive to Virtue_.]

VIII. Let us next consider another Determination of our _Mind_, which
strongly proves _Benevolence_ to be _natural_ to us, and that is
Compassion; by which we are dispos'd to study the _Interest_ of
others, without any Views of _private Advantage_. This needs little
Illustration. Every Mortal is made uneasy by any grievous Misery he
sees another involv'd in, unless the Person be imagin'd _evil_ in a
_moral Sense_: Nay, it is almost impossible for us to be unmov'd, even
in that Case. _Advantage_ may make us do a cruel Action, or may
overcome _Pity_; but it scarce ever extinguishes it. A sudden Passion
of _Hatred_ or _Anger_ may represent a Person as _absolutely evil_,
and so extinguish _Pity_; but when the Passion is over, it often
returns. Another _disinterested_ View may even in cold Blood overcome
_Pity_; such as _Love_ to _our Country_, or _Zeal_ for _Religion_.
_Persecution_ is generally occasion'd by _Love_ of _Virtue_, and a
_Desire_ of the _eternal Happiness_ of _Mankind_, altho' our _Folly_
makes us choose absurd Means to promote it; and is often accompany'd
with _Pity_ enough to make the _Persecutor_ uneasy, in what, for
prepollent Reasons, he chooses; unless his Opinion leads him to look
upon the _Heretick_ as _absolutely_ and _intirely evil_.

We may here observe, how wonderfully the Constitution of _human
Nature_ is adapted to move _Compassion_. Our _Misery_ or _Distress_
immediately appears in our _Countenance_, if we do not study to
prevent it, and propagates some Pain to all Spectators; who, from
Observation, universally understand the Meaning of those _dismal
Airs_. We _mechanichally_ send forth _Shrieks_ and _Groans_ upon any
surprizing Apprehension of _Evil_; so that no Regard to Decency can
sometimes restrain them. This is the Voice of Nature, understood by
all Nations, by which all who are present are rous'd to our
Assistance, and sometimes our _injurious_ Enemy is made to relent.

We observ'd above[63], that we are not immediately excited by
_Compassion_ to desire the _Removal_ of our own Pain: we think it just
to be so affected upon the Occasion, and dislike those who are not so.
But we are excited directly to desire the _Relief_ of the Miserable;
without any Imagination, that this Relief is a _private Good_ to
ourselves: And if we see this impossible, we may by _Reflection_
discern it to be vain for us to indulge our _Compassion_ any farther;
and then _Self-Love_ prompts us to retire from the Object which
occasions our Pain, and to endeavour to divert our Thoughts. But where
there is no such _Reflection_, People are hurry'd by a _natural kind
Instinct_, to see Objects of _Compassion_, and expose themselves to
this Pain, when they can give no Reason for it; as in the Instance of
_publick Executions_.

[Footnote 63: See _Sect._ ii. _Art._ 8. _Par._ 2.]

This same Principle leads Men to _Tragedies_; only we are to observe,
that another strong Reason of this is the _moral Beauty_ of the
_Characters_ and _Actions_, which we love to behold. For I doubt,
whether any Audience would be pleas'd to see fictitious Scenes of
Misery, if they were kept Strangers to the _moral Qualitys_ of the
Sufferers, or their _Characters_ and _Actions_. As in such a Case,
there would be no _Beauty_ to raise Desire of seeing such
Representations, I fancy we would not expose ourselves to Pain alone,
from Misery which we knew to be fictitious.

It was the same Cause which crouded the _Roman Theatres_ to see
_Gladiators_. There the People had frequent Instances of great
_Courage_, and _Contempt_ of Death, two great _moral Abilitys_, if not
_Virtues_. Hence Cicero looks upon them as great Instructions in
_Fortitude_. The _Antagonist Gladiator_ bore all the Blame of the
Cruelty committed, among People of little Reflection; and the
_courageous_ and artful one, really obtain'd a Reputation of _Virtue_,
and Favour among the Spectators, and was vindicated by the Necessity
of _Self-defence_. In the mean time they were inadvertent to this,
that their crouding to such Sights, and favouring the Persons who
presented them with such Spectacles of Courage, and with Opportunitys
of following their _natural Instinct_ to _Compassion_, was the true
Occasion of all the real Distress, or Assaults which they were sorry
for.

What Sentiments can we imagine a _Candidate_ would have rais'd of
himself, had he presented his Countrymen only with Scenes of _Misery_;
had he drain'd _Hospitals_ and _Infirmarys_ of all their pityable
Inhabitants, or had he bound so many _Slaves_, and without any
Resistance, butcher'd them with his own Hands? I should very much
question the Success of his Election, (however _Compassion_ might
cause his Shews still to be frequented) if his _Antagonist_ chose a
Diversion apparently more _virtuous_, or with a _Mixture_ of Scenes of
_Virtue_.

[Sidenote: _Compassion natural_.]

How independent this Disposition to _Compassion_ is on _Custom_,
_Education_ or _Instruction_, will appear from the Prevalence of it in
_Women_ and _Children_, who are less influenc'd by these. That
_Children_ delight in some Actions which are _cruel_ and _tormenting_
to Animals which they have in their Power, flows not from _Malice_, or
want of _Compassion_, but from their _Ignorance_ of those Signs of
Pain which many Creatures make; together with a _Curiosity_ to see the
various Contortions of their Bodys. For when they are more acquainted
with these Creatures, or come by any means to know their Sufferings,
their _Compassion_ often becomes too strong for their _Reason_; as it
generally does in beholding _Executions_, where as soon as they
observe the Evidences of Distress, or Pain in the _Malefactor_, they
are apt to condemn this necessary Method of Self-defence in the
_State_.




SECT. VI.

     _Concerning the_ Importance _of this_ moral Sense _to
     the present Happiness of_ Mankind, _and its_ Influence
     _on human Affairs_.


[Sidenote: _Importance of the Moral Sense_.]

I. It may now probably appear, that notwithstanding the Corruption of
Manners so justly complain'd of every-where, this _moral Sense_ has a
greater Influence on _Mankind_ than is generally imagin'd, altho' it
is often directed by very partial imperfect Views of _publick Good_,
and often overcome by _Self-Love_. But we shall offer some farther
Considerations to prove, "That it gives us more _Pleasure_ and _Pain_,
than all our _other Facultys_." And to prevent Repetitions, let us
observe, "That where-ever any _morally good Quality_ gives Pleasure
from _Reflection_, or from _Honour_, the contrary _evil one_ will give
proportionable Pain, from _Remorse_ and _Shame_." Now we shall
consider the _moral Pleasures_, not only _separately_, but as they are
the _most delightful Ingredient_ in the ordinary Pleasures of _Life_.

All Men seem persuaded of some _Excellency_ in the Possession of _good
moral Qualitys_, which is superior to all other Enjoyments; and on
the contrary, look upon a State of _moral Evil_, as worse and more
wretched than any other whatsoever. We must not form our Judgment in
this matter from the Actions of Men; for, however they may be
influenc'd by _moral Sentiments_, yet it is certain, that
_self-interested Passions_ frequently overcome them, and _partial
Views_ of the Tendency of Actions, make us do what is really _morally
evil_, apprehending it to be _good_. But let us examine the Sentiments
which Men universally form of the State of others, when they are no
way immediately concern'd; for in these Sentiments _human Nature_ is
_calm_ and _undisturb'd_, and shews its _true Face_.

Now should we imagine a _rational Creature_ in a sufficiently happy
State, whose Mind was, without _Interruption_, wholly occupy'd with
pleasant Sensations of _Smell_, _Taste_, _Touch_, _&c._ if at the same
time all other Ideas were excluded? Should we not think the State
_low_, _mean_, and _sordid_, if there were no _Society_, no _Love_ or
_Friendship_, no _good Offices_? What then must that State be, wherein
there are no Pleasures but those of the _external Senses_, with such
long Intervals as _human Nature_ at present must have? Do these short
Fits of Pleasure make the _Luxurious_ happy? How _insipid_ and
_joyless_ are the Reflections on past Pleasure! And how poor a
Recompence is the Return of the transient Sensation, for the
_nauseous Satietys_, and _Languors_ in the Intervals! This _Frame_ of
our _Nature_, so incapable of long Enjoyments of the _external
Senses_, points out to us, "That there must be some other more
_durable Pleasure_, without such _tedious Interruptions_, and
_nauseous Reflections_."

Let us even join with the Pleasures of the _external Senses_, the
Perceptions of _Beauty_, _Order_, _Harmony_. These are, no doubt, more
_noble Pleasures_, and seem to inlarge the _Mind_; and yet how _cold_
and _joyless_ are they, if there be no _moral Pleasures_ of
_Friendship_, _Love_ and _Beneficence_! Now, if the bare Absence of
_moral Good_ makes, in our Judgment, the State of a rational Agent
contemptible; the Presence of _contrary_ Dispositions is always
imagin'd by us to sink him into a degree of Misery, from which no
other Pleasures can relieve him. Would we ever wish to be in the same
Condition with a _wrathful_, _malicious_, _revengeful_, or _envious
Being_, tho' we were at the same time to enjoy all the Pleasures of
the _external_ and _internal Senses_? The internal Pleasures of
_Beauty_ and _Harmony_ contribute greatly indeed toward soothing the
Mind into a Forgetfulness of _Wrath_, _Malice_ or _Revenge_; and they
must do so, before we can have any tolerable Delight or Enjoyment: for
while _these Affections_ possess the Mind, there is nothing but
_Torment_ and _Misery_.

[Sidenote: _Castle-builders prove it_.]

What _Castle-builder_, who forms to himself imaginary Scenes of Life,
in which he thinks he should be happy, ever made _acknowledg'd
Treachery_, _Cruelty_, or _Ingratitude_, the Steps by which he mounted
to his wish'd-for Elevation, or Parts of his Character, when he had
attain'd it? We always conduct ourselves in such Resveries, according
to the Dictates of _Honour_, _Faith_, _Generosity_, _Courage_; and the
lowest we can sink, is hoping we may be enrich'd by some innocent
Accident.


    _O si urnam Argenti_ Fors _qua mihi monstret!_[64]----


But _Labour_, _Hunger_, _Thirst_, _Poverty_, _Pain_, _Danger_, have
nothing so detestable in them, that our _Self-Love_ cannot allow us to
be often expos'd to them. On the contrary, the Virtues which these
give us Occasions of displaying, are so amiable and excellent, that
scarce ever is any imaginary Hero, in _Romance_ or _Epic_, brought to
his highest Pitch of Happiness, without going thro' them _all_. Where
there is no _Virtue_, there is nothing worth Desire or Contemplation;
the _Romance_ or _Epos_ must end. Nay, the _Difficulty_[65], or
_natural Evil_, does so much increase the _Virtue_ of the _good_
Action which it accompanys, that we cannot easily sustain these Works
after the Distress is over; and if we continue the Work, it must be by
presenting a new Scene of _Benevolence_, in a prosperous Fortune. A
Scene of _external Prosperity_ or _natural Good_, without any thing
_moral_ or _virtuous_, cannot entertain a Person of the dullest
Imagination, had he ever so much interested himself in the Fortunes of
his Hero; for where _Virtue_ ceases, there remains nothing worth
wishing to our Favourite, or which we can be delighted to view his
Possession of, when we are most studious of his Happiness.

[Footnote 64: Hor. _Lib._ 2. _Sat._ 6. _ver._ 10.]

[Footnote 65: _Sect._ iii. _Art._ 11. _Axiom_ 6.]

[Sidenote: _Virtue own'd superior to all Pleasure_.]

Let us take a particular Instance, to try how much we prefer the
Possession of _Virtue_ to all other Enjoyments, and how we look upon
_Vice_ as worse than any other Misery. Who could ever read the History
of Regulus, as related by Cicero, and some others, without concerning
himself in the Fortunes of that _gallant_ Man, sorrowing at his
Sufferings, and wishing him a better Fate? But how better a Fate?
Should he have comply'd with the Terms of the Carthaginians, and
preserv'd himself from the intended Tortures, tho' to the Detriment of
his Country? Or should he have violated his plighted Faith, and
Promise of returning? Will any Man say, that either of these is the
better Fate he wishes his Favourite? Had he acted thus, _that_ Virtue
would have been gone, which interests every one in his Fortunes,--"Let
him take his Fate like other common Mortals."--What else do we wish
then, but that the Carthaginians had relented of their Cruelty, or
that Providence, by some unexpected Event, had rescued him out of
their Hands?

Now may not this teach us, that we are indeed determin'd to judge
_Virtue_ with Peace and Safety, preferable to _Virtue_ with Distress;
but that at the same time we look upon the State of the _Virtuous_,
the _Publick-spirited_, even in the utmost natural Distress, as
preferable to all Affluence of other Enjoyments? For this is what we
choose to have our Favourite Hero in, notwithstanding all its Pains,
and natural Evils. We should never have imagin'd him happier, had he
acted otherwise; or thought him in a more eligible State, with Liberty
and Safety, at the Expence of his _Virtue_. We secretly judge the
Purchase too dear; and therefore we never imagine he acted foolishly
in securing his _Virtue_, his _Honour_, at the Expence of his _Ease_,
his _Pleasure_, his _Life_. Nor can we think these _latter_ Enjoyments
worth the keeping, when the former are intirely lost.

[Sidenote: _Necessary in other Pleasures_.]

II. Let us in the same manner examine our Sentiments of the Happiness
of others in common Life. Wealth and External Pleasures bear no small
bulk in our Imaginations; but does there not always accompany this
Opinion of Happiness in _Wealth_, some suppos'd _beneficent Intention_
of doing good Offices to Persons dear to _us_, at least to our
_Familys_ or _Kinsmen_? And in our imagin'd Happiness from _external
Pleasure_, are not some Ideas always included of some _moral_
Enjoyments of _Society_, some _Communication_ of Pleasure, something
of _Love_, of _Friendship_, of _Esteem_, of _Gratitude_? Who ever
pretended to a _Taste_ of these Pleasures without _Society_? Or if any
seem violent in Pursuit of them, how _base_ and _contemptible_ do they
appear to all Persons, even to those who could have no Expectation of
Advantage from their having a more generous Notion of Pleasure?

Now, were there no _moral Sense_, no Happiness in _Benevolence_, and
did we act from no other Principle than _Self-Love_; sure there is no
Pleasure of the external Senses, which we could not enjoy alone, with
less Trouble and Expence than in _Society_. But a _Mixture_ of the
_moral Pleasures_ is what gives the _alluring Relish_; 'tis some
Appearance of _Friendship_, of _Love_, of _communicating Pleasure_ to
others, which preserves the Pleasures of the _Luxurious_ from being
_nauseous_ and _insipid_. And this partial Imagination of some _good
moral Qualitys_, some _Benevolence_, in Actions which have many
_cruel, inhuman_, and _destructive_ Consequences toward others, is
what has kept _Vice_ more in Countenance than any other
Consideration[66].

But to convince us farther wherein the Happiness of _Wealth_, and
_external Pleasure_ lies; let us but suppose _Malice_, _Wrath_,
_Revenge_; or only _Solitude_, Absence of _Friendship_, of _Love_, of
_Society_, of _Esteem_, join'd with the Possession of them; and all
the Happiness vanishes like a Dream. And yet _Love_, _Friendship_,
_Society_, _Humanity_, tho' accompany'd with _Poverty_ and _Toil_, nay
even with smaller degrees of _Pain_, such as do not wholly occupy the
Mind, are not only the Object of Love from others, but even of a sort
of Emulation: which plainly shews, "That _Virtue_ is the chief
_Happiness_ in the Judgment of _all Mankind_."

[Footnote 66: See above, _Sect._ iv. _Art._ 4. _Par._ 4, 5.]

[Sidenote: _The Charm in_ Beauty.]

III. There is a farther Consideration which must not be pass'd over,
concerning the External Beauty of Persons, which all allow to have a
great Power over human Minds. Now it is some apprehended _Morality_,
some natural or imagin'd Indication of _concomitant Virtue_, which
gives it this powerful Charm above all other kinds of _Beauty_. Let us
consider the Characters of _Beauty_, which are commonly admir'd in
Countenances, and we shall find them to be _Sweetness_, _Mildness_,
_Majesty_, _Dignity_, _Vivacity_, _Humility_, _Tenderness_,
_Good-nature_; that is, that certain _Airs_, _Proportions_, _je ne
scai quoy's_, are natural Indications of such Virtues, or of Abilitys
or Dispositions toward them. As we observ'd above[67] of _Misery_ or
_Distress_ appearing in Countenances; so it is certain, almost all
_habitual Dispositions_ of _Mind_ form the Countenance in such a
manner, as to give some Indications of them to the Spectator. Our
_violent_ Passions are obvious at first View in the Countenance; so
that sometimes no Art can conceal them: and smaller Degrees of them
give some less obvious Turns to the Face, which an accurate Eye will
observe. Now, when the _natural Air_ of a Face approaches to that
which any Passion would form it unto, we make a Conjecture from this
concerning the _leading Disposition_ of the Person's _Mind_.

[Footnote 67: See _Sect._ v. _Art._ 8. _Par._ 2.]

As to those Fancys which prevail in certain Countrys toward _large
Lips_, _little Noses_, _narrow Eyes_; unless we knew from themselves
under what Idea such Features are admir'd, whether as _naturally
beautiful_ in Form, or Proportion to the rest of the Face; or as
presum'd Indications of some _moral Qualitys_; we may more probably
conclude that it is the _latter_; since this is so much the Ground of
Approbation or Aversion towards Faces among ourselves. And as to
those Features which we count _naturally disagreeable_ as to Form, we
know the Aversion on this Account is so weak, that _moral Qualitys_
shall procure a Liking even to the Face, in Persons who are sensible
of the _Irregularity_, or Want of that _Regularity_ which is common in
others. With us, certain Features are imagin'd to denote _Dullness_;
as _hollow Eyes_, _large Lips_; a _Colour_ of Hair, _Wantonness_: and
may we not conclude the like _Association of Ideas_, upon some
probable Foundation in Nature, and sometimes without any, to be the
Ground of those Approbations which appear unaccountable to us?

In the same manner, when there is nothing _grosly_ disproportion'd in
any Face, what is it we dispraise? Is it _Pride_, _Haughtiness_,
_Sourness_, _Ill-nature_, _Discontent_, _Folly_, _Levity_,
_Wantonness_; which some Countenances discover in the Manner above
hinted at? And _these Airs_, when brought by Custom upon the most
_regular Set_ of Features, have often made them very disagreeable; as
the _contrary Airs_ have given the strongest Charms to Countenances,
which were far from Perfection in _external Beauty_. Had Homer, in his
Character of Helen, rais'd our Idea of her _external Beauty_ to the
greatest Height, yet it would have been ridiculous to have engag'd his
Countrymen in a War for such a Helen as Virgil has drawn her. He
therefore still retains something morally amiable amidst all her
Weakness, and often suggests to his Reader,


    ----[Greek: Helens oxmmata te sonachas te][68],


as the Spring of his Countrymens Indignation
and Revenge.

[Footnote 68: See _Homer, Iliad_ 2. _ver._ 356, 590.]

[Sidenote: _The Cause of different Fancys of Beauty_.]

This Consideration may shew us one Reason, among many others, for Mens
_different Fancys_, or _Relishes_ of _Beauty_. The _Mind_ of Man,
however generally dispos'd to esteem _Benevolence_ and _Virtue_, yet
by more particular Attention to some Kinds of it than others, may gain
a stronger Admiration of some _moral Dispositions_ than others.
_Military_ Men may admire _Courage_ more than other Virtues; Persons
of _smaller Courage_, may admire _Sweetness_ of _Temper_; Men of
_Thought_ and _Reflection_, who have more extensive Views, will admire
the _like Qualitys_ in others; Men of _keen Passions_ expect equal
Returns of all the kind Affections, and are wonderfully charm'd by
_Compliance_: The _Proud_ may like those of _higher Spirit_, as more
suitable to their Dignity; tho' _Pride_, join'd with _Reflection_ and
_good Sense_, will recommend to them _Humility_ in the Person belov'd.
Now as the _various_ Tempers of Men make _various_ Tempers of others
agreeable to them, so they must differ in their _Relishes_ of
_Beauty_, according as it denotes the several Qualitys most agreeable
to themselves.

This may also shew us, how, in _virtuous Love_, there may be the
greatest Beauty, without the least Charm to engage a Rival. _Love_
itself gives a Beauty to the _Lover_, in the Eyes of the Person
_belov'd_, which no other Mortal is much affected with. And this
perhaps is the _strongest Charm_ possible, and that which will have
the greatest Power, where there is not some very great Counterbalance
from _worldly Interest_, _Vice_, or _gross Deformity_.

[Sidenote: _Air, Motion, Gestures_.]

IV. This same Consideration may be extended to the whole Air and
Motion of any Person. Every thing we count agreeable, some way denotes
_Chearfulness_, _Ease_, a _Condescension_, and _Readiness_ to oblige,
a _Love_ of _Company_, with a _Freedom_ and _Boldness_ which always
accompanys an _honest_, _undesigning Heart_. On the contrary, what is
shocking in _Air_ or _Motion_, is _Roughness_, _Ill-nature_, a
_Disregard_ to others, or a _foolish Shame-facedness_, which evidences
a Person to be unexperienc'd in Society, or Offices of Humanity.

With relation to these _Airs_, _Motions_, _Gestures_, we may observe,
that considering the different _Ceremonys_ and _Modes_ of shewing
Respect, which are practis'd in different Nations, we may indeed
probably conclude, that there is no _natural_ Connection between any
of these _Gestures_ or _Motions_, and the _Affections_ of _Mind_ which
they are by _Custom_ made to express. But when _Custom_ has made any
of them pass for Expressions of _such Affections_, by a constant
_Association_ of Ideas, some shall become _agreeable_ and _lovely_,
and others _extremely offensive_, altho' they were both, in their own
Nature, _perfectly indifferent_.

[Sidenote: _The Spring of Love between the Sexes_.]

V. Here we may remark the Manner in which Nature leads _Mankind_ to
the Continuance of their Race, and by its strongest Power engages them
to what occasions the greatest Toil and Anxiety of Life; and yet
supports them under it with an inexpressible Delight. We might have
been excited to the Propagation of our Species, by such an uneasy
Sensation as would have effectually determin'd us to it, without any
great Prospect of Happiness; as we see _Hunger_ and _Thirst_ determine
us to preserve our Bodys, tho' few look upon eating and drinking as
any considerable Happiness. The _Sexes_ might have been engag'd to
Concurrence, as we imagine the _Brutes_ are, by _Desire_ only, or by a
_Love_ of _sensual Pleasure_. But how dull and insipid had Life been,
were there no more in Marriage! Who would have had Resolution enough
to bear all the Cares of a _Family_, and Education of _Children_? Or
who, from the general Motive of _Benevolence_ alone, would have chosen
to subject himself to _natural Affection_ toward an _Offspring_, when
he could so easily foresee what Troubles it might occasion?

This Inclination therefore of the _Sexes_, is founded on something
stronger, and more efficacious and joyful, than the Solicitations of
_Uneasiness_, or the bare _Desire_ of _sensible Pleasure_. Beauty
gives a favourable Presumption of _good Moral Dispositions_, and
_Acquaintance_ confirms this into a real _Love_ of _Esteem_, or begets
it, where there is little _Beauty_. This raises an Expectation of the
greatest _moral Pleasures_ along with the _sensible_, and a thousand
tender Sentiments of _Humanity_ and _Generosity_; and makes us
impatient for a _Society_ which we imagine big with unspeakable _moral
Pleasures_: where nothing is indifferent, and every trifling Service,
being an Evidence of _this strong Love_ and _Esteem_, is mutually
receiv'd with the Rapture and Gratitude of the greatest Benefit, and
of the most substantial Obligation; and where _Prudence_ and
_Good-nature_ influence both Sides, this _Society_ may answer all
their Expectations.

Nay, let us examine those of looser Conduct with relation to the _fair
Sex_, and we shall find, that _Love_ of _sensible Pleasure_ is not
the chief Motive of _Debauchery_, or _false Gallantry_. Were it so,
the _meanest Prostitutes_ would please as much as any. But we know
sufficiently, that Men are fond of _Good-nature_, _Faith_,
_Pleasantry_ of _Temper_, _Wit_, and many other _moral Qualitys_, even
in a _Mistress_. And this may furnish us with a Reason for what
appears pretty unaccountable, _viz._ "That _Chastity_ itself has a
powerful Charm in the Eyes of the _Dissolute_, even when they are
attempting to destroy it."

This powerful Determination even to a _limited Benevolence_, and other
_moral Sentiments_, is observ'd to give a strong Bias to our Minds
towards a _universal Goodness_, _Tenderness_, _Humanity_,
_Generosity_, and _Contempt_ of _private Good_ in our whole Conduct;
besides the obvious Improvement it occasions in our _external
Deportment_, and in our Relish of _Beauty_, _Order_, and _Harmony_. As
soon as a Heart, before _hard_ and _obdurate_, is soften'd in this
Flame, we shall observe, arising along with it, a Love of _Poetry_,
_Music_, the _Beauty_ of _Nature_ in rural Scenes, a _Contempt_ of
other selfish Pleasures of the _external Senses_, a _neat Dress_, a
_humane Deportment_, a _Delight_ in, and _Emulation_ of, every thing
which is _gallant_, _generous_, and _friendly_.

[Sidenote: _Society_, _Friendships_, _from our Moral Sense_.]

In the same manner we are determin'd to common Friendships and
Acquaintances, not by the sullen Apprehensions of our _Necessitys_,
or Prospects of _Interest_; but by an incredible Variety of little,
agreeable, engaging Evidences of _Love_, _Good-nature_, and other
_morally, amiable Qualitys_ in those we converse with. Among the rest,
none of the least considerable is an Inclination to _Chearfulness_, a
_Delight_ to raise _Mirth_ in others, which procures a secret
Approbation and Gratitude toward the Person who puts us in such an
_agreeable_, _innocent_, _good-natur'd_, and _easy State_ of Mind, as
we are conscious of, while we enjoy pleasant Conversation, enliven'd
by _moderate Laughter_.

[Sidenote: _The Power of Oratory founded on it_.]

VI. Upon this _moral_ Sense is founded all the Power of the Orator.
The various Figures of Speech are the several Manners, which a lively
Genious, warm'd with Passions suitable to the Occasion, naturally runs
into, only a little diversify'd by _Custom_: and they only move the
_Hearers_, by giving a lively Representation of the Passions of the
_Speaker_; which are communicated to the _Hearers_, as we[69] observ'd
above of one Passion, _viz._ _Pity_.

[Footnote 69: See _Sect._ v. _Art._ 8. _Par._ 2.]

Now the Passions which the _Orator_ attempts to raise, are all founded
on _moral Qualitys_. All the bold _Metaphors_, or _Descriptions_, all
the artificial Manners of _Expostulation_, _Arguing_, and _Addressing_
the _Audience_, all the _Appeals_ to _Mankind_, are but more lively
Methods of giving the _Audience_ a stronger Impression of the _moral
Qualitys_ of the Person _accus'd_ or _defended_; of the Action
_advis'd_, or _dissuaded_: And all the _Antitheses_, or _Witticisms_;
all the _Cadences_ of sonorous Periods, whatever inferior kind of
Beauty they may have separately, are of no Consequence to persuade, if
we neglect moving the Passions by some Species of _Morality_. They may
perhaps raise a little Admiration of the _Speaker_, among those who
already favour his Party, but they oftener raise Contempt in his
_Adversarys_. But when you display the _Beneficence_ of any Action,
the _good Effect_ it shall have on the _Public_ in promoting the
Welfare of the _Innocent_, and relieving the _unjustly Distressed_; if
you prove your Allegations, you make every Mortal approve the
undertaking it. When any Person is to be _recommended_, display his
_Humanity_, _Generosity_, _Study_ of the _publick Good_, and
_Capacity_ to promote it, his _Contempt_ of Dangers, and private
Pleasures; and you are sure to procure him _Love_ and _Esteem_. If at
the same time you shew his _Distress_, or the _Injurys_ he has
suffer'd, you raise _Pity_, and every _tender_ Affection.

On the contrary, represent the _Barbarity_, or _Cruelty_ of any
Action, the _Misery_ it shall procure to the _Kind_, the _Faithful_,
the _Generous_, or only to the _Innocent_; and you raise an Abhorrence
of it in the Breasts of the _Audience_, tho' they were not the
Persons who would have suffer'd by it. The same way, would you make a
Person _infamous_, and _despis'd_ and _hated_, represent him as
_cruel_, _inhuman_, or _treacherous_ toward the most distant rational
Agents; or shew him only to be _selfish_, and given to _solitary
Luxury_, without regard to any _Friend_, or the _Interest_ of others;
and you have gain'd your Point, as soon as you prove what you alledge.
Nay, how does it stop our Admiration of any _celebrated_ Action, to
suggest, "That the _Author_ of it was no Fool; he knew it would turn
to his own _Advantage_!"

Now, are the _Learned_ and _Polite_ the only Persons who are mov'd by
such Speeches? Must Men know the Schemes of the _Moralists_ and
_Politicians_, or the _Art_ of _Rhetoric_, to be capable of being
persuaded? Must they be nicely conversant in all the Methods of
promoting _Self-Interest_? Nay, do we not see on the contrary, the
_rude undisciplin'd Multitude_ most affected? Where had _Oratory_ so
much Power as in _popular States_, and that too before the Perfection
of the Sciences? _Reflection_ and _Study_ may raise in Men a Suspicion
of Design, and Caution of Assent, when they have some Knowledge of the
various Topicks of Argument, and find them employ'd upon themselves:
but _rude Nature_ is still open to every _moral_ Impression, and
carry'd furiously along without Caution, or Suspense. It was not the
_Groves_ of the _Academy_, or the _polish'd Stones_ of the _Portico_,
or the _manag'd Horses_ of Greece, which listen'd to the Harp of an
Amphion, or an Orpheus; but the _Trees_, and _Rocks_, and _Tygers_ of
the _Forest_: which may shew us, "That there is some _Sense_ of
_Morality_ antecedent to Instruction, or metaphysical Arguments
proving the _private Interest_ of the Person who is persuaded, to be
connected with the _publick Good_."

[Sidenote: _Poetry pleases from this Moral Sense_.]

VII. We shall find this _Sense_ to be the Foundation also of the chief
Pleasures of Poetry. We hinted, in the former Treatise, at the
Foundation of Delight in the _Numbers_, _Measures_, _Metaphors_,
_Similitudes_[70]. But as the Contemplation of _moral Objects_, either
of _Vice_ or _Virtue_, affects us more strongly, and moves our
Passions in a quite different and a more powerful manner, than
_natural Beauty_, or (what we commonly call) _Deformity_; so the most
moving Beautys bear a Relation to our _moral Sense_, and affect us
more vehemently, than the Representations of _natural Objects_ in the
liveliest Descriptions. _Dramatic_ and _Epic_ Poetry are intirely
address'd to this _Sense_, and raise our Passions by the Fortunes of
_Characters_, distinctly represented as _morally good_ or _evil_; as
might be seen more fully, were we to consider the Passions
separately.

[Footnote 70: See _Treatise_ I. _Sect._ ii. _Art._ 13. _Sect._ iv.
_Art._ 3.]

Where we are studying to raise any _Desire_, or _Admiration_ of an
Object _really beautiful_, we are not content with a _bare Narration_,
but endeavour, if we can, to present the _Object_ itself, or the most
_lively Image_ of it. And hence the _Epic Poem_, or _Tragedy_, gives a
far greater Pleasure than the Writings of _Philosophers_, tho' both
aim at recommending _Virtue_. The representing the Actions themselves,
if the Representation be _judicious, natural_, and _lively_, will make
us admire the _Good_, and detest the _Vitious_, the _Inhuman_, the
_Treacherous_ and _Cruel_, by means of our _moral Sense_, without any
Reflections of the Poet to guide our Sentiments. It is for this Reason
that Horace has justly made Knowledge in _Morals_ so necessary to a
_good Poet_:


    _Scribendi recte_ Sapere _est & principium & fons_[71].


[Footnote 71: Hor. de Arte Poet. ver. 309.]

And again:


    _Qui didicit Patri quid debeat, & quid Amicis,
     Quo sit amore Parens, quo Frater amandus, & Hospes,
     Quod sit Conscripti, quod Judicis officium, qu
     Partes in bellum missi Ducis; ille profecto
     Reddere Person scit convenientia cuique_[72].


[Sidenote: _Imagery in Poetry founded on the Moral Sense_.]

Upon this same _Sense_ is founded the Power of that _great Beauty_ in
Poetry, the Prosopopoeia, by which _every Affection_ is made a
_Person_; every _natural Event_, _Cause_, _Object_, is animated by
_moral Epithets_. For we join the Contemplation of _moral
Circumstances_ and _Qualitys_, along with _natural Objects_, to
increase their _Beauty_ or _Deformity_; and we affect the _Hearer_ in
a more lively manner with the Affections describ'd, by representing
them as _Persons_. Thus a shady Wood must have its _solemn venerable
Genius_, and proper _rural Gods_; every clear Fountain, its _sacred
chaste Nymph_; and River, its _bountiful God_, with his _Urn_, and
perhaps a _Cornucopi_ diffusing _Plenty_ and _Fruitfulness_ along its
Banks. The _Day-light_ is _holy_, _beneign_, and _powerful_ to banish
the pernicious Spirits of the _Night_. The Morning is a _kind
officious Goddess_, _tripping_ over the dewy Mountains, and _ushering_
in Light to _Gods_ and _Men_. War is an _impetuous_, _cruel_,
_undistinguishing Monster_, whom no _Virtue_, no Circumstance of
_Compassion_, can move from his bloody Purposes. The Steel is
_unrelenting_; the Arrow and Spear are _impatient_ to destroy, and
carry _Death_ on their Points. Our modern Engines of War are also
_frightful Personages_, counterfeiting with their rude Throats the
Thunder of Jove. The _moral Imagery_ of _Death_ is every-where known,
_viz._ his _Insensibility_ to _Pity_, his _Inflexibility_, and
_universal impartial Empire_. Fortune is inimitably drawn by
Horace[73], with all her _Retinue_ and _Votarys_, and with her _rigid
severe_ Minister, _Necessity_. The Qualitys of _Mind_ too become
_Persons_. _Love_ becomes a Venus, or a Cupid; _Courage_, or
_Conduct_, a Mars, or a Pallas, _protecting_ and _assisting_ the Hero;
before them march _Terror_ and _Dread_, _Flight_ and _Pursuit_,
_Shouts_ and _Amazement_. Nay, the _most sacred Poets_ are often led
into this _Imagery_, and represent _Justice_ and _Judgment_, as
_supporting_ the Almighty's Throne, and _Mercy_ and _Truth going_
before his Face: They shew us _Peace_ as _springing_ up from the
Earth, and _Mercy looking_ down from Heaven.

[Footnote 72: Hor. de Arte Poet. ver. 312, &c.]

[Footnote 73: See _Lib._ i. _Od._ 35.]

Every one perceives a greater Beauty in this manner of Representation,
this Imagery, this Conjunction of _moral Ideas_, than in the fullest
Narration, or the most lively natural Description. When one reads the
fourth Book of Homer, and is prepar'd, from the Council of the _Gods_,
to imagine the bloody Sequel, and amidst the most beautiful
Description which ever was imagin'd of _shooting_ an Arrow, meets with
its _moral Epithet_,


    ----[Greek: melainan hezm odynan][74],
    ----_The Source of blackest Woes_;


he will find himself more mov'd by this Circumstance, than by all the
Profusion of natural Description which Man could imagine.

[Footnote 74: See _Homer, Iliad_ iv. _ver._ 117.]

[Sidenote: _History_.]

VIII. History derives its chief Excellence from the representing the
_Manners_ and _Characters_; the Contemplation of which in _Nature_
being very affecting, they must necessarily give Pleasure, when well
related.

[Sidenote: _Painting_.]

IX. It is well known too, that a Collection of the best Pieces of
_Face-painting_ is but a poor Entertainment, when compar'd with those
Pieces which represent _moral Actions_, _Passions_, and _Characters_.




SECT. VII.

     _A Deduction of some_ Complex moral Ideas; _viz. of_
     Obligation, _and_ Right, Perfect, Imperfect, _and_
     External, Alienable, _and_ Unalienable, _from this_
     moral Sense.


I. To conclude this Subject, we may, from what has been said, see the
_true Original of moral Ideas, viz. This moral Sense of Excellence in
every Appearance, or Evidence of Benevolence_. It remains to be
explain'd, how we acquire more particular Ideas of _Virtue_ and
_Vice_, abstracting from any _Law_, _Human_, or _Divine_.

[Sidenote: _Obligation_.]

If any one ask, Can we have any Sense of Obligation, abstracting from
the _Laws_ of a _Superior_? We must answer according to the various
Senses of the Word _Obligation_. If by _Obligation_ we understand a
_Determination, without regard to our own Interest, to approve
Actions, and to perform them; which Determination shall also make us
displeas'd with ourselves, and uneasy upon having acted contrary to
it_: in this Meaning of the word _Obligation_, there is _naturally_ an
_Obligation_ upon all Men to _Benevolence_; and they are still under
its Influence, even when by false, or partial Opinions of the natural
Tendency of their Actions, this _moral Sense_ leads them to _Evil_;
unless by long inveterate Habits it be exceedingly weaken'd; for it
scarce seems possible wholly to extinguish it. Or, which is to the
same Purpose, this _internal Sense_, and _Instinct_ of _Benevolence_,
will either influence our Actions, or make us very uneasy and
dissatisfy'd; and we shall be conscious, that we are in a base unhappy
State, even without considering any _Law_ whatsoever, or any external
Advantages lost, or Disadvantages impending from its Sanctions. And
farther, there are still such Indications given us of what is in the
whole _beneficent_, and what not, as may probably discover to us the
true Tendency of every Action; and let us see, some time or other, the
evil Tendency of what upon a partial View appear'd _good_: or if we
have no Friends so faithful as to admonish us, the Persons injur'd
will not fail to upbraid us. So that no Mortal can secure to himself a
perpetual Serenity, Satisfaction, and Self-approbation, but by a
_serious Inquiry_ into the Tendency of his Actions, and a _perpetual
Study_ of _universal Good_, according to the justest Notions of it.

But if, by _Obligation_, we understand _a Motive from Self-Interest,
sufficient to determine all those who duly consider it, and pursue
their own Advantage wisely, to a certain Course of Actions_; we may
have a Sense of such an _Obligation_, by reflecting on this
_Determination_ of our _Nature_ to approve _Virtue_, to be pleas'd and
happy when we reflect upon our having done _virtuous Actions_, and to
be uneasy when we are conscious of having acted otherwise; and also by
considering how much superior we esteem the Happiness of _Virtue_ to
any other Enjoyment[75]. We may likewise have a Sense of this sort of
_Obligation_, by considering those Reasons which prove a constant
Course of _benevolent_ and _social Actions_, to be the most probable
Means of promoting the _natural Good_ of every _Individual_; as
Cumberland and Pufendorf have prov'd: And all this without Relation to
a _Law_.

[Footnote 75: See above, _Sect._ vi. _Art._ 1, 2.]

But farther, if our _moral Sense_ be suppos'd exceedingly weakened,
and the _selfish Passions_ grown strong, either thro' some general
Corruption of Nature, or inveterate Habits; if our _Understanding_ be
weak, and we be often in danger of being hurry'd by our _Passions_
into precipitate and rash Judgments, that _malicious Actions_ shall
promote our Advantage more than _Beneficence_; in such a Case, if it
be inquir'd what is necessary to engage Men to _beneficent Actions_,
or induce a steady Sense of an _Obligation_ to act for the _public
Good_; then, no doubt, "A _Law_ with Sanctions, given by a _superior
Being_, of sufficient Power to make us happy or miserable, must be
necessary to counterbalance those apparent Motives of _Interest_, to
calm our _Passions_, and give room for the Recovery of our _moral
Sense_, or at least for a just View of our _Interest_."

[Sidenote: _How far Virtue can be taught_.]

II. Now the principal Business of the _moral Philosopher_ is to shew,
from solid Reasons, "That _universal Benevolence_ tends to the
Happiness of the _Benevolent_, either from the Pleasures of
_Reflection_, _Honour_, _natural Tendency_ to engage the good Offices
of Men, upon whose Aid we must depend for our Happiness in this World;
or from the Sanctions of _divine Laws_ discover'd to us by the
Constitution of the _Universe_;" that so no apparent Views of
_Interest_ may counteract this _natural Inclination_: but not to
attempt proving, "That Prospects of our _own Advantage_ of any kind
can raise in us the _virtuous Benevolence_ toward others." Let the
Obstacles from _Self-Love_ be only remov'd, and Nature itself will
incline us to _Benevolence_. Let the Misery of _excessive
Selfishness_, and all its Passions, be but once explain'd, that so
_Self-Love_ may cease to counteract our _natural Propensity_ to
_Benevolence_; and when this _noble_ Disposition gets loose from these
Bonds of _Ignorance_, and false Views of _Interest_, it shall be
assisted even by _Self-Love_, and grow strong enough to make a _noble
virtuous Character_. Then he is to inquire, by _Reflection_ upon human
Affairs, what Course of Action does most effectually promote the
_universal Good_, what universal Rules or Maxims are to be observ'd,
and in what Circumstances the Reason of them alters, so as to admit
Exceptions; that so our _good Inclinations_ may be directed by
_Reason_, and a _just Knowledge_ of the _Interests_ of _Mankind_. But
_Virtue_ itself, or _good Dispositions_ of _Mind_, are not directly
taught, or produc'd by _Instruction_; they must be originally
implanted in our Nature by its _great_ Author, and afterwards
strengthen'd and confirm'd by our own Cultivation.

[Sidenote: _Objection_.]

III. We are often told, "That there is no Need of supposing such a
_Sense_ of _Morality_ given to Men, since _Reflection_ and
_Instruction_ would recommend the same Actions from Arguments of
_Self-Interest_, and engage us, from the acknowledg'd Principle of
_Self-Love_, to the Practice of them, without this _unintelligible
Determination_ to _Benevolence_, or the _occult Quality_ of a _moral
Sense_."

[Sidenote: _Moral Sense, not from Reflection_.]

It is perhaps true, that _Reflection_, and _Reason_ might lead us to
approve the same Actions as _advantageous_. But would not the _same_
Reflection and Reason likewise generally recommend the same _Meats_ to
us, which our _Taste_ represents as pleasant? And shall we thence
conclude, that we have no _Sense_ of _Tasting_, or that such a _Sense_
is _useless_? No: The Use is plain in both Cases. Notwithstanding the
mighty _Reason_ we boast of above other Animals, its Processes are too
slow, too full of Doubt and Hesitation, to serve us in every Exigency,
either for our own Preservation, without the _external Senses_, or to
influence our Actions for the _Good_ of the _Whole_, without this
_moral Sense_. Nor could we be so strongly determin'd at all times to
what is most conducive to either of these Ends, without these
_expeditious Monitors_, and _importunate Solicitors_; nor so nobly
rewarded, when we act vigorously in Pursuit of these Ends, by the calm
dull Reflections of _Self-Interest_, as by those delightful
Sensations.

This _natural Determination_ to approve and admire, or hate and
dislike Actions, is, no doubt, an _occult Quality_. But is it any way
more mysterious, that the Idea of an Action should raise _Esteem_ or
_Contempt_, than that the Motion or tearing of Flesh should give
_Pleasure_ or _Pain_; or the Act of Volition should move _Flesh_ and
_Bones_? In the latter Case, we have got the Brain, and elastic
Fibres, and animal Spirits, and elastic Fluids, like the _Indian's_
Elephant, and Tortoise, to bear the Burden of the Difficulty: but go
one Step farther, and you find the whole as difficult as at first, and
equally a Mystery with _this Determination_ to love and approve, or
condemn and despise _Actions_ and _Agents_, without any Views of
_Interest_, as they appear _benevolent_, or the contrary.

When they offer it as a Presumption that there can be no such _Sense_,
antecedent to all Prospect of _Interest_, "That these Actions for the
most part are really _advantageous_, one way or other, to the _Actor_,
the _Approver_, or _Mankind_ in general, by whose Happiness our own
State may be some way made better;" may we not ask, supposing the
Deity intended to impress such a _Sense_ of something _amiable_ in
Actions, (which is no impossible Supposition) What sort of Actions
would a _good_ God determine to _approve_? Must we deny the
Possibility of such a Determination, if it did not lead us to admire
Actions of no _Advantage_ to _Mankind_, or to love _Agents_ for their
being _eminent Triflers_? If then the Actions which a _wise_ and
_good_ God must determine us to approve, if he give us any such
_Sense_ at all, must be Actions _useful_ to the _Publick_, this
_Advantage_ can never be a Reason against the _Sense_ itself. After
the same manner, we should deny all _Revelation_, which taught us
_good Sense_, _Humanity_, _Justice_, and a _rational Worship_,
because _Reason_ and _Interest_ confirm and recommend such
_Principles_ and _Services_; and should greedily embrace every
_Contradiction_, _Foppery_, and _Pageantry_, as a _truly divine
Institution_, without any thing _humane_, or _useful_ to _Mankind_.

[Sidenote: _Moral Sense judges of Laws_.]

IV. The Writers upon opposite Schemes, who deduce all Ideas of _Good_
and _Evil_ from the _private Advantage_ of the _Actor_, or from
Relation to a _Law_, and its _Sanctions_, either known from _Reason_
or _Revelation_, are perpetually recurring to this _moral Sense_ which
they deny; not only in calling the _Laws_ of the Deity _just_ and
_good_, and alledging _Justice_ and _Right_ in the Deity to govern us;
but by using a Set of Words which import something different from what
they will allow to be their only Meaning. _Obligation_, with them, is
only such a _Constitution, either of Nature, or some governing Power,
as makes it advantageous for the Agent to act in a certain manner_.
Let this Definition be substituted, where-ever we meet with the Words,
_ought_, _should_, _must_, in a moral Sense, and many of their
Sentences would seem very strange; as that the Deity _must_ act
rationally, _must_ not, or _ought_ not to punish the Innocent, _must_
make the State of the _Virtuous_ better than that of the _Wicked_,
_must_ observe Promises; substituting the Definition of the Words,
_must_, _ought_, _should_, would make these Sentences either
ridiculous, or very disputable.

V. But that our first Ideas of _moral Good_ depend not on _Laws_, may
plainly appear from our constant Inquirys into the _Justice_ of _Laws
themselves_; and that not only of _human Laws_, but of the _divine_.
What else can be the Meaning of that universal Opinion, "That the
_Laws_ of God are _just_, and _holy_, and _good_?" _Human Laws_ may be
call'd _good_, because of their Conformity to the _Divine_. But to
call the _Laws_ of the _supreme_ Deity _good_, or _holy_, or _just_,
if all _Goodness_, _Holiness_, and _Justice_ be constituted by _Laws_,
or the _Will_ of a _Superior_ any way reveal'd, must be an
insignificant Tautology, amounting to no more than this, "That God
_wills_ what he _wills_."

It must then first be suppos'd, that there is something in Actions
which is apprehended _absolutely good_; and this is _Benevolence_, or
Desire of the _publick natural Happiness_ of _rational Agents_; and
that our _moral Sense_ perceives this _Excellence_: and then we call
the _Laws_ of the Deity _good_, when we imagine that they are
contriv'd to promote the _publick Good_ in the most effectual and
impartial manner. And the Deity is call'd _good_, in a _moral Sense_,
when we apprehend that his _whole Providence_ tends to the universal
Happiness of his _Creatures_; whence we conclude his _Benevolence_,
and _Desire_ in their Happiness.

Some tell us, "That the _Goodness_ of the _divine Laws_ consists in
their Conformity to some _essential Rectitude_ of his _Nature_." But
they must excuse us from assenting to this, till they make us
understand the Meaning of this Metaphor, _essential Rectitude_; and
till we discern whether any thing more is meant by it than a
_perfectly wise_, _uniform_, _impartial Benevolence_.

[Sidenote: _Difference between Constraint and Obligation_.]

Hence we may see the Difference between _Constraint_ and _Obligation_.
There is indeed no Difference between _Constraint_, and the second
Sense of the Word _Obligation_, viz. _a Constitution which makes an
Action eligible from Self-Interest_, if we only mean _external
Interest_, distinct from the delightful Consciousness which arises
from the _moral Sense_. The Reader need scarcely be told, that by
_Constraint_, we do not understand an _external Force_ moving our
Limbs without our Consent; for in that Case we are not _Agents_ at
all; but that _Constraint_ which arises from the threatening and
presenting some _Evil_, in order to make us act in a certain manner.
And yet there seems an universally acknowledg'd Difference between
even this sort of _Constraint_ and _Obligation_. We never say, we are
_oblig'd_ to do an Action which we count base, but we may be
_constrain'd_ to it: we never say, that the _divine Laws_, by their
Sanctions, _constrain_ us, but _oblige_ us; nor do we call Obedience
to the Deity _Constraint_, unless by a Metaphor, tho' many own they
are influenc'd by Fear of Punishments. And yet supposing an _almighty
evil Being_ should require, under grievous Penaltys, _Treachery_,
_Cruelty_, _Ingratitude_, we would call this _Constraint_. The
Difference is plainly this: When any Sanctions cooperate with our
_moral Sense_, in exciting us to Actions which we count _morally
good_, we say we are _oblig'd_; but when Sanctions of Rewards or
Punishments oppose our _moral Sense_, then we say we are _brib'd_ or
_constrain'd_. In the former Case we call the _Lawgiver good_, as
designing the _publick Happiness_; in the latter we call him _evil_,
or _unjust_, for the suppos'd _contrary_ Intention. But were all our
Ideas of _moral Good_ or _Evil_ deriv'd solely from Opinions of
_private Advantage_ or _Loss_ in Actions, I see no possible Difference
which could be made in the Meaning of these Words.

[Sidenote: _Rights_.]

VI. From this Sense too we derive our Ideas of Rights. Whenever it
appears to us, that _a Faculty of doing, demanding, or possessing any
thing, universally allow'd in certain Circumstances, would in the
Whole tend to the general Good_, we say, that one in such
Circumstances has _a Right to do, possess, or demand that Thing_. And
according as this Tendency to the _publick Good_ is _greater_ or
_less_, the _Right_ is _greater_ or _less_.

[Sidenote: _Perfect Rights._]

The _Rights_ call'd _perfect_, are of _such Necessity to the publick
Good, that the universal Violation of them would make human Life
intolerable_; and it actually makes those miserable, whose _Rights_
are thus _violated_. On the contrary, to fulfil these _Rights_ in
every Instance, tends to the _publick Good___, either _directly_, or
by promoting the innocent Advantage of a _Part_. Hence it plainly
follows, "That to allow a violent Defence, or Prosecution of such
_Rights_, before Civil Government be constituted, cannot in any
particular Case be more detrimental to the _Publick_, than the
Violation of them with Impunity." And as to the general Consequences,
the universal Use of Force in _a State of Nature_, in pursuance of
_perfect Rights_, seems exceedingly _advantageous_ to the _Whole_, by
making every one dread any Attempts against the _perfect Rights_ of
others.

[Sidenote: _Right of War, and Punishment._]

This is the _moral Effect_ which attends _proper Injury_, or a
_Violation of the perfect Rights of others, viz_. A _Right_ to _War_,
and all _Violence_ which is necessary to oblige the _Injurious_ to
repair the Damage, and give Security against such Offences for the
future. This is the sole Foundation of the Rights of _punishing_
Criminals, and of _violent Prosecutions_ of our Rights, in a _State of
Nature_. And these Rights, naturally residing in the Persons injur'd,
or their _voluntary_, or _invited_ Assistants, to use Force according
to the Judgment of indifferent Arbitrators, being by the Consent of
the _Persons injur'd_, transferr'd to the _Magistrate_ in a _Civil
State_, are the true Foundation of his Right of Punishment. Instances
of _perfect Rights_ are those to our _Lives_; to the _Fruits_ of our
Labours; to demand Performance of _Contracts_ upon valuable
Considerations, from Men capable of performing them; to _direct_ our
own Actions either for _publick_, or _innocent private Good_, before
we have submitted them to the Direction of others in any measure: and
many others of like Nature.

[Sidenote: _Imperfect Rights_.]

Imperfect _Rights_ are _such as, when universally violated, would not
necessarily make Men miserable_. These _Rights_ tend to the
Improvement and Increase of _positive Good_ in any Society, but are
not _absolutely_ necessary to prevent universal Misery. The Violation
of them only disappoints Men of the Happiness expected from the
Humanity or Gratitude of others; but does not deprive Men of any
_Good_ which they had before. From this Description it appears, "That
a violent Prosecution of such _Rights_ would generally occasion
greater _Evil_ than the Violation of them." Besides, the allowing of
Force in such Cases would deprive Men of the greatest Pleasure in
Actions of _Kindness_, _Humanity_, _Gratitude_, which would cease to
appear amiable, when Men could be constrain'd to perform them.
Instances of _imperfect Rights_ are those which the _Poor_ have to the
Charity of the Wealthy; which _all Men_ have to Offices of no Trouble
or Expence to the Performer; which _Benefactors_ have to Returns of
Gratitude, and such-like.

The Violation of _imperfect Rights_ only argues a Man to have such
weak _Benevolence_, as not to study advancing the _positive Good_ of
others, when in the least opposite to his own: but the Violation of
_perfect Rights_ argues the _injurious Person_ to be _positively evil_
or _cruel_; or at least so _immoderately selfish_, as to be
indifferent about the _positive Misery_ and _Ruin_ of others, when he
imagines he can find his _Interest_ in it. In violating the _former_,
we shew a weak Desire of _publick Happiness_, which every small View
of _private Interest_ overbalances; but in violating the _latter_, we
shew ourselves so intirely negligent of the _Misery_ of others, that
Views of increasing our own _Good_ overcome all our Compassion toward
their Sufferings. Now as the Absence of _Good_ is more easily borne
than the Presence of _Misery_; so our _good Wishes_ toward the
_positive Good_ of others, are weaker than our _Compassion_ toward
their _Misery_. He then who violates _imperfect Rights_, shews that
his _Self-Love_ overcomes only the Desire of _positive Good_ to
others; but he who violates _perfect Rights_, betrays such a
_selfish_ Desire of advancing his own _positive Good_, as overcomes
all _Compassion_ toward the _Misery_ of others.

[Sidenote: _External Rights_.]

Beside these two sorts of _Rights_, there is a third call'd
_External_; as when _the doing_, _possessing_, _or demanding of any
Thing_, _is really detrimental to the Publick in any particular
Instance, as being contrary to the imperfect Right of another; but yet
the universally denying Men this Faculty of doing, possessing, or
demanding that Thing, or of using Force in Pursuance of it, would do
more Mischief than all the Evils to be fear'd from the Use of this
Faculty_. And hence it appears, "That there can be no Right to use
Force in Opposition even to _external Rights_, since it tends to the
_universal Good_ to allow Force in Pursuance of them."

Civil Societys substitute _Actions in Law_, instead of the Force
allow'd in _the State of Nature_.

Instances of _external Rights_ are these; that of a _wealthy Miser_ to
recal his Loan from the most industrious poor Tradesman at any time;
that of demanding the Performance of a _Covenant_ too burdensome on
one Side; the Right of a _wealthy Heir_ to refuse Payment of any Debts
which were contracted by him under Age, without Fraud in the Lender;
the Right of taking Advantage of a _positive Law_, contrary to what
was _Equity_ antecedent to that Law; as when a _register'd Deed_ takes
Place of one not register'd, altho' prior to it, and known to be so
before the second Contract.

[Sidenote: _What Rights can be opposite_.]

Now, whereas no _Action_, _Demand_, or _Possession_, can at once be
either necessary to the _publick Good_, or conducive to it, and at the
same time its _contrary_ be either necessary or conducive to the same
End; it follows, "That there can be no Opposition of _perfect Rights_
among themselves, of _imperfect_ among themselves, or between
_perfect_ and _imperfect Rights_." But it may often tend to the
_publick Good_, to allow a _Right_ of _doing_, _possessing_, or
_demanding_, and of using _Force_ in Pursuance of it, while perhaps it
would have been more _humane_ and _kind_ in any Person to have acted
otherwise, and not have claim'd his _Right_. But yet a violent
Opposition to _these Rights_ would have been vastly more _pernicious_
than all the Inhumanity in the Use of them. And therefore, tho'
_external Rights_ cannot be opposite among themselves; yet they may be
opposite to _imperfect Rights_; but _imperfect Rights_, tho' violated,
give no _Right_ to _Force_. Hence it appears, "That there can never be
a _Right_ to _Force_ on both Sides, or a _just War_ on both Sides at
the same time."

[Sidenote: _Rights alienable and unalienable_.]

VII. There is another important Difference of _Rights_, according as
they are _Alienable_, or _Unalienable_. To determine what _Rights_ are
_alienable_, and what not, we must take these two Marks:


     1_st_. If the Alienation be within our natural Power,
     so that it be possible for us in Fact to transfer our
     _Right_; and if it be so, then,

     2_dly_. It must appear, that to transfer such _Rights_
     may serve some valuable Purpose.


By the _first_ Mark it appears, "That the _Right of private Judgment_,
or of our _inward Sentiments_, is _unalienable_;" since we cannot
command ourselves to think what either we ourselves, or any other
Person pleases. So are also our _Internal Affections_, which
necessarily arise according to our Opinions of their Objects. By the
_second_ Mark it appears, "That our _Right_ of _serving_ God, in the
manner which we think acceptable, is not _alienable_;" because it can
never serve any valuable Purpose, to make Men worship him in a way
which seems to them displeasing to him. The same way, a _direct Right_
over our _Lives_ or _Limbs_ is not _alienable_ to any Person; so that
he might at Pleasure put us to Death, or maim us. We have indeed a
_Right_ to hazard our Lives in any good Action which is of Importance
to the _Publick_; and it may often serve a most valuable End, to
subject the Direction of such perilous Actions to the Prudence of
others in pursuing a _publick Good_; as _Soldiers_ do to their
_General_, or to a _Council_ of _War_: and so far this _Right_ is
_alienable_. These may serve as Instances to shew the Use of the two
Marks of _alienable Rights_, which must both concur to make them so,
and will explain the manner of applying them in other Cases.

[Sidenote: _The Foundation of Property_.]

VIII. That we may see the Foundation of some of the more _important
Rights_ of _Mankind_, let us observe, that probably nine Tenths, at
least, of the things which are useful to Mankind, are owing to their
_Labour_ and _Industry_; and consequently, when once Men become so
numerous, that the _natural Product_ of the Earth is not sufficient
for their Support, or Ease, or innocent Pleasure; a Necessity arises,
for the Support of the increasing _System_, that such a _Tenour_ of
Conduct be observ'd, as shall most effectually promote _Industry_, and
that Men abstain from all Actions which would have the contrary
Effect. It is well known, that _general Benevolence_ alone, is not a
Motive strong enough to _Industry_, to bear _Labour_ and _Toil_, and
many other Difficultys which we are averse to from _Self-Love_. For
the strengthening therefore our Motives to _Industry_, we have the
strongest Attractions of _Blood_, of _Friendship_, of _Gratitude_, and
the additional Motives of _Honour_, and even of _external Interest_.
_Self-Love_ is really as necessary to the _Good_ of the _Whole_, as
_Benevolence_; as that _Attraction_ which causes the Cohesion of the
Parts, is as necessary to the _regular State_ of the _Whole_, as
_Gravitation_. Without these additional Motives, _Self-Love_ would
generally oppose the Motions of _Benevolence_, and concur with
_Malice_, or influence us to the same Actions which _Malice_ would.
"That Tenour of Action then, which would take away the stronger Ties
of _Benevolence_, or the additional Motives of _Honour_ and
_Advantage_, from our _Minds_, and so hinder us from pursuing
_industriously_ that Course which really increases the _Good_ of the
_Whole_, is _evil_; and we are oblig'd to shun it."

First then, the depriving any Person of the Fruits of his own innocent
Labour, takes away all Motives to _Industry_ from _Self-Love_, or the
nearer _Ties_; and leaves us no other Motive than _general
Benevolence_: nay, it exposes the _Industrious_ as a constant Prey to
the _Slothful_, and sets _Self-Love_ against _Industry_. This is the
Ground of our _Right of Dominion_ and _Property_ in the _Fruits_ of
our _Labours_; without which _Right_, we could scarce hope for any
_Industry_, or any thing beyond the Product of uncultivated Nature.
_Industry_ will be confin'd to our present Necessitys, and cease when
they are provided for; at least it will only continue from the weak
Motive of _general Benevolence_, if we are not allow'd to store up
beyond present Necessity, and to dispose of what is above our
Necessitys, either in Barter for other kinds of Necessarys, or for the
Service of our Friends or Familys. And hence appears the _Right_ which
Men have to lay up for the _future_, the Goods which will not
bespoil'd by it; of alienating them in _Trade_; of Donation to
_Friends_, _Children_, _Relations_: otherwise we deprive _Industry_ of
all the Motives of _Self-Love_, _Friendship_, _Gratitude_, and
_natural Affection_. The same Foundation there is for the _Right_ of
Disposition by _Testament_. The _Presumption_ of Disposition is the
Ground of the _Right_ of Succession to the _Intestate_.

The _external Right_ of the _Miser_ to his useless Hoards is founded
also on this, That allowing Persons by Violence, or without Consent of
the Acquirer, to take the Use of his Acquisitions, would discourage
_Industry_, and takeaway all the Pleasures of _Generosity_, _Honour_,
_Charity_, which cease when Men can be forc'd to these Actions.
Besides, there is no determining in many Cases, who is a _Miser_, and
who is not.

[Sidenote: _Right of Marriage_.]

Marriage must be so constituted as to ascertain the Offspring;
otherwise we take away from the _Males_ one of the strongest Motives
to _publick Good_, viz. _natural Affection_; and discourage
_Industry_, as has been shewn above.

[Sidenote: _Commerce_.]

The _Labour_ of each Man cannot furnish him with all Necessarys, tho'
it may furnish him with a needless Plenty of one Sort: Hence the
_Right_ of _Commerce_, and _alienating_ our Goods; and also the
_Rights_ from _Contracts_ and _Promises_, either to the _Goods_
acquir'd by others, or to their _Labours_.

[Sidenote: _Right of Civil Government_.]

The great Advantages which accrue to Mankind from unprejudiced
_Arbitrators_, impower'd to decide the _Controversys_ which ordinarily
arise, thro' the Partiality of _Self-love_, among Neighbours; as also
from prudent Directors, who should not only instruct the Multitude in
the best Methods of promoting the _publick Good_, and of defending
themselves against mutual or foreign _Injurys_; but also be arm'd with
Force sufficient to make their Decrees or Orders effectual at home,
and the Society formidable abroad: These Advantages, I say,
sufficiently shew the _Right_ Men have to constitute _Civil
Government_, and to subject their _alienable Rights_ to the Disposal
of their Governors, under such _Limitations_ as their Prudence
suggests. And as far as the People have subjected their _Rights_, so
far their Governors have an _external Right_, at least, to dispose of
them, as their Prudence shall direct, for attaining the Ends of their
Institution; and no farther.

[Sidenote: _Corollarys for comparing the Degrees of Virtue and Vice in
Actions_.]

IX. These Instances may shew how our _moral Sense_, by a little
Reflection upon the Tendencys of Actions, may adjust the _Rights_ of
_Mankind_. Let us now apply the general Rules laid down above[76], for
comparing the Degrees of _Virtue_ and _Vice_ in Actions, in a few
Corollarys besides that one already deduc'd[77].

[Sidenote: _From Ability_.]

1. The Disappointment, in whole, or in part, of any Attempt, _Good_ or
_Evil_, if it be occasion'd only by external Force, or any unforeseen
Accident, does not vary the _moral Good_ or _Evil_; for as in _good_
Attempts, the _Moment_ of _Good_ is diminish'd or vanishes in such a
Case, so does the _Ability_ likewise: The _Quotient_ then may still be
the same. This holds equally in _evil_ Attempts. So that Actions are
not to be judg'd _good_ or _evil_ by the Events, any farther than they
might have been foreseen by the _Agent_ in _evil_ Attempts; or were
actually intended, if they were _good_, in _good_ Actions; for then
only they argue either _Love_ or _Hatred_ in the _Agent_.

[Footnote 76: See _Sect._ iii. _Art._ 11, 12.]

[Footnote 77: See _Sect._ iii. _Art._ 15. _Par._ 3.]

[Sidenote: _Interest_.]

2. Secular _Rewards_ annex'd to _Virtue_, and actually influencing the
_Agent_ farther than his _Benevolence_ would, diminish the _moral
Good_ as far as they were necessary to move the _Agent_ to the Action,
or to make him do more _Good_ than otherwise he would have done; for
by increasing the _Interest_, to be subtracted, they diminish the
_Benevolence_. But _additional Interests_, which were not necessary to
have mov'd the _Agent_, such as the _Rewards_ of a _good Being_ for
Actions which he would have undertaken without a Reward, do not
diminish the _Virtue_. In this, however, no Mortal is capable of
judging another: Nor do the Prospects of grateful Returns for Benefits
which we would have conferr'd gratuitously, diminish the _Generosity_.
This Corollary may be apply'd to the _Rewards_ of a _future State_, if
any Person conceives them distinct from the Pleasures of _Virtue_
itself: If they be not conceiv'd as something distinct from those
Pleasures, then the very Desire of them is a strong Evidence of a
_virtuous Disposition_.

3. External _Advantage_ exciting us to Actions of _evil_ Tendency to
others, if without this Prospect of _Advantage_ we would not have
undertaken them, diminishes the _Evil_ of the Action; such as the
Prospects of _great Rewards_, of avoiding _Tortures_, or even the
_uneasy Solicitations_ of violent _selfish Passions_. This is commonly
called the _Greatness of Temptation_. The Reason of this is the same
with that in the former Case. We may here also remember again, that we
are more uneasy upon the Presence of _Pain_, than upon the Absence of
_Good_; and hence _Torture_ is a more extenuating Circumstance than
_Bribes_, engaging us to _Evil_, because the Motives of private
Interest are greater.

[Sidenote: _Detriment_.]

4. The surmounting the uneasy Solicitations of the _selfish Passions_
increases the _Virtue_ of a _benevolent_ Action, and much more worldly
Losses, Toil, &c. For now the _Interest_ becomes _negative_; the
Subtraction of which increases the _Quantity_.

5. A malicious Action is made the more odious by all its foreseen
_Disadvantages_ to the _Agent_, for the same Reason: particularly,

[Sidenote: _Knowledge of Laws, how it affects Actions_.]

6. The Knowledge of a _Law_, prohibiting an _evil_ Action, increases
the _Evil_ by increasing the _negative Interest_ to be subtracted; for
then the _ill-natur'd_ Inclination must be so strong as to surmount
all the selfish Motives from the Penaltys, and all the Motives of
_Gratitude_ toward the _Lawgiver_. This is commonly call'd _sinning
against Conscience_.

7. Offices of no _Toil_ or _Expence_ have little _Virtue_ generally,
because the _Ability_ is very great, and there is no _contrary
Interest_ surmounted.

8. But the refusing of them may be very _vitious_, as it argues an
Absence of _good Affection_, and often produces a great enough Moment
of _natural Evil_. And,

[Sidenote: _Degree of Right_.]

9. In general, the fulfilling the _perfect Rights_ of others has
little _Virtue_ in it: For thereby no new _Moment_ of _Good_ is
produc'd; and the _Interest_ engaging to the Action is very great,
even the avoiding all the Evils of _War_ in a _State of natural_
Liberty, or the Penalties of Law in Civil Society.

10. But the _violating perfect_, or even _external Rights_, is always
_exceedingly evil_, either in the immediate, or more remote
Consequences of the Action; and the _selfish_ Motives, surmounted by
this _vitious_ Inclination, are the same with those in the former
Case.

11. The truest Matter of Praise are those Actions or Offices, which
others claim from us by an _imperfect Right_; and generally, the
stronger their _Right_ is, there is the less _Virtue_ in fulfilling
it, but the greater _Vice_ in violating it.

[Sidenote: _Strength of Ties_.]

A stronger and less extensive Tie of _Benevolence_, in _equal
Abilitys_, must produce a greater _Moment_ of _Good_ to the Object of
it, in _equally good Characters_, than the weaker Ties. Thus, _natural
Affection_, _Gratitude_, _Friendship_, have greater Effects than
_general Benevolence_: Or, we do more Good to Friends, Children,
Benefactors, than to Persons under no special Relation.

12. In _equal Moments_ of _Good_ produc'd by two _Agents_, when one
acts from _general Be-_* _nevolence_ alone, and the other from a
_nearer Tie_; there is greater _Virtue_ in the _Agent_, who produces
_equal Good_ from the more extensive, but less passionate Attachment;
and less _Virtue_, where there is the more violent, or passionate
Attachment, which yet produces no more. The general Benevolence
appears of itself a more amiable Principle, according to the
Constitution of our moral Sense[78], than any particular Passion.

[Footnote 78: See _Sect._ 3. _Art._ ix. _The Author all along
supposes, that no Man acts without some_ Desire, _or_ Instinct, _or_
Affection, _or_ Appetite; _that of these_ Attachments _of the Will,
some are calm and unpassionate, others are passionate; some are
extensive, and others confined to one, or to a few. The former Sort in
each of these Divisions, manifestly appears more amiable; and
consequently_, cteris paribus, _the Virtue is less, in any given
Quantity of Good done from the violent, passionate, and narrow
Attachment. A certain_ Remarker _thence argues, "That then the Virtue
is highest, when there is no Desire, Affection or Attachment at all;
or when we act solely from Reason, without any_ Affection _to any
Thing." One may retort this Reasoning in a like Case. In any given_
Momentum _of Bodies, there the_ Velocity _is greater, where there is
least_ Matter; _consequently, it is there greatest, where there is no_
Matter _at all_.]

13. But the Omission of the _good Offices_ of the stronger Ties, or
Actions _contrary_ to them, have greater _Vice_ in them, than the like
Omissions, or Actions, contrary to the weaker Ties; since our
_Selfishness_ or _Malice_ must appear the greater, by the Strength of
the contrary Attachment which it surmounts. Thus, in co-operating with
_Gratitude_, _natural Affection_, or _Friendship_, we evidence less
_Virtue_ in any _given Moment_ of _Good_ produc'd, than in equally
important Actions of _general Benevolence_: But _Ingratitude_ to a
_Benefactor_, _Negligence_ of the _Interests_ of a _Friend_ or
_Relation_, or Returns of _evil Offices_, are vastly more _odious_,
than _equal Negligence_, or _evil Offices_ toward _Strangers_.

[Sidenote: _What Offices to be prefer'd, when there appears any
Opposition_.]

14. When we cannot at once follow two different Inclinations of
_Benevolence_, we are to prefer gratifying the stronger Inclination;
according to the wise Order of Nature, which has constituted these
Attachments. Thus, we are rather to be _grateful_ than _liberal_;
rather serve a _Friend_, or _Kinsman_, than a Stranger of only _equal
Virtue_, when we cannot do both.

15. Or, more generally, since there can be no _Right_, _Claim_, or
_Obligation_ to _Impossibilitys_; when two _Actions_ to be done by any
Agent, would both tend to the Good of Mankind, but they cannot be
perform'd both at once; that which occasions most _Good_ is to be
done, if the Omission of the other occasions no prepollent _Evil_. If
the Omission of either will occasion some _new natural Evil, that_ is
to be omitted, whose Omission will occasion the least _Evil_. Thus if
two Persons of unequal Dignity be in Danger, we are to relieve the
more _valuable_, when we cannot relieve both. _Ingratitude_, as it
evidences a worse Temper than Neglect of _Beneficence_; so it raises
worse Sentiments in the Benefactor, and greater Diffidence, and
Suspicion of his Fellow-Creatures, than an Omission of an Act of
Beneficence: we ought therefore to be _grateful_, rather than
_beneficent_, when we cannot (in any particular Case) evidence both
Dispositions. If omitting of one Action will occasion _new positive
Evil_, or Continuance in a State of _Pain_, whereas the Omission of
another would only prevent some _new positive Good_; since a State of
_Pain_ is a greater Evil, than the Absence of Good, we are to follow
_Compassion_, rather than _Kindness_; and relieve the _Distressed_,
rather than increase the Pleasures of the _Easy_, when we cannot do
both at once, and other Circumstances of the Objects are equal. In
such Cases, we should not suppose _contrary Obligations_, or _Dutys_;
the more important Office is our _present Duty_, and the Omission of
the less important inconsistent Office at present, is no _moral Evil_.

[Sidenote: _The Original of Government_.]

X. From _Art._ vii. it follows, "That all human _Power_, or
_Authority_, must consist in _a Right transferr'd to any Person or
Council, to dispose of the alienable Rights of others_; and that
consequently, there can be no Government so absolute, as to have even
an _external Right_ to do or command every thing." For where-ever any
Invasion is made upon _unalienable Rights_, there must arise either a
_perfect_, or _external Right_ to _Resistance_. The only Restraints
of a moral Kind upon Subjects in such Cases, are, when they foresee
that, thro' their want of Force, they shall probably by Resistance
occasion greater Evils to the Publick, than those they attempt to
remove; or when they find that _Governors_, in the main very useful to
the Publick, have by some unadvised Passion, done an Injury too small
to overbalance the Advantages of their Administration, or the Evils
which Resistance would in all likelihood occasion; especially when the
Injury is of a private Nature, and not likely to be made a Precedent
to the Ruin of others. _Unalienable Rights_ are _essential
Limitations_ in all Governments.

[Sidenote: _Absolute Government_.]

But by _absolute Government_, either in _Prince_ or _Council_, or in
_both jointly_, we understand _a Right to dispose of the natural
Force, and Goods of a whole People, as far as they are naturally
alienable, according to the Prudence of the Prince, Council, or of
both jointly, for the publick Good of the State, or whole People;
without any Reservation as to the Quantity of the Goods, Manner of
Levying, or the Proportion of the Labours of the Subject, which they
shall demand_. But in all States this _tacit Trust_ is presuppos'd,
"That the Power conferr'd shall be employ'd according to the best
Judgment of the Rulers for the publick Good." So that, whenever the
Governors openly profess a Design of destroying the State, or act in
such a manner as will necessarily do it; the _essential Trust_,
suppos'd in all Conveyance of _Civil Power_, is violated, and the
_Grant_ thereby made void.

[Sidenote: _Limited Government_.]

A Prince, or Council, or both jointly, may be variously limited;
_either when the Consent of the one may be necessary to the Validity
of the Acts of the other; or when, in the very Constitution of this
supreme Power, certain Affairs are expresly exempted from the
Jurisdiction of the Prince, or Council, or both jointly_: as when
several independent States uniting, form a general Council, from whose
Cognizance they expresly reserve certain Privileges, in the very
Formation of this Council; or when, in the very Constitution of any
State, a certain Method of _Election_ of the Person of the Prince, or
of the Members of the supreme Council, is determin'd, and the
_Intention_ of their Assembling declar'd. In all such Cases, it is not
in the Power of such Prince, Council, or both jointly, to alter the
very _Form of Government_, or to take away that Right which the People
have to be govern'd in such a manner, by a Prince or Council thus
elected, without the universal Consent of the very People who have
subjected themselves to this Form of Government. So that there may be
a very _regular State_, where there is no universal absolute Power,
lodg'd either in one Person, or Council, or in any other Assembly
beside that of the whole People associated into that State. To say,
that upon a Change attempted in the very _Form of the Government_, by
the _supreme Power_, the People have no Remedy according to the
Constitution itself, will not prove that the _supreme Power_ has such
a _Right_; unless we confound all Ideas of _Right_ with those of
_external Force_. The only Remedy indeed in that Case, is an universal
Insurrection against such _perfidious Trustees_.

[Sidenote: _The Nature of Despotick Power_.]

Despotick Power, is _that which Persons injur'd may acquire over those
Criminals, whose Lives, consistently with the publick Safety, they may
prolong, that by their Labours they may repair the Damages they have
done; or over those who stand oblig'd to a greater Value, than all
their Goods and Labours can possibly amount to_. This Power itself is
limited to the Goods and Labours only of the Criminals or Debtors; and
includes no Right to _Tortures_, _Prostitution_, or any Rights of the
Governed which are _naturally unalienable_; or to any thing which is
not of some Moment toward _Repair of Damage_, _Payment of Debt_, or
_Security against future Offences_. The Characteristick of _Despotick
Power_, is this, "That it is solely intended for the Good of the
Governors, without any _tacit Trust_ of consulting the Good of the
_Governed_." Despotick Government, in this Sense, is directly
inconsistent with the Notion of Civil Government.

From the Idea of _Right_, as above explain'd, we must necessarily
conclude, "That there can be no _Right_, or _Limitation of Right_,
inconsistent with, or opposite to the greatest publick Good." And
therefore in Cases of _extreme Necessity_, when the State cannot
otherwise be preserv'd from Ruin, it must certainly be _just_ and
_good_ in limited Governors, or in any other Persons who can do it, to
use the Force of the State for its own Preservation, beyond the Limits
fix'd by the _Constitution_, in some _transitory Acts_, which are not
to be made _Precedents_. And on the other hand, when an _equal
Necessity_ to avoid Ruin requires it, the Subjects may justly resume
the Powers ordinarily lodg'd in their Governors, or may counteract
them. This Privilege of _flagrant Necessity_ we all allow in Defense
of the most perfect _private Rights_: And if _publick Rights_ are of
more extensive Importance, so are also _publick Necessitys_. These
Necessitys must be very grievous and flagrant, otherwise they can
never overbalance the _Evils_ of violateing a tolerable Constitution,
by _an arbitrary Act of Power_, on the one hand; or by an
Insurrection, or Civil War, on the other. No Person, or State can be
happy, where they do not think their _important Rights_ are secure
from the _Cruelty_, _Avarice_, _Ambition_, or _Caprice_ of their
Governors. Nor can any _Magistracy_ be safe, or effectual for the Ends
of its Institution, where there are frequent Terrors of
_Insurrections_. Whatever _temporary Acts_ therefore may be allow'd in
extraordinary Cases; whatever may be lawful in the _transitory Act_ of
a bold Legislator, who without previous Consent should rescue a
slavish Nation, and place their Affairs so in the Hands of a _Person_
or _Council_, _elected_ or _limited_ by themselves, that they should
soon have Confidence in their own Safety, and in the Wisdom of the
Administration; yet, as to the fixed State which should ordinarily
obtain in all Communitys, since no _Assumer_ of Government can so
demonstrate his superior Wisdom or Goodness to the Satisfaction and
Security of the Governed, as is necessary to their Happiness; this
must follow, "That except when Men, for their _own Interest_, or out
of _publick Love_, have by _Consent_ subjected their Actions, or their
Goods, within certain Limits to the Disposal of others; no Mortal can
have a _Right_ from his _superior Wisdom_, or _Goodness_, or any other
_Quality_, to give Laws to others without their _Consent, express_ or
_tacit_; or to dispose of the _Fruits_ of their Labours, or of any
other _Right_ whatsoever." And therefore _superior Wisdom_, or
_Goodness_, gives no _Right_ to Men to govern others.

[Sidenote: _Divine Government founded on Wisdom and Goodness_.]

But then with relation to the Deity, suppos'd _omniscient_ and
_benevolent_, and secure from _Indigence_, the ordinary Cause of
Injurys toward others; it must be _amiable_ in such a _Being_, to
assume the Government of _weak_, _inconstant Creatures_, often misled
by _Selfishness_; and to give them Laws. To these Laws every Mortal
should submit from _publick Love_, as being contriv'd for the _Good_
of _the Whole_, and for the _greatest private Good_ consistent with
it; and every one may be sure, that he shall be better directed how to
attain these Ends by the _Divine Laws_, than by his own greatest
Prudence and Circumspection. Hence we imagine, "That a _good_ and
_wise_ God must have a _perfect Right_ to govern the _Universe_; and
that all Mortals are oblig'd to _universal Obedience_."

[Sidenote: _Divine Justice what_.]

The _Justice_ of the Deity is only a Conception of his _universal
impartial Benevolence_, as it shall influence him, if he gives any
Laws, to attemper them to the _universal Good_, and enforce them with
the most effectual Sanctions of _Rewards_ and _Punishments_.

[Sidenote: _Creation not the Ground of God's Dominion_.]

XI. Some imagine that the _Property_ the _Creator_ has in all his
Works, must be the _true_ Foundation of his _Right_ to govern. Among
Men indeed, we find it necessary for the _publick Good_, that none
should arbitrarily dispose of the Goods acquir'd by the Labour of
another, which we call his _Property_, and hence we imagine that
_Creation_ is the _only_ Foundation of God's _Dominion_, But if the
Reason[79] of establishing the _Rights_ of _Property_ does not hold
against a _perfectly wise_ and _benevolent Being_, I see no Reason why
_Property_ should be necessary to his _Dominion_. Now the Reason does
not hold: For an _infinitely wise_ and _good Being_ could never employ
his assumed Authority to counteract the _universal Good_. The Tie of
_Gratitude_ is stronger indeed than bare _Benevolence_; and therefore
supposing two _equally wise_ and _good Beings_, the one our _Creator_,
and the other not, we should think ourselves more oblig'd to obey our
_Creator_. But supposing our _Creator malicious_, and a _good Being_
condescending to rescue us, or govern us better, with sufficient Power
to accomplish his kind Intentions; his _Right_ to govern would be
perfectly good. But this is rather Matter of curious Speculation than
Use; since both Titles of _Benevolence_ and _Property_ concur in the
_one only true_ Deity, as far as we can know, join'd with _infinite
Wisdom_ and _Power_.

[Footnote 79: See _Art._. 10. _Par._ 6. _of this Section_.]

[Sidenote: _Our Moral Sense the Effect of the Divine Goodness_.]

XII. If it be here inquir'd, "Could not the Deity have given us a
_different_ or _contrary Determination_ of _Mind, viz._ to _approve_
Actions upon another Foundation than _Benevolence_?" There seems
nothing in this surpassing the natural Power of the Deity. But, as in
the first Treatise[80], we resolv'd the Constitution of our present
_Sense_ of _Beauty_ into the _divine Goodness_, so with much more
obvious Reason may we ascribe the present Constitution of our _moral
Sense_ to his _Goodness_. For if the Deity be really _benevolent_, and
desires the Happiness of others, he could not _rationally_ act
otherwise, or give us a _moral Sense_ upon another Foundation, without
counteracting his own _benevolent Intentions_. For even upon the
Supposition of a _contrary Sense_, every _rational Being_ must still
have been solicitous in some degree about his own external Happiness:
Reflection on the Circumstances of Mankind in this World would have
suggested, that _universal Benevolence_, and a _social Temper_, or a
_certain Course_ of external Actions, would most effectually promote
the _external Good_ of every one, according to the Reasonings of
Cumberland and Puffendorf; while at the same time this _perverted
Sense_ of _Morality_ would have made us uneasy in such a Course, and
inclin'd us to the quite contrary, _viz._ _Barbarity_, _Cruelty_, and
_Fraud_; and _universal War_, according to Mr. Hobbes, would really
have been our _natural State_; so that in every Action we must have
been distracted by two contrary Principles, and perpetually
miserable, and dissatisfy'd, when we follow'd the Directions of
either.

[Footnote 80: _Sect._ viii. _Art._ 2. _Prop._ 5.]

[Sidenote: _Whence this universal Opinion of the Divine Goodness_.]

XIII. It has often been taken for granted in _these Papers_, "That the
Deity is _morally good_;" tho' the Reasoning is not at all built upon
this Supposition. If we inquire into the Reason of the great Agreement
of Mankind in this Opinion, we shall perhaps find no demonstrative
Arguments _ priori_, from the Idea of an _Independent Being_, to
prove his _Goodness_. But there is abundant Probability, deduc'd from
the whole _Frame_ of _Nature_, which seems, as far as we know, plainly
contriv'd for the _Good_ of the _Whole_; and the casual Evils seem the
necessary Concomitants of some Mechanism design'd for prepollent
_Good_. Nay, this very _moral Sense_, implanted in _rational Agents_,
to approve and admire whatever Actions flow from a Study of the _Good_
of _others_, is one of the strongest Evidences of _Goodness_ in the
Author of _Nature_.

But these Reflections are not so universal as the Opinion, nor are
they often inculcated. What then more probably leads _Mankind_ into
that Opinion, is this: The obvious _Frame_ of the _World_ gives us
Ideas of _boundless Wisdom_ and _Power_ in its Author. Such a _Being_
we cannot conceive _indigent_, and must conclude _happy_, and in the
_best State_ possible, since he can still gratify himself. The _best
State_ of _rational Agents_, and their _greatest_ and most _worthy
Happiness_, we are necessarily led to imagine must consist in
_universal efficacious Benevolence_: and hence we conclude the Deity
_benevolent_ in the most _universal impartial manner_. Nor can we well
imagine what else deserves the Name of _Perfection_ more than
_Benevolence_, and those _Capacitys_ or _Abilitys_ which are necessary
to make it _effectual_; such as _Wisdom_ and _Power_: at least we can
have no more lovely Conception of it.

_FINIS_.




Additions _and_ Corrections, &c.


_This Edition having been inadvertently cast off, before the Author's
Corrections were obtained, a few Sheets have been cancelled where it
was necessary, and some few additional Paragraphs or Notes are here
subjoined, with some few Corrections of the Expressions referred to
their proper Pages and Lines, where the Reader may make a Mark_.

P. 45. _upon the penult. Paragraph_, Note. 'Tis surprising to see the
ingenious Author of _Alciphron_ alledging, that all Beauty observed is
solely some _Use_ perceived or imagined; for no other Reason than
this, that the Apprehension of the Use intended, occurs continually,
when we are judging of the Forms of Chairs, Doors, Tables, and some
other Things of obvious Use; and that we like those Forms most, which
are _fittest for the Use_. Whereas we see, that in these very Things
_Similitude_ of Parts is regarded, where unlike Parts would be equally
useful: Thus the Feet of a Chair would be of the same Use, tho'
unlike, were they equally long; tho' one were strait, and the other
bended; or one bending outwards, and the other inwards: A Coffin-shape
for a Door would bear a more manifest Aptitude to the human Shape,
than that which Artists require. And then what is the _Use_ of these
_Imitations of Nature_, or of its Works, in _Architecture_? Why should
a Pillar please which has some of the Human Proportions? Is the _End_
or _Use_ of a Pillar the same as of a Man? Why the Imitation of other
natural or well-proportioned Things in the Entablature? Is there then
a _Sense of Imitation_, relishing it where there is no other Use than
this, that it naturally pleases? Again; Is no Man pleased with the
Shapes of any Animals, but those which he expects Use from? The Shapes
of the Horse or the Ox may promise Use to the Owner; but is he the
only Person who relishes the Beauty? And is there no Beauty discerned
in Plants, in Flowers, in Animals, whose Use is to us unknown? But
what is still more surprising, is his representing _Aristotle_ as
giving the [Greek: epaineton], for the Notion of the [Greek: kalon]:
when he has so often told us, "that the [Greek:
kalon] is prior to it; that we love Praise from others, as it gives
Testimony to, and confirms our Opinion of, our being possessed of
Virtue, or the [Greek: kalon]; and that the superior Excellency
of this, which we antecedently perceive, is the Reason why we love
Praise." _See Ethic. ad Nicom. Lib._ i. _c._ 5. and often elsewhere.
'Tis true, that the [Greek: kalon] is laudable, and, as _Plato_
asserts, all-wise, [Greek: hdy, kai phelimon], at
last; and so does every one maintain who asserts a _Moral Sense_, in
that very Assertion. And yet the Doctor has found out the Art of
making this an Objection to a _Moral Sense_.

P. 117. l. 3. _insert what follows_.

As Mr. _Hobbes_ explains all the Sensations of Pity by our Fear of the
like Evils, when by Imagination we place ourselves in the Case of the
Sufferers; so others explain all Approbation and Condemnation of
Actions in distant Ages or Nations, by a like Effort of Imagination:
We place ourselves in the Case of others, and then discern an
_imaginary private Advantage or Disadvantage_ in these Actions. But as
his Account of Pity will never explain how the Sensation increases,
according to the apprehended _Worth_ of the Sufferer, or according to
the _Affection_ we formerly had to him; since the Sufferings of any
Stranger may suggest the same Possibility of our suffering the like:
So this Explication will never account for our high Approbation of
brave unsuccessful Attempts, which we see prove detrimental both to
the Agent, and to those for whose Service they were intended; here
there is no private Advantage to be imagined. Nor will it account for
our Abhorrence of such Injuries as we are incapable of suffering.
Sure, when a Man abhors the Attempt of the young _Tarquin_, he does
not imagine that he has chang'd his Sex like _Cneus_. And then, when
one corrects his Imagination, by remembring his own Situation, and
Circumstances, we find the moral Approbation and Condemnation
continues as lively as it was before, tho' the Imagination of
Advantage is gone.

P. 148. l. 13. _Life_. Note. Cic. de Finib. lib. ii. c. 31. _Ista
commendatic puerorum, memoria et caritas amiciti, summorum officiorum
in extremo spiritu conservatio, indicat innatam esse homini probitatem
gratuitam, non invitatam voluptatibus, nec prmiorum mercedibus
evocatam, &c._

P. 161. _After this Page subjoin_,

Another Author thinks all this easily deducible from Self-Love.
"Children are not only made of our Bodies, but resemble us in Body and
Mind; they are rational Agents as we are, and we only love our own
Likeness in them." Very good all this. What is _Likeness_? 'Tis not
_individual Sameness_; 'tis only being included under one general or
specifical Idea. Thus there is Likeness between us and other Mens
Children, thus any Man is like any other, in some Respects; a Man is
also like an Angel, and in some Respects like a Brute. Is there then a
natural Disposition in every Man to _love his Like_, to wish well not
only to his individual Self, but to any other like rational or
sensitive Being? and this Disposition strongest, where there is the
greatest Likeness in the more noble Qualities? If all this is called
by the Name _Self-Love_; be it so: The highest Mystick needs no
more-disinterested Principle; 'tis not confined to the Individual,
but terminates ultimately on the Good of others, and may extend to
all; since each one some way resembles each other. Nothing can be
better than this Self-Love, nothing more generous.

If any allege, That "Parents always derive Pleasure, often Honour, and
sometimes Wealth, from the Wisdom and Prosperity of their Children,
and hence all Parental Solicitude arises;" let us recollect what was
said above; all these Motives cease upon Approach of Death, and yet
the Affection is as strong then as ever. Let Parents examine their own
Hearts, and see if these Views are the only Springs of their
Affection, and that toward the most infirm, from whom there is least
Hope.

P. 243. l. 19. _subjoin_, Some have alleged, That "however the Sight
of another's Misery some way or other gives us Pain, yet the very
feeling of Compassion is also attended with Pleasure: This Pleasure is
superior to the Pain of Sympathy, and hence we desire to raise
Compassion in ourselves, and incline to indulge it." Were this truly
the Case, the _Continuation of the Suffering_ would be the natural
Desire of the Compassionate, in order to continue this State, not of
pure Pleasure indeed, but of Pleasure superior to all Pains.

P. 273. _subjoin at the End of the first Paragraph_,

Some also object, That according to this Account, Brutes may be
capable of Virtue; and this is thought a great Absurdity. But 'tis
manifest, that, 1. Brutes are not capable of that, in which this
Scheme places the highest Virtue, to wit, the _calm Motions of the
Will_ toward the Good of others; if our common Accounts of Brutes are
true, that they are merely led by particular Passions toward present
Objects of Sense. Again, 'tis plain there is something in certain
Tempers of Brutes[81], which engages our Liking, and some lower
Good-will and Esteem, tho' we do not usually call it Virtue, nor do we
call the sweeter Dispositions of Children Virtue; and yet they are so
very like the lower Kinds of Virtue, that I see no harm in calling
them Virtues. What if there are low Virtues in Creatures void of
Reflection, incapable of knowing Laws, or of being moved by their
Sanctions, or by Example of Rewards or Punishments? Such Creatures
cannot be brought to a proper Trial or Judgment: Laws, Rewards, or
Punishments won't have these Effects upon them, which they may have
upon rational Agents. Perhaps they are no farther rewarded or punished
than by the immediate Pleasure or Pain of their Actions, or what Men
immediately inflict upon them. Where is the Harm of all this, That
there are lower Virtues, and lower Vices, the Rewarding or Punishing
of which, in Creatures void of Reason and Reflection, can answer no
wise End of Government?

[Footnote 81: _Cicero_ is not ashamed to say of some Brutes, _Videmus
indicia pietatis, cognitionem, memoriam, desideria,----secreta 
voluptate humanarum simulacra virtutum._. De Finib. lib. ii. c. 33.]




_Small Alterations designed for this Edition_.

Preface, p. 12. l. 15. Sense. _There are few Objects which are not_
thus

p. 13. l. 11. pleased with _certain complex Forms_, the Author

p. 14. l. 14. _our_ r. _some_

Treatise I. p. 3. l. 4. _Corporeal_ Substances. l. 9. raise a clear
enough Idea

p. 5. l. 5. from bottom of the Page. Objects _including_ many

p. 6. l. 21. there _appears no_ Ground

p. 17. l. 19. This _may seem probable, and hold pretty generally_.

p. 22. l. 15. _minuter Parts, even of those_ which

p. 26. l. 19. _frequently_ a perfect

p. 40. l. 19. dele _in a moral Sense_.

p. 47. l. 6, 7, of the Note, it is _below our Notice_. But

p. 100. Note upon l. 16. See _Cicero de Nat. Deor_. lib. i. c. 27.

p. 109. l. 15. this _pleasant Self-Approbation_; much

p. 122. l. 5. from bott. who have scarce _any Dispositions of Piety,
or thoughts of future Rewards_; and abhor

p. 130. l. 5. Conduct, _that Virtue never fails to give Pleasure_.
When

p. 136. l. 8. from bott. be any _real Good-will or Kindness_ at all,
&c.

p. 150. l. 10, from bott. r. _Virtuous_

p. 152. l. 4. _dele_ only. Read, approve _only such_ Actions

p. 157. l. 10, from bott. no _ultimate_ Good-will. l. 8, from bott.
from _such_ Good-will

p. 161. l. 11. No; say others, Children, &c.

p. 166. l. 12. they _generally_ appear

p. 169. l. 10, 11. _dele_ speculative

p. 172. l. 15. the _manifest_ publick Evil

p. 179. l. 26. for VII. r. VIII.

p. 180. l. 23. _dele_ VIII.

p. 183. l. 8. _dele_ IX.

p. 184. l. 5. for X. read IX.

p. 219. l. 16. descend _more strongly and constantly than it_ ascends

l. 22. left it _more_ to Reflection

p. 220. l. _penult_. read _a Multiplicity_

p. 228. l. 10. No; _we should distrust all Pretenders to such a
Temper_, and hate

p. 235. l. 17. This _strengthens the natural Modesty in civiliz'd
Nations, as Habits and Education improve it_; so that

p. 237. l. 14. Associations _of_ the Disaffected or Factious

p. 239. l. 10. imagined _morally evil_

p. 242. l. 15. Compassion or _Curiosity_ might

p. 275. l. 16. Wills. _Or that his Will is conformable to his Will_

l. 26. called _morally good_

p. 278. l. 19. State of Nature, r. _Natural Liberty_. Line ult. _idem_

p. 283. l. 11. that _the Power of transferring_ such Rights

p. 299. l. 16. Since no _violent Usurper_ of Government

l. 22. out of _regard to a publick Good_, have

p. 301. l. 18. malicious, _as some ancient Hereticks did_, and

p. 302. l. 20. Temper, _with a suitable Course of Actions_.




Directions _to the_ Bookbinder.


_In the_ Preface, _Cancel from_ p. 15 _to the End_.

_In the_ Work, _Cancel from_ p. 9 _to_ 17. _From_ 29 _to_ 39. _From_
57 _to_ 59. _From_ 173 _to_ 179. _From_ 185 _to_ 203. _From_ 217 _to_
219. _From_ 221 _to_ 223. _From_ 253 _to_ 255. _From_ 287 _to_ 293.




[End of _An Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas
of Beauty and Virtue_ by Francis Hutcheson]
